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And whether Prometheus were a name for 
Chance, Destiny, a Plastick Nature, or 
an Evil Daemon; whatever was design'd by 
it; 'twas still the same Breach of 
Omnipotence. 
Shaftesbury, The Moralists 1709. 
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PLAYING WITH FIRE: MARY SHELLEY, ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING 
AND THE REWRITING OF THE PROMETHEUS MYTH 
According to Greek myth, Prometheus stole fire from the gods 
and gave it to mortals, either in the form of culture, or by 
using it to bring to life the clay people he had made. 
Margaret Homans distinguishes between what she calls 
literal and figurative creativity (1980:223). The woman who 
is a mother, creating literally and naturally with her body, 
and who writes, creating figurative offspring, cultural 
texts, makes use of the Promethean fire in both of its 
possible senses. Only the literal, however, is seen by 
patriarchal culture as her rightful realm. Myth dictates 
that only men received from Prometheus the fire of 
figurative creativity, of language. The "woman writer," 
then, as a kind of contradiction in terms, is forced to 
suffer the conflict imposed by her choice to create, within 
the dictates of culture, with both forms of "fire." 
In the face of this conflict, Alicia Ostriker suggests 
that the project of wom~n writers should be to rewrite the 
mythology of patriarchy and, in doing so, take from men 
their sole possession of the fire of culture, an ownership 
which empowers them in the same way as it did Zeus, the 
_tyrannical father-god. In her words, women writers should 
become "thieves of language, female Prometheuses" 
(1986:211). 





as both figuratively revising the theft by re-telling its 
story, and as literally re-enacting the myth itself by 
rebelling against the limitations of androcentrism. The 
"female Prometheus" re-creates the myth, bringing together 
the definitions of herself as woman and writer in what I 
argue is a disruptive and positive form of hybridism. 
Chapter One examines the mythic complex which surrounds 
the figure of Prometheus, concentrating on the versions by 
Hesjod, Aeschylus and Ovid, and considers the implications 
of its appropriation and revision by women writers. 
Chapters Two and Three analyse the way in which two 
nineteenth century women, Mary Shelley and Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning, rewrote the myth. Shelley's novel, Frankenstein, 
presents two Promethean figures - the scientist and the 
monster - and so embodies the ambivalence of its author. 
Barrett Browning translated Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound 
twice, and then wrote Aurora Leigh, a hybrid novel-poem in 
which the central character is female, a writer and 
Promethean. 
I argue that both succeeded, in different ways, in 
liberating language from the limitations of the patriarchal 
symbolic, so carrying out a theft of linguistic "fire," the 
act recognised by Shaftesbury as a ''Breach of Omnipotence." 
v 
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THE REWRITING OF FIRE 
Yes! I am satisfied to 'take up' with the blind 
hopes again .... It is as well to fly towards the 
light, even where there may be some fluttering and 
bruising of wings against the windowpanes, is it 
not? 
Elizabeth Barrett to Robert Browning, 
5 March 1845. (1:35) 1 
There is a moth named after the thief-of fire. It is the 
giant North American silk moth, Callosamia promethea. 2 Like 
all moths, no doubt, it is fascinated by light, and will 
batter itself to death against a lightbulb or a lighted 
window, or will circle the flame of a candle, coming closer 
and closer until, inevitably, it is burned up by the fire. 
Naming the moth after Prometheus probably refers to the 
creature's fascination with fire, rather than to the Titanis 
theft. In Greek, the name "Prometheus" means foreknowledge. 
If the moth were truly Promethean, it would know that the 
fire was going to burn it, but nonetheless let its desire 
for the incandescence of the flame override its instinct for 
self-preservation. Perhaps this is true. Perhaps moths know 
that they are mortal and ephemeral, and to die ignited in 




Or perhaps they are not in this sense Promethean, but 
rather fly at the flame in the blind hope that its beauty, 
its fascinating warmth and its brightness, are all there is. 
Perhaps the moth does not know that fire can burn until it 
is too late. 
Prometheus stole fire from Zeus, ruler of the gods. 
Alicia Ostriker finds in the myth a fitting metaphor for the 
project of women writers: the theft undermined Zeus's 
ownership and control of fire. In the same way, women need 
to liberate language from its possession by a culture which 
defines itself by silencing women. They should carry out 
what Ostriker calls 
a vigorous and varied invasion of the sanctuaries 
of existing language, the treasuries where our 
meanings for "male" and "female" are themselves 
preserved. (1986~211) 
This theft constitutes not only a revision of the myths 
themselves, but potentially a far more radical re-creation: 
Where women write strongly as women, it is clear 
· that their intention is to subvert and transform 
the life and literature they inherit .... 
revisionist mythmaking ... is a means of 
redefining both woman and culture. (ibid.) 
·rn doing so they re-enact and re-interpret the Titan's 
audacious theft, becoming "thieves of language, female 
Prometheuses" (ibid.). 3 
I intend to explore the far-reaching implications of 
this metaphor. ostriker names women writers, specifically 
those who actively rewrite and revise the myths of 
patriarchal culture, after Prometheus. If the project of 
women writers is to revise existing myths, what is t.he 
\ 
purpose of naming them after an existing mythical figure, 
and so situating them within the patterns they wish to 
disrupt? The name of Prometheus carries with it a complex 
and multifaceted act of transgression the effects of which 
can extend beyond and so subvert the system which first 
produced the myth. 
3 
Further, this naming includes the writers themselves in 
the work of their writing: as the attribution of the name 
implies, in revising mythology they actually become 
revisions of the myth. When the figure in question is that 
of Prometheus, this is emphasised: in rewriting the myth, 
Mary Shelley and Elizabeth Barrett Browning· also re-enact 
it. The writer becomes the literal embodiment of the new 
myth, which in turn figures her act of writing it. 
This conflation of the figurative and the literal has 
significant implications for women writers. The 
contradictory and ambivalent relationship between women and 
writing may be attributed, as Margaret Homans suggests, to 
the dependence of symbolic language on the dualism between 
the figurative signifier, present in discourse, and the 
literal referent, necessarily absent (1986:4). Lacan's myth 
of the origin of language identifies the masculine and the 
phallus with the signifier, required to be present in the 
speech of the subject, and the feminine, particularly the 
maternal, with the desired but absent referent, the object 
of discourse. The child's entry into the symbolic is, for 
Lacan, simultaneous with the rejection of the mother and the 
language of the imaginary, in which referent and sign were 
indivisible. Identifying the feminine with the literal, 
then, makes it a contradiction in terms for a woman to be a 
writer. 
4 
But, as Homans points out, Lacan's child is implicitly 
male. The daughter's acquisition of language is different in 
that the incest taboo is not so harshly imposed: it is less 
urgent for the daughter to reject the mother. This results 
in a less clearcut distinction between the literal and the 
figurative, leaving women free to retain something of the 
"presymbolic language" which, rather than re-presenting what 
has been removed, the absent mother, enacts her literal 
presence. As Homans puts it, the "daughter therefore speaks 
two languages at once" (1986:13). 
The distinction between these "two languages" needs to 
be clarified, for the literal may itself be defined in 
different.ways. As the "presymbolic communication" that 
occurs between mother and child before the entry into the 
symbolic, the literal is non-referring (Homans 1986:13). The 
ideal communication of the presymbolic dyad is based on 
presence, sameness, rather than difference, but in this form 
is of little use to the woman writer, being identified with 
the non-signifying and inarticulate, which in cultural terms 
is the silent. Juliet Mitchell's analysis of Freud's myth of 
the origin of culture suggests that any apparent escape from 
the binary structures ·of patriarchy is simply an acceptance 
of culture's exclusion of women, for "the freedom of women 
is pre-historic, pre-civilization" (1974:366). Ironically, 
this implies that rejection of the patriarchal symbolic is 
the same, for the female child, as accepting her defined 
place in androcentric culture: symbolic absence. 
Taking on the voice of the speaking subject within the 
symbolic, then, means denying the literal: "to be in the 
place of the speaking subject is to remove herself from 
her pleasure in 'woman's place' in the object world" (a 
world where the mother is not required to be absent, or 
dead) and trying to find a compromise between the literal 
and the symbolic is for the woman "bearing ... the word of 
her own silencing" (Homans 1986:36). In writing, women are 
required either to use the literal, so risking 
unintelligibility and finally silence, or to reject their· 
first language and identify entirely with the figurative. 
It is possible, though, as Homans shows, to find 
strategies for transferring the literal into the symbolic, 
for working within this duality of language. It is 
paradoxical that the ''literal" as defined from within the 
symbolic, is what functions as a sign: to mean something 
literally is to use reference at its primary level, without 
any mediating figuration within language. The symbolic's 
devaluation of the literal ("To take something literally is 
to get it wrong" [Homans 1986:5]) is thus also ambiguous. 
5 
The balancing or mediation of opposites required by the 
woman's double language can be fruitful, then: the ambiguity 
of the role of the literal - either as the "non-sense" of 
non-symbolic language or as the recalling of a sign's 
referent into the realm of the symbolic, by literalisation -
has the· potential to be a space for the return and 
acceptance of the absent mother, rather than a site of the. 
painful ambivalence imposed on women writers by androcentric 
culture. 4 
6 
The two central female characters connected with the 
myth of Prometheus, Pandora and Io, reveal the contradictory 
nature of the literal in their disparate linguistic 
implications. I intend to show that both offer analogie~ for 
the simultaneous rewriting and re-enactment of the myth by 
Shelley and Barrett Browning. Both writers find ways of 
collapsing the duality between the figurative and the 
literal, revealing the possibility that women writers can, 
without abandoning their identity as women, be present in -
and possessed of - the language which all patriarchal 
mythology, including Lacan's, bestows on men. 5 
The revisionist theft is.not easily accomplished; as 
the naming of the moth after Prometheus overtly emphasises 
only one aspect of the figure, so Ostriker's naming of women 
writers elides that same aspect: the danger of fire, the 
likelihood of being burnt. Prometheus was punished for his 
audacity. This was not something which nineteenth century 
women writers could forget for long, as Barrett Browning's 
letter reveals. Her certainty is modified even before she 
reaches the end of her sentence: "It is as well to fly 
towards the light ... , is it not?" 
I intend to explore the implications of Ostriker's name 
for the "thieves of language" by taking her metaphor 
literally and exploring the extent to which Shelley and 
Barrett Browning, both in what they wrote and in the act of 
writing, re-created the myth of Prometheus. 
To do this it is necessary first to examine the 
existing myth, to find the recondite connections between the 
moth and the thief, the woman and the writer. These reside 
in fire, that mutable element which underlies all versions 
of the myth and which, shifting with each interpretation, 
can either exacerbate or resolve the contradictions facing 
the woman writer. 
HESIOD: THE TRICKSTER AND THE FIRST WOMAN. 
But afterwards Zeus who gathers the clouds said to 
[Prometheus) in anger: 
"Son of Iapetus, surpassing all in cunning, 
you are glad that you have outwitted me and stolen 
fire - a great plague to you yourself and. to men 
that shall be. But I will give men as the price 
for fire an evil thing in which they may all be 
glad of heart while they embrace their own 
destruction." 
So said the father of men and gods, and laughed 
aloud. 
Hesiod, Works and Days (7) 6 
7 
The "evil thing" whose. invention so amuses the father god is 
the first woman. This aspect of Hesiod's early version of 
the myth is usually ignored in later revisions, yet naming 
woman as the "price for fire" is, as I shall show, both a 
foreshadowing of Lacan's linguistic myth and a potentially 
fertile site for feminist reconstructions of the origins of 
language. 
In Hesiod's Theogony and Works and Days, Zeus is 
presented as the wise and just ruler of the gods, while 
Prometheus is a trickster, threatening Zeus with the 
disruption of his divine order. At the initiation of the 
sacrifice ritual which mediates between gods and mortals, 
Prometheus tricks Zeus into choosing the bones of the 
sacrificial ox, rather than its flesh. ·The angry god 
responds by withdrawing from man the use of fire, also 
called "the means of life" (Works and Days, 5). This makes 
all sacrifice impossible and so breaks the bond between men 
and gods. But the Titan steals it back. 
In the Theogony, Zeus punishes Prometheus by binding 
him to a "pillar" and having an eagle come each day to eat 
his.liver, which grows back each night. Hesiod tells that 
Prometheus will be set free eventually, by Herakles, but 
"not without the will of Olympian Zeus who reigns on high" 
(in Kirk 1974:136). According to Hesiod's version, thenr 
Zeus succeeds in subduing Prometheus, and is justified in 
doing so. 
8 
The consequences which man suffers for receiving the 
stolen fire are given greater emphasis by Hesiod than 
Prometheus's punishment. In Works and Days, Hesiod calls the 
first woman Pandora ("all-endowed") because she brings with 
her a jar containing "gifts" from the gods: suffering, 
misery, toil and disease, as well as one redemptive factor, 
hope (9). 
In the Theogony, the first woman is nameless and, 
instead of carrying evil in a separate vessel, is literally· 
its embodiment and its source: "from her are the destructive 
race and tribes of women, who dwell as a great misery among 
mortal men" (in Kirk 1974:140). 
Hesiod's myth of the creation of woman has a number of 
implications for the aspirant "female Prometheus." Like Eve, 
Pandora is created second, after man and god have drawn up 
the·conditions of their relationship (in this case the · 
practice of sacrifice)., and so excluded from the origins of 
the social order. She is also instrumental in man's fall 
9 
from a perfect state: before she is made, "the tribes of men 
lived on earth remote and free from ... ills and hard toil 
and heav~ sicknesses~ (Works and Days, 9). Unlike Eve, 
though, she is not tempted by a source of evil external to 
herself and the deity, but is rather created expressly to 
bear that evil, whether in a jar or, as the mother of the 
"destructive race ... of women", in her body. In Hesiod's 
particularly misogyn'istic version of the myth, the existence 
of woman is inseparable from the suffering of man (I do not 
use the term generically) for his acceptance of stolen fire 
from Prometheus. 
What exactly is this fire? It is the "means of 
(civilized, human) life'' (5). Used for burning ~acrificial 
offerings, it is the medium of man's communication with the 
gods, with his source of universal and moral significance. 
As the cooking fire, it represents man's power to transform 
nature at will, to take his environment in its "raw" state 
and suit it to his needs, make it more digestible. Hence, 
the gift of fire cannot be separated from that of culture.' 
Language also plays a significant role in the myth. In 
Works and Days, after Pandora has opened the jar, 
... d.iseases come upon men continually by day and 
by night, bringing mischief to mortals silently; 
for wise Zeus took· away speech from them. So is 
there no way to escape the will of Zeus. (9) 8 
Zeus has the power to bestow and to rescind both fire and 
speech, but the effect of the af.flictions appears to be 
----~---·- --·-· ---
10 
strengthened, rather than weakened, by their loss of speech. 
This connection between ·~mischief" and silence, jux~aposed 
as it is with Hesiod's final affirmation of Zeus's wisdom 
and power, reveals - ironically, perhaps - the understated 
but crucial role of language in the myth. 
This is strengthened by the explicit association of 
women with language. The creation of Pandora is described in 
detail: Zeus tells Hephaestus to 
mix earth with water and to put in it the voice 
and strength of human kind, and fashion a sweet, 
lovely maiden-shape, like to the immortal 
goddesses in face .... (Works and Days, 7) 
The blacksmith of the gods, who usually creates with fire~ 
makes woman from inanimate and natural matter - mud - which 
he brings to life by adding "voice and strength." This 
connects the original (and originary) voice with the breath, 
the source of life only l~ter shaped into speech. As 
potential speech, this first "voice" may be likened to the 
literal language of the presymbolic. 
Hermes is then told to "put in her a shameless mind and 
a deceitful nature" (7): 
[he] contrived within her lies and crafty words 
and a deceitful nature at the will of loud 
thundering Zeus, and •.. put speech in her. (7-9) 
The "evil" brought by woman is thus inseparable from her 
speech. Rather than being denied access to language, Pandora 
is given two _forms of it, the prelapsarian and implicitly 
non-symbolic "voice" which already exists among men as the 
"strength of humankind," and a new language which is 
characterised by its capacity for lies and deceit, f6r mis-
representation. 
11 
The idea of woman as "price for fire" in Hesiod then 
' ' 
both presages and contradicts Lacan's myth of language 
acquisition. In the latter, she is the "price'' for language 
in that, as the mother, she is relinquished in exchange for 
entry into the symbolic. She becomes the ultimate object, 
the eternally unattainable referent, both feared and 
desired, but above all absent. 
For Hesiod, conversely, it is the presence of· woman 
that man must suffer as the price for accepting the fire of 
culture. The language Pandora speaks as the "evil" mother is 
defined not by the absence of the referent, but by its 
possible non-existence, and the mother is the speaking 
subject rather than the referent of the sign. In Hesiod, the 
literal "voice" is associated with the period preceding 
culture, before sin and punishment by god (the "no" of the 
father?), but woman is not connected primarily with this 
kind of language. Pandora, rather than being relegated to 
the desired but absent prelapsarian world, is centrally 
present in the new order. Man is made speechless by Zeus, 
but Pandora introduces the possibility of taking the 
symbolic to its logical conclusion: fiction, or even 
fantasy, where the referent may be non-existent. At this 
point language begins once more to resemble the non-
ref ererttiali ty of the literal. To this extent, the myth has 
radical implications for feminist linguistics: Pandora 
conflates the "voice" of the presyfubolic language with "lies 
and crafty words," the subversion of reference, the 
signification of what does not exist. This misrepresentation 
is the basis of fictive and poetic language, of the positing 
12 
of alternative realities, and of changing existing ones. The 
figure of Pandora, which is specifically designated as 
maternal, is thus the site of the first potential subversion 
of language, the ability, as Ostriker puts it, "to subvert 
and transform ... life and literature" (1986:211). 
There are connections between Pandora and Prometheus in 
Hesiod's version of the myth. Not only does she provide the 
consummation of the Titan's gift as well as the ambivalence 
that is to characterise it but, as dissembler and bringer of 
ambiguous gifts to man, she resembles him. Pandora may be 
seen as the first "female Prometheus." It is ironic that the 
most conservative and misogynistic version of the myth 
should have the potential _to be_ the most positive for the 
woman writer. 
It is small wonder that the connection between 
Prometheus and Pandora is usually suppressed. In Aeschylus's 
later version of the myth, all that remains of Pandora is 
the one gift she brings which is not apparently a 
punishment. 9 In Prometheus Bound, the Titan gives man two 
things: one is fire, the other is hope. 
AESCHYLUS: THE HERO, THE TYRANT AND THE COW 
IO: 
Who of the company of the unfortunate endure - ah 
me! - sufferings such as mine? ... declare it to 
the hapless, wandering virgin. 
PROMETHEUS: 
I will tell thee plainly all that thou art fain -to 
know, not weaving riddles, but in simple language, 
even as is right to open the lips to friends. 
Behold, I whom thou seest am Prometheus, that gave 
fire unto mankind. 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound (vv.601-612) 10 
13 
Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound is probably the most 
influential version of the myth. The tragedy is one part of 
a trilogy, the rest of which, apart from a few fragments, 
has been lost. Its setting and central issue is Zeus's 
punishment of Prometheus in which, as in Hesiod, the Titan 
is staked to a rock. The implications of the punishment, 
however, are examined in far more detail in the later work. 
Aeschylus depicts Zeus as a tyrant, harsh, unforgiving 
and unjust, and Prometheus is far more than a simple 
trickster; he is noble and heroic, suffering for the sake of 
mankind, whom he has saved from Zeus's plan to destroy them. 
Prometheus gives man "blind hope" (v.252), the ability to 
act in the belief of significance, undaunted by the 
apprehension of his inevitable death~ This makes possible 
the use of .the gift of fire, which is now defined as 
culture: "every art possessed by man comes from Prometheus" 
(vv.505-6). The gift explicitly includes language, 
"combining of letters, cr,eative mother of the Muses' arts, 
wherewith to hold all things in memory" (vv.460-3). George 
14 
Steiner, in explicating the connection between language and 
fire, "between the live twist of flame and the darting 
tongue" mentions a significant addition to the role of 
language in the myth: 
Prometheus is the first to hold Nemesis at bay by 
silence, by refusing to disclose to his otherwise 
omnipotent tormentor the words which pulse and 
blaze in his own visionary intellect. (1975:230) 
Prometheus knows the secret of Zeus's possible downfall, but 
he refuses to reveal it. As well as giving language to man, 
then, he makes use of it himself to threaten the god's 
power, for deliberate silence is a significant manipulation. 
of the possession of language. 
Further, the words of Prometheus's secret knowledge 
are, like the foresight for which he is named, given to him 
by his mother, Themis, also called Gaia, the earth goddess: 
Mother Nature. While Gaia is an overtly silent and immanent 
force in the drama, her.role is implicitly an active one. 
Conacher describes her function in the "divine sticcession" 
of the first Greek gods (1980:6). She undermines the rule of 
each. Ouranos, the sky god, fathers in her the first beings 
to live on earth, but will not let them escape from her 
womb. She enables Kronos to castrate his father from within 
her body and he becomes the first ruler. Gaia then helps 
Rhea give birth to Zeus in secret so that he can overthrow 
Kronos. She also aids Zeus in the war by providing him with 
his weapons, thunder and fir~ (in the form of lightning), 
and by giving Prometheus prophetic advice which he uses to 
help Zeus. As in the figure of Pandora, linguistic power_ is 
linked to the female: 
Full oft my mother Themis, or Earth (one form she 
hath but many names), had foretold to me the way 
in which the future was fated to come to pass -
how it was not by brute strength and not through 
violence, but by guile that those who. should gain 
the upper hand were destined to prevail. (vv.211-
215) 
15 
Again, when Zeus ungratefully punishes Prometheus, she gives 
her son the secret which empowers him, "the oracle recounted 
to me by my mother" (v.873-4). 
Nature, then, is presented as a force controlling and 
potentially transcending culture, limiting the rule of each 
god before he becomes too strong. The identification of the 
female with nature, and with power, has conflicting 
consequences for the woman writer, for nature is still 
opposed to the culture in which women, want to write. Like 
Pandora's possession of language, Gaia's power is ambiguous. 
It is potentially a source of strength, a way to disrupt 
culture's exclusion and silencing of women but, at the same 
time, identification with nature means embracing that 
exclusion. This problem is emphasised in the figure of Io. 
Io .is a mortal maiden who is desired by Zeus. She is 
turned into a cow (either by the god, or by his jealous 
wife, Hera - Aeschylus is ambiguous about which), and made 
to wander the world pursued by a stinging fly. Unlike 
Prometheus's suffering, hers is not a punishment for a 
misdeed, but the result of her passive physical 
desirability. Aeschylus emphasises her virtue, her innocence 
and purity. She is powerless over her beauty and its 
consequences. Her association with the cow, a symbol of 
natural fertility, is fitting, for even in her restored 
form, her function is biological reproduction. 
16 
Charles Segal explicates the difference between Io and 
Prometheus, saying their meeting is like "the confrontation 
of oral and w~itten mentalities'' and that Prometheus, in 
telling Io to write down "on the recording tablets of [her] 
mind" (v.789) what he tells her about her future, "provides 
her with both the temporal and spatial organisation that the 
ordering of reality by writing makes possible" (1986:85). As 
well as developing the connection between the gift of fire 
and writing, the interchange between Prometheus and Io 
distinguishes between the masculine hero's possession of 
symbolic language and the female victim's lack of it. 
Prometheus promises to tell everything plainly to Io, "in 
simple language," without "weaving riddles." From the point 
of view of the symbolic, this means as literally as 
possible. While the stated reason for.this is his 
sympathetic friendship, it also implies her inability to 
understand anything more complex, and carries with it the 
patriarchal symbolic's devaluation of the literal, either as 
apparently simple signification or as the non-referential 
presymbolic. The fact that Io is bovine makes explicit the 
connection between the woman as object of desire (in this 
case, Zeus's lust) and her positioning within nature, 
essentially excluded from the subjective, figurative and 
symbolic use of language. The inarticulate cries that 
precede many of her speeches represent her alienation from 
the symbolic and her links with the presymbolic form of the 
literal. Kott describes Io's entrance, "running onto the 
stage m6oing and wailing" (1974:30) and, as I shall show, 
Ovid considers her difficulty in using symbolic language 
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after the curse is lifted. 
Aeschlyus's version of the myth, like Hesiod's, 
introduces both positive and negative elements for the woman 
writer. Io and Gaia, unlike Pandora, are inseparable from 
nature and the inarticulate, despite being potentially 
powerful. 
To appropriate language, then, the woman writer must 
rather identify with Prometheus because of his possession of 
the symbolic. But in doing so she has to confront another 
danger: the tragedy is pervaded with the pain that is the 
consequence of rebellion against Zeus, of the certainty that 
to be Prometheus means to be - figuratively at least - burnt 
by the stolen fire. 
The conflict between the symbolic use of language and 
the association of women with its opposite is most 
explicitly highlighted in Ovid's version of the Prometheus 
myth. 
OVID: THE OTHER FIRE 
Prometheus on his crag 
Heard the cry of the wombs. 
He had invented them. 
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Then stolen the holy fire, and hidden it in them . 
... the vulture was the revenge of those wombs 
To show him what it,was like.... ' 
Ted Hughes (1979:83) 
Prometheus, son of Iapetus, took the new-made 
earth which, only recently separated from the 
lofty aether, still retained some elements related 
to those of heaven and, mixing it with rainwater, 
fashioned it into the image of the all-governing 
gods. Whereas other animals hang their heads and 
look at the ground, .he made man stand erect, 
bidding him look up to heaven, and lift his head 
to the stars. So the earth, which had been rough 
and formless, was moulded into the shape of man, a 
creature till then unknown. 
Ovid, Metamorphoses (31) 11 
For Ovid, Prometheus is not just man's benefactor, but his 
creator. To this extent fire, implicit in the "elements 
related to those of heaven," has been transmuted from 
culture - figuratively the essence of humanity - to the 
"spark of life" used in the literal creation of human 
beings. 
As the variations of the myth attest, fire has the 
potential to be an all-encompassing image, a natural 
phenomenon which the human mind may imbue with many and 
potentially conflicting meanings. In terms of the complex of 
myths connected with Prometheus, fire begins as. the gift 
given to Zeus by Gaia: the figure of feminine nature 
provides the masculine god with a natural element to use as 
a weapon. The first meaning of fire, then, is related to 
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man's need to explain 11ghtning - the most natural form of 
fire? - and the terrifying conflagrations it could cause. 
Fire is to some extent controlled by suggesting that nature 
deliberately gave it to the deity, and that the frightening 
occurrences of natural fire have a reason: the god is angry. 
The first direct involvement of man with fire is 
through the sacrifice ritual. As I have suggested, this 
symbolises communion between gods and men, expanding the 
interpretation of Zeus's use of. lightning: the god lets man 
have some control of fire. The step from burning the 
sacrificial animal to cooking it for food is an obvious but 
c~ucial one: not only is fire controlled by man, but it is 
now used as a means of domesticating other parts of nature 
·for man's use. The connections between fire and nature shift 
as man's developing culture begins to use Gaia's gift to 
control her domain. 
Aeschylus's reading of fire as culture, removing all 
connections with its natural source, is a logical 
development from this. Fire, in domesticating nature, has 
itself been further demarcated and controlled; the alien and 
inexplicable natural force, a physical element which 
literally burns when present, has gradually been absented. 
The word for it, its signifier, is made into a symbol, a 
figure for something else. Fire is no longer present in 
Aeschylus as a literal flame, and Zeus's punishment of 
Prometheus is not literally by the burning thunderbolt. 
"Fire" as a signifier is, in its mythical journey into the 
patriarchal symbolic, purified of the natural and made to 
refer to the referent at the root of all reference: culture. 
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Man's ambivalence about this exclusion of nature is 
revealed in introducing Prometheus as the thief: there is 
something illicit and presumptious about culture. The thief, 
neither god nor man, is made (created, and obliged) to take 
responsibility for this. He is both benefactor and 
scapegoat. 
Ovid's reading of the myth both extends and brings full 
circle the significance of fire. Prometheus has gone from 
being culpable trickster, spoiling with no apparent 
motivation man's relationship with the god, via magnanimous 
hero, defender of man's rights, to the very creator of man. 
Fire has become the source of life. But this does not imply 
a return to nature; fire here is not literal, but further 
emptied of all but symbolic meaning. Literal fire has been 
appropriated by culture, and is now use~ to usurp Gaia's 
role in creation: the masculine creator becomes the source 
of life, of the spark giving significance to the inanimate 
and silent muddy matter of nature. And because of 
Prometheus's role, man is created different from, and 
implicitly better than, nature. Animals "look at the ground" 
while man "look[s] up to heaven, and lift[s] his head to the 
stars," denying his connection ~ith the earth, with the 
literal, with the mother. 
In the Metamorphoses, Io and Pandora are no longer 
associated with Prometheus. He creates alone, the new 
revision of his myth having ingested both the language of 
Pandora and the biology of Io, in the same way that the 
symbolisation of fire incorporates and so denies the 
function of the feminine. The division between the natural 
referent and the cultural sign is complete; man's theft of 
fire from nature has been accomplished. 
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The woman writer is, as female, identified with nature 
and so excluded from the symbolic order which has 
appropriated the image of fire. As a writer, she attempts to 
position herself as a subject within that order. The 
conflict between the two roles is echoed by the duality of 
fire: the woman who writes must seize these opposites and 
weld them together into a new entity, or she will herself be 
consumed. 
WOMEN'S FIRE, WRITERS' FIRE: THE MOTH AS MONSTER 
[University education for women] would result in 
the creation of a new race of puny, sedentary and 
unfeminine students, ... and would disqualify 
women for their true vocation, the nurture of the 
corning race .... 
J.Fitch "Women in the Universities," 
Contemporary Review 1890 (in Morgan 1989:161) 
A learned girl is one of the most intolerable 
monsters of creation. 
Saturday Review 1870 (in Morgan 1989:158) 
A "new race" of "intolerable monsters": women writers. These 
nineteenth century opinions emphasise, in their choice of 
metaphor, the perceived conflict existing between the two 
uses for fire found in the Prometheus myth, the figurative 
creativity that produces writing and the literal creativity 
that produces children. 
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Margaret Homans introduces these terms in Women Writers 
and Poetic Identity: 
Motherhood is literal creativity. It must be 
difficult for a woman to choose as her vocation 
poetry [writing] or figurative creativity, perhaps 
to the detriment of the maternal vocation with 
which she is expected to be contented, because the 
values associated with motherhood and with poetry 
are so very different. (1980:223) 
Elaine Showalter quotes a review of Barrett Browning's work 
which reveals the use of this contradiction to discourage 
women from pursuing figurative creativity: 
It is very doubtful if the highest and richest 
nature of woman can ever be unfolded in its home 
life and wedded relationships, and yet at the same 
time blossom and bear fruit in art or literature 
with a similar fulness. What we mean is, that 
there is so great a draft made upon women by other 
creative works, so as to make the chance ~ery 
small that the general energy shall culminate in 
the greatest musician, for example. The nature of 
woman demands that to perfect it in life which 
must half-lame it for art. ·A mother's heart, at 
its richest, is not likely to get adequate 
expression in notes and bars, if it were only for 
the fact that she must be absorbed in other music. 
(Gerald ~assey 1862, in Showalter 1977:76) 
Massey (or his plural speakers who try so hard to say what 
"we mean") does not even consider that the woman will let 
her choice of art be "to the detriment" of motherhood, still 
less that literal and figurative creativity could ever co-
exist with success. His "that" which supposedly perfects 
woman's nature "in life," which is in turn carefully opposed 
to "art," is literal creativity, this "other" music that 
deafens - handicaps - women who attempt figurative creation. 
His objections are couched in admiring terms: his repetition 
of "richness" and the use of nature imagery for both kinds 
of creativity support his assumption that the "nature of 
II • 11 woman w1 leave her a nhalf-lame" artist, making her 
foolish even to try, when she is, he implies, already so 
bounteous ~ creator. 
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For the woman writer the· conflict between. the two kinds 
of creativity underlies her ambivalence, her fear that as a 
"female Prometheus" she will be punished for her ambition, 
either with failure in one or other sphere or, if she dares 
to do the unmentionable and succeed, with worse. She is 
. "expected" to be contented .with literal creativity because 
she is associated with nature~ with Gaia who gave up fire to 
. . 
the warring god and who is ignored beneath the feet of men 
gazing up at the unattainable objects of their fi~urations. 
If she writes successfully she appears to take on the values 
of those men and so becomes a dual creature, a hybrid of the 
two gendered forms of fire, not quite a man and not quite a 
woman. She is reviled as a monster. 
The implications of the chosen epithet are significant. 
There is a kind of writing by women which was, especially in 
the nineteenth century, quite acceptable: there was a kind 
of self-effacing, sentimental verse which could be indulged 
as harmless by patriarchal society. Showalter discusses the 
way Victorian critics found new terms which classified those 
women writers who were not threatening as something other 
than genuine creative artists, 
[straining] their ingenuity for terms that would 
put delicate emphasis on the specialness of women 
and avoid the professional neutrality of "woman 
writer": authoress, female pen, lady novelist .... 
(1977:74) 
Women who revealed intellectual powers beyond what was 
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acceptable for the "proper lady" could not be treated with 
such patronising politeness. They were attacked as monstrous 
for, instead of writing within their given role as ladies, 
they, as women, actively appropriated the figurative. 12 ·For 
this reason, they were perceived as abnormal, and immensely 
threatening. The monster inspires not only loathing, but 
terror. The descriptions used to attack such women writers 
unwittingly reveal their power, as Rufus Griswold, the 
compiler of Women Poets of America (1848), shows in his 
distinction between the acceptable poetess and 
the ruder sort of women ... casting aside their 
own eminence [moral], for which they are too base, 
and seeking after ours [intellectual], for which 
they are too weak, they are hermaphroditic 
disturbers of the peace of both. (in Ostriker 
1986:31) 
A description using these terms is clearly intended 
pejoratively. In fact; however, what the definition implies 
is not unlike what women writers strive for. They need to be 
abnormal, if to be normal is to be the silent lady, the 
domestic angel whose vocation is exclusively the 
reproduction and "nurture of the coming race." To be a 
monster is to be that which is "out of the common course of 
nature. 1113 To sidestep that "common course" is precisely the 
ambition of the woman writer. To be "herma.phrodi tic," an 
appalling mixture of the categories of male and female, is 
to "disturb the p~ace," to confound the structures which 
connect woman with nature and man with culture. 14 
In the Prometheus myth,·Io is the most overtly 
monstrous female character, ~ woman in animal form. But in 
the terms of the quotations above, she is not a monster at 
all; being half-woman and half-cow does not really 
contradict culture's definition of women. As I have 
suggested, the bovine Io is simply a literalisation of the 
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"normal" vocation imposed on woman: reproduction. 
Aeschylus's association of her with simple, literal language 
is apt, as is her destined impregnation by Zeus and 
mothering of the race of Egypt. At the same time, she is 
powerful: like Gaia, her connection with nature makes her a 
potent threat to the symbolic order. This is emphasised by 
her role as progenitor of Herakles, the eventual rescuer of 
Prometheus. 
Io represents the possibilities and the disadvantages 
inherent in literal creativity. In Ovid's Metamorphoses, she 
and Prometheus no longer have anything to do with each 
other, but Io remains an imag-e of feminine desirability and 
virtue. At the end of her suffering, 
Io resumed her former appearance, and became what 
she had been before. The hairs fell from her body, 
her horns disappeared, .... Nothing remained of her 
cowlike shape, except her snowy whiteness .... She 
was afraid to speak, in case she should low like a 
heifer, and timidly attempted the words which she 
had not used for so long. Now she is a goddess of 
high renown.... (48-9) 
. ' . Ovid retains her innocence, her connection with presymbol1c 
language (the heifer's lowing, her fear of speech), and her 
ultimate power, a function of her literal creativity. 15 
The woman writer has the option to deny the duality 
which makes her monstrous. She can choose to embrace her 
role as literal creator, but this role, taken to its logical 
conclusion, will make her speech unintelligible and writing 
impossible. It will finally silence her. 
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She also has the option of rejecting entirely her 
connection with Io and the maternal, writing_instead like a 
man. This strategy was frequently used in. the nineteenth 
century, as ·my discussion of Barrett Browning will reveal. 
But c~6osi~g to be a writer rather than a woman invdlves as 
much of a denial as the reverse. Rather than embracing the 
monstrous dual role of the woman writer-, she tries to 
-
conform to the 'normal role of the male. The woman writer can 
try to bea "male Prometheus," striving for an unassailable 
subject pos1tion.within the symbolic and denying her early, 
literal langU~g~, her connection with the power of Gaia. 
A third .. alternative is to confront the dissonance 
between literal-and figurative. ~rometheus is a useftil model 
in this regard because; as both the source of human culture 
and the'literal creator of man, he embodies both uses for 
fire. But his role as creator, as I have suggested, is 
problematic. The separation of fire from its natural source· 
sidesteps·rather than resolves the conflict of the woman 
writer. The att::r:ibution of literal·creativity to a male 
figure simply denies it to the female. He is still the "male 
Prometheus,"·a £brerunner in this £orm Of Shelley's Victor 
Frankenstein) whose disastrous masculine mothering of his 
creature reve·a1s the danger of· "cons urning"- the female. 
The woman writer, in rewriting the myth of Prometheus, 
has to find ~;way to deconstruct the gendering of "fire," 
not only by combining its figurative and, the literal f6rms, 
but by avoiding the masculine gendering of that combination. 
She has to try ·and confound the binary defi~ition of gender 






her.capacity to be a "hermaphroditic disturber of the peace" 
may be found. 
Prometheus is hybrid not only because of his conflation 
of the literal and figurative across the interpretative 
history of the myth, but because inherent in his character 
as trickster and as Titan is his role as mediator. Neither 
god nor man, he is situated between Olympus and the world of 
mortals. Kott analyses the Titan's role in relation to "The 
Vertical Axis" of the classical cosmos: fathered by God and 
mothered by Earth, he is a "personification . . r. and 
instrument ... of mediation in the universe split into the 
above and the below" (1974:xiv-xv). He links the divine and 
the base. 
For Kott, mediation is finally impossible in the 
Aeschylean universe: Prometheus Bound ends with the Titan 
hurled downward into Tartarus. Perhaps for the "female 
Prometheus," engendered by the Gaia of nature and the Zeus 
of culture, there may be a better chance. The source of this 
lies in her own hybridism. Capable of drawing together both 
motherhood and authorship, she is more monstrous than the 
Titan because of culture's initial marginalisation of the 
maternal. 
This conflation of the intellectual and the bodily, of 
what culture labels respectively as superior and inferior, 
has the disruptive potential Bakhtin explores in his 
analysis of the "grotesque" and the "carnivalesque." The 
carnival, where opposites meet and freaks are displayed, is 
governed by the logic of the ungovernable, 
the peculiar logic of the "inside out" ... ,-of the 
"turnabout," of a continual shifting from top to 
bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies 
and travesties, humiliations, profanations, comic 
crownings and uncrownings. (Bakhtin 1968:11) 
Stallybrass and White ·point out the potential for 
transgression inherent in the carnivalesque; its logic 
disrupts that which supports any stable hierarchy: 
[s]ymbolic polarities of high and low, official 
and popular, grotesque and classical are mutually 
constructed and deformed. (Stallybrass and White 
1986:16) 
This construction of dualisms is similar to the Lacanian 
model of (masculine) identity, the rejected being as 
important, symbolically, as what is retained. Stallybrass 
and White, writing on transgression, say that they set out 
to "explore the contradictory constructions of bourgeois 
desire ... a construction of subjectivity.through totally 
ambivalent internalizations of the ... carnivalesque" 
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( 1986: 21) . 16 Subjectivity and desire are constructed through 
the rejection of the low, the popular, the grotesque - as 
well as the literal, the natural and the female - and at the 
same time deformed by the insistent presence of what is 
rejected. The woman writer embodies both of the poles which 
the subject within culture needs to keep in a state of tense 
separation. The result of this mediation is a transgression 
like that of the carnivalesque, a "symbolic inversion" of 
the classical axes of higher and lower, culture and nature, 
male and female (Stallybrass and White 1986:18). 
The monstrous woman writer, positioned as she is in the 
anomalous no-man's land between culture and nature, has the 
capacity for such transgression. She is not simply base, but 
a mixture: her aberration is that she is a hybrid, offspring 
and evidence of the union of high and low. Stallybrass and 
White give a useful definition of the hybrid as: 
the grotesque ... formed ... through a process of 
hybridization or inmixing of binary opposites ... 
such that there is a heterodox merging of elements 
usually perceived as incompatible, ... and [which] 
unsettles any fixed binaryism .... (1986:44) 
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This ability to unsettle the binary is the crux of the woman 
writer's subversive potential: because the hybrid makes 
impossible the simple exclusion of one term or the other, it 
undercuts at its source the dualistic basis of the symbolic, 
producing 
new combinations and strange instabilities in a 
given semiotic system. It therefore generates the 
possibility of shifting the very terms of the 
system itself, by erasing and interrogating the 
relationships which constitute it. (ibid.58) 
The cultural contradiction between being a woman and being a 
writer which is the source of the woman writer's ambivalence 
can paralyse her, forcing her to choose one side of the 
duality or the other. It can also become a way into a space 
where, .refu$ing to be relegated to either pole of the binary 
opposition, she stubbornly remains in the middle, 
incorporating the figurative and the literal. In this way, 
she has the potential to threaten the very constitution of 
the patriarchal symbolic. In her enactment of the Promethean 
theft, the woman writer rebels, like the Titan, against the 
construction of the cosmos in which she has been positioned: 
she has the capacity to carry out a symbolic inversion, or 
even a disruption of the symbolic itself. 
The word ''hybrid" is etymologically associated with the 
"Greek hybris, insolence, overweening," the source of the 
term hubris. 11 The hybrid carries with it the meaning of the 
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Promethean, the heroic audacity which enabled the Titan to 
steal from the gods. At the same time, hubris is associated 
specifically with the tragic hero: so arrogant a disruption 
of universal order seldom goes unpunished. The woman 
writer's identification with Prometheus, then, carries with 
it the likelihood of puni~hment; it is hard to play with 
fire without being burnt. 
The "female Prometheus" must carry off her stolen fire 
in the spirit of the moth which flies into the flame, either 
with the Titan's prescience, choosing to embrace known 
suffering, or with "blind hope," the ~ift that is not fire, 
but facilitates its theft, the only one of Pandora's gifts 
allowed to remain in later versions of the myth. In either 
case she needs to convert that punitive definition of 
herself into the source of her subversion, taking the 
literal fire that was the source of Zeus's thunderbolts and 
using it for her own purposes. 
Thus, Ostriker's decision to name
0
the woman writer a 
"female Prometheus" ca~ries a re-evaluation of monstrosity. 
In the nineteenth century, women writers who threatened to 
bring about the return of the rejected and repressed mother 
(and her disruptive and threatening language) were 
transgressing and could be made to suffer. But the critics 
of women writers, in defining them as monsters, unwittingly 
discovered a prophetic synonym for the name later given by 
Ostriker. 
MONSTROUS MOTH(ER)S, MOTHERING MONSTERS. 
I bid my hideous progeny go forth and prosper. 
Mary Shelley, 
Introduction to Frankenstein ( 60 )18 
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The monstrous woman writer, in embodying the hybridisa~ion 
of opposites, is potentially the mother of monsters: 
resulting from the abnormal combination of her dual capacity 
for natural sexual reproduction and symbolic, textual, 
production, the writing she engenders is the realisation of 
her transgression. 
Rabelais's Gargantua is born through the ear of his 
mother, Gargamelle (Rabelais 1534; 1955:52). This recalls 
Athena's birth from the head of Zeus .(Hamilton 1940:29) but, 
significantly, Gargantua is the product of his mother's womb 
and not her head. Unlike Athena, he is not the result of a 
mental conception. Gargamelle's labour is described as a 
grotesque intermingling of defecation and parturition and, 
as Bakhtin points out, the birth is "completely 
carnivalesque" because the "child does not go down, but up" 
(1968:~~6). Gargantua's inversion of the accepted bodily 
hierarchy of childbirth threatens the divisions between the 
lower body and the head. similarly, a woman's textual 
off spring has the potential to disrupt the hierarchy of 
culture and nature, writing and bearing children. 
The childbirth metaphor has frequently been applied to 
figurative creativity. Susan Stanford Friedman discusses the 
implications of this for women writers . 19 She examines the 
effect which the gender of the writer using the metaphor has 
' 
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on its function. Male writers' descriptions of their work as 
childbirth serves to emphasise the difference between 
literal and figurative creativity and to privilege the 
latter; their "brainchilds'' (Friedman 1989:81) are, like 
Athena rather than Gargantua, entirely the products of the 
writers' minds. When used to refer to the creativity of the 
woman writer, by comparison, the metaphor 
represents a defiance of historical [rather than 
biological] realities and a symbolic reunion of 
mind and body, creation and procreation. 
(Friedman 1989:80) 
.It facilitates the fusion, as Friedman explains it, of the 
tenor (writing) and the vehicle (childbirth) of the metaphor 
(ibid.). This (con)fusion of culturally defined opposites is 
the project of the "female Prometheus," for she can give 
birth to both books and babies. 
The character in the Prometheus myth who is associated 
with both forms of creativity at the same time as 
maintaining her female and particularly maternal identity, 
is Pandora, who produces both the figurative and the 
feminine. Like the texts of the woman writer, she is both 
transgressor and consequence of transgression. As the first 
"female Prometheus," she is the first of a new race of 
"intolerable monsters" (epigraph, 23 above). 
Pandora is usually only remembered for her careless 
release of misery into an edenic male world. Her role as 
first mother is forgotten, because He~iod's tale of the 
origins of childbirth was supplanted by versions which, like 
Ovid's, attempted to reduce the importance of the female. 
This is another case of what Homans recognises as the 
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absence, or death, of the mother in myths about the 
initiation of culture. Pandora is ~upplanted by her male 
counterpart, Prometheus. In producing the work of the 
"female Prometheus," then, women writers recall not only the 
Titan, but also the monstrous mother of the new race who 
brought together in her first form the two aspects of 
creativity which patriarchal culture has tried to separate 
ever since. 
The hybrid is most threatening when it emphasises its 
monstrosity, when the work of a writer makes explicit her 
capacity for literal creativity. One strategy for doing this 
is when, instead of producing overtly original (and so, in 
culture's terms, masculine) writing, she allows the 
reproductive to impinge, revealing the femaleness in her 
Prometheanism and recalling the disruptive presence of the 
maternal. Shelley and Barrett Browning recall not only the 
presymbolic reproductive force revealed in their writing 
strategies, which I shall examine in more detail presently, 
but also a more literal mother figure,, Mary Wollstonecraft. 
Wollstonecraft was the biological but absent mother of 
Mary Shelley (whose birth caused her death), and both 
Shelley and Barrett Browning read her work while 
adolescents.w Her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
written in 1792, contains a detailed argument in support of 
the education of women. For this reason it was cal1ed, in a 
review, a "scripture, archly framed for propagating 
w[hore]s" (in Gilbert and Gubar 1979:222). Wollstonecraft 
also wrote two novels. Laurie Langbauer finds in the 
unfinished second one, Maria, or the Wrongs of Women, a 
remarkably sophisticated confrontation with the duality of 
being a woman writer, of the ability to use both symbolic 
and literal language (in Mellor 1988b:208-219). 
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Wollstonecraft's heroine, Maria, is imprisoned in an insane 
asylum. In the midst of the unintelligiple speech of the 
mad, she writes a letter to her daughter. Langbauer 
discusses the significance of this: the mother's writing 
emphasize[s] that naming, language, is not just 
the function of the transcendental signifier, the 
phallus, but also of the undertones and side 
effects of signification - its babble and noise 
that won't leave it alone, that call it into 
question .... The mother ... is half-man .... 
Locating the woman writer with motherhood, 
difference, and division a1lows her to make sense 
- and nonsense - within the paternal order, to 
work within it without completely accepting its 
rule. ( 1988b: 215) 
Maria finds a special language for her daughter, one which 
can include the "undertones" of signification, the devalued 
presymbolic language. Yet she is an active subject within 
the symbolic even while she recalls the language of her role 
as mother, a language not far, perhaps, from the "lowing" of 
Io. The marginalised context in which Maria's narrative is 
written is fitting. The background noise is unmediated, 
nonsymbolic and non-sensical, but certainly not meaningless: 
groans and shrieks [which] were no insubstantial 
sounds of whistling winds ... modulated by a 
romantic fancy, ... but such tones of misery as 
carry a d~eadful certainty directly to the heart. 
(1976:75) 
Maria's letter is never finished, for its author died giving 
birth to her own daughter. Both narratives collapse into 
rough notes and ellipses, but both contain the possibility 
of simultaneously using and subverting the symbolic order. 
Wollstonecraft's novel expresses the "dreadful certainty" of 
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"misery" which is the dark side of her audacious writing. At 
the same time she confronts in her manipulation of the 
language of suffering (which is as "beyond words" as the 
"misery" which her own daughter was to describe thirty years 
later) the hopeful potential of the mother's language. 
Shelley and Barrett Browning both make use of the 
disruptive role of the maternal in their writing. Instead of 
recognising the literal by addressing daughters, though, 
both make reproduction part of the texts themselves, 
extending the results of Wollstonecraft's experiments. 
One way to include the literal and subvert culture's 
definition of it is by rewriting. The revision of existing 
material is a kind of hybridisation, for it both alludes to 
and transforms the female Side of the woman writer's 
conflict. Literal creativity consists of the faithful, 
duplicative reproduction of the father's child and his name. 
When this is united with the originary powers of figurative 
·creativity, a monstrosity results, a re-creation, a "new 
race" imbued with life stolen from the "common" one. 
The methods of re-creation used by Shelley and Barrett 
Browning differ considerably, but both give figurative birth 
to hybrid progeny, conceived of the contradiction between 
the writer's mind and the woman's body. Both writers may be 
called translators, in that they carry across, from one form 
and.meaning to another, the myth of Prometheus. 
Homans discusses translation as a means of combining 
the literal and the figurative, showing how "the unwomanly 
selfishness of writing" can be converted into the seemingly 
harmless and hence subversive "selflessness of transmission" 
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(1986:31). Lori Chamberlain, in her analysis of the 
historical use of childbirth metaphors in the description of 
translation, perceives that "binary logic defines 
translation as ... an archetypal feminine activity" 
(1988:467). George Steiner makes a similar point: 
There is a strain of.femininity in the great 
interpreter, a submission, made active by 
intensity of response, to the creative presence. 
(1975:26) 
The apparently selfless submission of translation, read by 
Steiner as a natural passivity inspired to action and 
simultaneously subdued by"the originary creation of another, 
seems to be an acquiescence in the reproductive role. It is 
only partially so. The connection between translation and 
interpretation implies the impossibility of pure 
"selflessness." The translator, although "archetypally 
feminine" and so the object rather than the subject of 
symbolic discourse, is nonetheless never absolutely 
objective. Translation is still writing, its writer still 
its subject .. In the same way that presymbolic literal 
language is retained as well as transformed when used by a 
subject within the symbolic, so the reproduction of texts 
remains a textual rather than a sexual act: the woman only 
seems to be carrying out the silent transmission of 
another's creation. The complex re-creation facilitated by 
the work of female translators is thus another form of 
hybridism. 
Stallybrass and White examine the connections between 
authorship and transgression, discussing the a~bivalent 
rejection of the hybrid in Augustan literature. Pope's 
/ 
Dunciad attacks writers who did not actively separate the 
domains of the high and the low, whose works were a danger 
to both "literary and social marks of difference" 
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(1986:114), for such transgression has linguistic 
consequences: "grotesque hybridization threatens to subvert 
the distinction between words and genres" (1986:115). The 
hybrid writer's subversion extends to language itself, and 
the woman writer, although not the same kind of monster as 
the male writers attacked by Pope, is even more threatening 
because of her inherent hybridism. 
Shelley and Barrett Browning use different modes of 
"translation," but both produce new and disruptive forms 
from existing material. Frankenstein is the revision of a 
number of versions of the myth, incorporating as it does two 
Promethean figures, each of which embodies different aspects 
of the Titan. It may be seen as a translation of the myth 
into the genre of the novel and is, at the same time, the 
creation of a new genre - Brian Aldiss calls it "the first 
real novel of science fiction" (1986:51) - and of a new and 
particularly modern myth. Barrett Browning's revisions of 
Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound are linguistic translations, 
carrying it from Greek into English. Her later work, Aurora 
Leigh, which I shall argue is a further rewriting of the 
myth, is also a hybrid, a Victorian novel-poem. Both writers 
carry the myth from its position within androcentric culture 
into a new place, one occupied by the woman writer whose 
revision of the myth hybridises it, through her own 
' 
paradoxical identity, into a subversion of its source. 
Barrett's translations were criticised for their 
38 
"grotesque peculiarities," for "it was rarely her pleasure 
to be faithful to her text" (Stedman 1904:121-2). Her 
translations were, by implication, monstrous. No wonder the 
critic hurried to domesticate her, purifying the feminine of 
its cortnection with writing: "The chief element in the life 
of Elizabeth Barrett was her marriage" (132). The 
translations, like Mary Shelley's novel and Victor 
Frankenstein's creature, are Barrett's "hideous progeny," 
the illegitimate offspring of the union of nature and 
culture, the literal and the figurative. 
Walter Benjamin describes "The Task of the Translator" 
r 
as 
to release in [the translator's] own language that 
pure language which is under the spell of another 
[trapped beneath what he calls the burden of 
meaning], to liberate the language imprisoned in a 
work in his re-creation of that work. (1970:80) 
The ideal of setting language free resembles Ostriker's call 
for women writers to carry out an "invasion of the 
sanctuaries of existing language," of that place where the 
symbolic binary dualism at the root of ~atriarchal culture 
is kept as the possession of men (1986:211). Benjamin states 
that language is liberated in the absolutely literal 
translation (1970:78). The lit~ral, in his sense, is not a 
clear symbolic connection between sign and referent (which 
would require the translation to be faithful to the literal 
meaning of the original), but is rather the presymbolic 
literal: for him, the ideal translation carries only the 
letter of the original, at the cbst of signification. This 
literal, then, is very close to that of the maternal. 
Benjamin establishes that there are two aspects of an 
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original text which can be translated from the source 
language into the target language, and absolute fidelity to 
either one of them necessitates a failure or an infidelity 
in translating the other (1970:74). All translation.(and 
this may be said of all rewriting) is different from 
reproduction to this extent: the translator/mother can never 
be entirely effaced, entirely "selfless." 
While neither Shelley nor Barrett Browning carry out 
literal translations in Benjamin's sense, the disruptive 
effect such rewriting can have on language and the metaphors 
used to describe them provide a useful paradigm for the 
woman writer's theft. 
The two aspects of a text which can be translated are 
the "intended object," the meaning, or signified, and the 
"mode of intention," the signifier (Benjamin 1970:74). 
These, respectively, are carried by the sentence or 
proposition, and the word, the basis of syntax. Paul de Man, 
in his analysis of the English and French translations of 
Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," retranslates them 
as meaning-bearing "logos" and structuring "lexis" (De Man 
1985:39). Fidelity to the .logos, then, implies emphasis on. 
the communication of meaning, while the literal translation 
is true to the lexis or its component, the letter; that is, 
its concern is not -so much with figuring the absent referent 
as with the present linguistic surface. The absolutely 
literal translation is non-symbolic in the same way as the 
pre-symbolic "non-sense" talk between mother and child is: 
presence is all. 
This liberation of language from figuration, Benjamin 
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writes, "completely demolishes the theory of reproduction of 
meaning and is a direct threat to comprehensibility"; he 
describes such work as ''monstrous" (1970:78). Absolute 
fidelity to the lexis of the original necessitates 
infidelity to, even complete denial of, the logos. This 
recalls the disruption by the hybrid of the terms of a 
semiotic system: the literal/body's invasion of the 
figurative realm reveals, by causing a collapse of meaning, 
an inherent weakness in the symbolic. Translation discloses 
the difference between man's word and the divine Logos of 
originary creation where for once, according to myth 
(Judaeo-Christian, Greek and Lacanian), the figurative and 
the literal were inseparable. Translation can reveal that 
the woman writer's acquiescence in reproducing the products 
of ~en is potentially deceptive and unreliable, that the 
symbolic is man's ultimately feeble attempt to own and 
domesticate the fire of nature. 
Translation, then, as the carrying across by women 
writers of a text or myth from one form, genre or language 
to another, has the potential to disrupt the logic which 
deprives women of an empowered relationship to language. 
Instead of choosing one side of the literal/figurative 
opposition, women writers can bring the two into both 
conflict and conjugality. As Benjamin's theory implies, the 
resulting hybridism makes possible the dislocation of 
language from the structures of the symbolic, the same 
structures which deny it to women. Translating, or 
rewriting, is a means for women writers to give birth to 
monstrous texts which, like Gargantua, invert the 
hierarchies of culture and connect, inseparably, the womb 
and the head. 
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But this theoretical discussion of potential conceals 
the immensity of the transgression, and the likelihood that 
it cannot, be carried out completely, or with ease and 
impunity. The woman writer, especially in· the nineteenth 
century, would not have been surprised if the consequences 
of· her theft of language were more cataclysmic for herself 
than for culture. The ambivalence that characterises the 
writing of both Shelley and Barrett Browning is partly a 
result of this fear. 
AMBIVALENCE AND THE DANGER OF BURNING 
At the top of the pole stuck on to the pyre he 
could make out a scroll listing the sixteen 
charges of which Jeanne had been found guilty: 
Jeanne. who called herself the Maid. a liar. a 
pernicious woman. a betrayer of the people. a 
soothsayer. superstitious blasphemer of God. 
presumptuous. unbeliever in the faith. boastful, 
idolatrous, cruel. dissolute. invoker of devils. 
apostate. schismatic. heretic .••. The stake was 
too high for the executioner to strangle her .•.. 
So Jeanne had to endure inhuman torments to the 
end. 
Michel Tournier, Gilles and Jeanne (1983:34) 
The fate of Joan of Arc, and innumerable suspected witches: 
purification by burning, the cauterisation of the monstrous 
by man's Jovian use of fire for punishment. While Tournier's 
account of Jeanne's immolation is fictitious, the litany of 
her sins is relevant, for it defines her as Promethean. She 
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is presumptious, a rebel against God, and she does not 
believe in the dictated faith. Above all, though, she has 
dressed as a man and "called herself the Maid." Her first 
transgression, her hubris, is that she is a hybrid, and for 
that she burns. 
The nineteenth century labelling of women writers as 
monstrous has its roots in that litany, or similar ones, and 
the public condemnation of the "pernicious woman" is 
equivalent to burning at the stake. The fear of burning 
remained in the ambivalence of the woman writer. Her 
rewriting was not only a way of changing the world she found 
herself in; it was also her response to that potentially 
crippling ambivalence. She did not only rewrite patriarchal 
mythology. She also rewrote her own revisions. Shelley 
revised her 1818 version of Frankenstein in 1831 and Barrett 
Browni'ng called her second translation of Prometheus Bound 
an "expiation" of the "sin" of the first. As I shall show, 
there were times when their "blind hope" or their heroism 
failed, and fear made them go back and try to hide their 
most audacious re-creations, to make retractions - the 
promethea moth may waver in its flight. 
To sum up, then, Alicia ostriker's naming of women 
writers as "female Prometheuses" positions them in such a 
way that they re-create themselves as well as the myth they 
revise. The contradiction which underlies women's exclusion 
from culture is that between the literal and the figurative. 
The definition of the "woman writer" is read by the 
patriarchal symbolic as a contradiction in terms.-The hybrid 
"female Prometheus" enacts this contradiction and in doing 
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so can revise the name and the dualism which is the source 
of her ambivalence. The monster, as writer and as text, as 
mother -and as child, reveals the positive potential in what 
has usually been interpreted by existing mythology as 
loathsome and dangerous. 
When the Promethean the~t of language is complete, 
those apparent contradictions will be recognized for the 
fertile space they provide. Meanwhile, though, "monster" 
remains associated with the horrifying and, like the 
presymbolic maternal, is marginalised rather than embraced 
by culture. 
The theft of fire bears with it the danger of burning: 
the father-gods are still insistent that Pandora-must be 
ignored and Prometheus must be punished. Mary Shelley and 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning flew towards the flames with 
immense courage in their aspirations to be both female and 
Promethean. or to put it another way, in striving to steal 
fire from its safe place within patriarchal culture, they 
risked being struck by Zeus's lightning. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CREATION AND REMORSE: MARY SHELLEY 
I remained, while the storm lasted, watching its 
progress with curiosity and delight. As I stood at 
the door, on a sudden I beheld a stream of fire 
issue from an old and beautiful oak which stood 
about twenty yards from our house; and so soon as 
the dazzling light vanished, the oak had 
disappeared, and nothing remained but a blasted 
stump .... I never beheld anything so utterly 
destroyed. 
Shelley, Frankenstein (89) 
Mary Shelley began writing Frankenstein in June 1816. She 
was eighteen years old, had eloped with Percy Shelley and 
was living with him, her stepsister and the poet Byron in 
Europe .. She had already given birth to two illegitimate 
children and by the time she finished the novel in May 1817, 
she was five months pregnant with a third. 
As many critics have pointed out, the acts of literal 
and figurative creation could hardly have failed to inform 
each other in Shelley's case and the novel, her "hideous 
progeny," is frequently read as a "birth myth," her 
rewriting of motherhood. 1 At the same time, the novel is 
about writing, about birthing texts. 2 The writing of the 
."female Prometheus," as I have argued, is a kind of 
translation, the act of carrying material from one form and 
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interpretation to another, and is often done in two 
contradictory ways: the audacious revision of existing 
(patriarchal) myths, and the subsequent self-censoring 
"expiations." The two kinds of rewriting can also be 
simultaneous, for the revised figure can be re-created 
twice, split and doubled. Shelley and Barrett Browning use 
the myth to test their own identification with the Titan: 
both Frankenstein and his creature, both Romney and Aurora 
Leigh, embody different aspects of the myth and of the 
ambitious act which their authors carry out. 
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Writing in the company of two of the great poets of the 
Romantic period, Mary Shelley could not have avoided the 
influence ·of the dominant literary tradition of her time, 
that of the subjectivity of the Romantic poet. As Homans has 
pointed out, the Romantic tradition implicitly emphasises 
the contradictions of being a woman and a writer, for the 
female was both reified and adored as the other, the silent 
material which the poet articulates and endows with meaning. 
The death of the mother, in terms of Lacan's myth of the 
subject's entry into the symbolic, was perhaps most 
effectively - and most damagingly for the woman writer -
institutionalised by the Romantic poets. 3 
Mary Shelley's response to her situation could not be 
anything but ambivalent. Mary Poovey discusses Shelley's 
contradictory position between the revolutionary lives and 
beliefs of her parents and future husband and the increasing 
social approbation of self-effacing feminine behaviour: she 
was caught in the "collision between what we now call the 
'Romantic' model of originality and the 'Victorian' model of 
feminine domesticity" (Poovey 1984:116). Shelley'~ writing 
reflects this particularly complex biographical situation. 
She began her adulthood with an escape from the strictures 
which usually limited the life of the nineteenth century 
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woman. Paradoxically, but not surprisingly, much of her life 
appears to have been spent regretting her transgression and 
trying to return to the insignificance ahd safety she had 
rejected. 
Frankenstein embodies this ambivalence. If Victor 
Frankenstein, thief and creator, is read as Prometheus, then 
the monster is man, recipient of his gift. If the monster is 
seen as Promethean for rebelling against his creator, then 
Frankenstein, attempting to use the power of lightning, 
becomes Zeus. As a ''female Prometheus," Shelley interpreted 
her own position as writer-creator and wo~an-rebel in 
relation to the order against which she had already 
transgressed. The figures of Frankenstein and his rebellious 
creature offer a critique of Romanticism that is at once 
conservative and revolutionary. Its voice is that of the 
''proper lady," warning against all egocentric ambition, and 
also that of the "female Prometheus" who not only 
appropriates the subjecthood of the patriarchal symbolic, 
but threatens culture with the subversive potenti&l of her 
hybridism. In her revision of the Prometheus myth, then, 
Shelley enacts a double response to culture. She works 
within the Romantic tradition even while she explores the 
dangers of doing so. 
In 1831 a revised version of the novel was published; 
by this time, Shelley was thirty-three. Percy was dead; as 
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were all three of the children whose gestations coincided 
with that of. Frankenstein. She was back in England, living 
with her one surviving son .. Her journal entries describe her 
feelings at the time: 
·I have felt my solitude more entirely but never 
more painfully than now. I seem deserted - alone 
in the world - cast off .... (18 December 1830) 
God grant that after these few months are elapsed 
I may be able to take refuge in Nature & solitude 
from the feverish misery of my present 
existence .... I am miserable beyond words. 
(8 March 1831) 4 
This is the voice of the despairing Prometheus, bound to the 
rock and suffering for his defiance. The punishment consists 
of solitude, of being "cast off" from the world of human 
relationships, yet Shelley also yearns for the relief of 
"Nature & solitude," for an escape implying death. For 
Shelley, isolation is ambiguous, meaning both pain and 
solace. This is connected with the double meaning of the 
literal: from the point of view of culture, the woman writer 
is punished by being excluded, labelled as monstrous and so 
banished to the margins of normal society. Her refusal to 
relinquish either her figurative creativity or her 
connection with the literal positions her in an ambiguous 
mediating realm. This is not in the circle of the family, 
the cosy hearth where the literal (as both fire and 
fertility) is entirely domesticate~ by figuration, but in 
what culture perceives to be a lonely and frightening place 
on the edge of the symbolic. At the same time as resenting 
her loss of community, Shelley longs to escape society 
altogether and enter willingly the presymbolic maternal 
dyad, the unambivalent union with nature which, preceding 
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entry into the figurative, is entirely free from culture's 
definition, from the father's law. Shelley's expression of 
her suffering contains the paradox of the "female 
Prometheus" and reveals the consequence of doing so: 
solitude, whether as isolation within culture or complete 
exclusion in the form of the silence of death. In either 
case, her misery is indeed "beyond words." In her 
presentation of the suffering of Frankenstein and his 
monster, Shelley explores the possibilities for resolving 
the crisis of the woman writer. In re-creating two 
Prometheuses, Shelley explores her own ambivalent position. 
The 1831 revision of Frankenstein reveals Shelley's 
increasing conservatism, based on the remorse she feels for 
her earlier transgressions (both social and literary, if the 
two can be separated). Victor Frankenstein's development is 
rewritten in such a way as to reduce his responsibility at 
the same time as increasing the sense of his sin. Poovey 
points out that Shelley both enhances the destruction caused 
by his egotistical ambition, and at the same time makes him 
more the victim of his own externally determined and 
inevitable transgression than the wilful and deliberate . 
sinne~ (1984:133-4). To this extent, in revising his 
character, Shelley does not so much reconsider the myth as 
emphasise her existing reading: the revisions "extend her 
criticism of imaginative indulgence, already present in the 
1818 text, and direct it more pointedly at the blasphemy she 
now associates with her own adolescent audacity" (Poovey 
1984:133). Her "modern Prometheus" is made more harmful but 
less heroic and less culpable: to the extent that she 
identified with him, this is consistent with Shelley's 
changed position. 
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Significantly, though, the narrative of the monster, 
which I shall argue contains the more positive aspects of 
Shelley's Prometheanism, is virtually unchanged in the 
second version. 5 Shelley's declaration at the end of her 
1831 introduction that she has left "the core and substance 
[of the novel] untouched" (60), a statement Mellor calls a 
"defensive lie" (1988a:176), is truer than it appears: at 
the centre of the novel the monster is given a voice, and 
this voice is hardly modified at all. 
I shall not carry out a close analysis of the 
differences between the two versions of Frankenstein. Apart 
from the fact that a number of such analyses have already 
been done, the revisions emphasise an ambivalence already 
present in the 1818 edition: Shelley's dual re-creation of 
the Prometheus myth exists as much within the novel as 
between versions. 6 For this reason, I shall use as the basis 
of my reading the 1831 edition, which emphasises the woman 
writer's fear and guilt in its revisions of Frankenstein, at 
the same time as retaining tier defiance in the form of the 
monster. The Promethean creator is subjected to the power of 
the author, while the rebellious Promethean creature 
escapes. 
It is in relation to Victor Frankenstein that Shelley's 
fear of her own punishment finds its most active expression. 
The character of Frankenstein may be seen as the Promethean 
Romantic hero taken literally, and taken to its logical 
conclusion, by a repentant Romantic. 
I 
MAN TO CHILD AS WOMAN TO TEXT? FRANKENSTEIN AS MONSTER 
'I agree with you,' replied the stranger 
[Frankenstein]; 'we are unfashioned creatures, but 
half made up, if one wiser, better, dearer than 
ourselves ... do not lend his aid to perfectionate 
our weak and faulty natures .... ' 
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Shelley, Frankenstein (77) 
Prometheus was a popular Romantic figure, seen by both Percy 
Shelley and Byron as standing for what Peter L.Thorslev 
calls "the ultimate in titanic rebellion ... which asserted 
the independence of the individual and the primacy of his 
values not only in the face of society, but even in the face 
of 'God'" (1962:172). As ~ell as being humanity's champion, 
he is, as "the Romantic Hero apotheosized, ... pure 
allegory; there is nothing in him of the Gothic, nothing of 
the dark mystery or taint of sin of the other Romantic 
heroes•i (Thorslev 1962:112). Shelley takes this ideal figure 
and puts him into what M.K.Joseph calls the "real and 
inescapable" world af science, of the physical (1969:xiv). 
She makes literal the allegorical or figurative Romantic 
hero. In her Gothic novel he is carried into mysterious, 
sinful reality and tested, along with the ideals he has been 
made to stand for. 
If Shelley is seen as identifying with Frankenstein, if 
her double rewriting results from her perceiving in his 
illicit creation the culpability of her own, then perhaps he 
is in some way monstrous too: where the woman writer who 
steals figurative creativity becomes a "half-man," his 
literal creation might make him a kind of "half-woman." But 
both thefts are more complex than this, as Shelley's 
presentation of nature, the source and site of literal 
creativity, suggests. 
The lesson Frankenstein learns is that humans are 
"unfashioned creatures" if they are not completed by human 
relationships, by love. Egocentric ambition separates the 
individual from community, from the culturally perceived 
feminine values of self-effacing altruism and caring for 
others. 7 Frankenstein's denial of these values, Shelley 
suggests, ·makes him a monster. 
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Frankenstein is like Ovid's Prometheus in that he 
creates literally, giving life to a new creature. At the 
same time, as Prometheus brings the clay to life without 
using fire in any but the figurative sense, so Frankenstein 
does not literally become pregnant and bear a child. By 
producing a living creature, he appropriates the role of the 
maternal, but the act itself is entirely cultural. Nature is 
used simply to provide the materials for his own 
scientific/artistic creation. This distortion of 
reproduction is revealed by the particular elements of 
nature used by Frankenstein: corpses and lightning, the dead 
and the destructive. He inverts natural procreation by 
associating it with death. In this way the maternal, as the 
capacity of the female body to bear children, is rendered 
obsolete. Homans differentiates between circumvention and 
appropriation, suggesting that Frankenstein "does not so 
much appropriate the maternal as bypass it, to demonstrate 
the unnecessariness of natural motherhood and, indeed, of 
women" (1986!105). His distortion of natural reproduction is 
52 
like that of Ovid's Prometheus in that both incorporate the 
literal withiri an act of figurative creation, so denying its 
importance. The implication is, as Fried~an points out in 
relation to male use of the childbirth metaphor, not that 
women can create in a way that men cannot, but that 
figurative creativity can replace all other kinds, which are 
hence devalued. Frankenstein creates with culture - with 
language: "masculine appropriation of the creative word 
attempts to reduce woman to the processes of her body" 
(Friedman 1989:76) - the idea of "reduction'' is telling 
here. This resembles culture's "theft'' of fire from nature: 
the literal and threatening flame is rendered harmless by 
making- it into a figure of speech. Frankenstein's theft of 
the evidence of death and decay suggests a similar desire to 
incapacitate the literal. 
Ovid's Prometheus completes the cultural domestication 
of fire by drawing it into the symbolic, but in the myth 
fire continues to exist as a literal and dangerous force 
outside of culture. Similarly, Frankenstein excludes the 
role of Gaia/woman from his act of creation but he cannot 
usurp the natural form of creativity. The presymbolic 
maternal, in the form of nature, is unscathed by his theft. 
It is he who suffers, not so much for creating as for 
failing to parent his creature. Shelley suggests that 
Frankenstein is culpable, monstrous even, less because he 
stole "fire" from the natural female than because of his 
refusal to accept the culturally defined feminine 
consequence of motherhood, self-denying care of others. 
Shelley emphasises this lack by surrounding Frankenstein 
with ideal Romantic role models of the feminine. 
The novel's female characters are, virtually without 
exception, what Homans would call "models of femininity 
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who, by their passivity and infantility, pose the least 
threat to the 'superiority of the masculine principle'" 
(1980:16) .. Victor's mother has a "soft and benevolent mind" 
(82) and martyrs herself in caring for Elizabeth, his future 
wife, who is presented to him as a "pretty present" and seen 
as his possession, his "to protect, love and cherish" (84). 
Even Safie and Agatha, seemingly part of a more enlightened 
family, are weak and in need of masculine protection. As 
well as being good and kind, the female characters are also, 
almost without exception, "orphans and beggars," isolated 
from family - and from money. They are only too willing to 
be cared for, taken in (in both senses of the phrase). 
Shelley pursues the virtue of self-abnegation to its 
logical conclusion: death. Virtually all her central female 
characters die: they are not real protagonists, but symbols 
of the ideal Romantic woman. Part of inarticulate nature, 
with its implications of passivity, they are apotheosised in 
death. This valorisation of feminine martyrdom, particularly 
the deaths of mothers, both conceals and hints at the other 
kind of death, undomesticated by culture, which Frankenstein 
encounters. Like fire, the mother and death are deprived of 
their literal power by being defined within the symbolic. 0 
Shelley makes Frankenstein uncover this power. Gilbert and 
.Gubar describe women's "alienation from the patriarchal 
chain-of-being" (1979:227): as "aliens," though, they are, 
even while disempowered within the structure of culture, 
also potentially threatening to the same structure. 
Mary Wollstonecraft, Shelley's mother, died ten days 
after, and as a direct result of, giving birth to her. The 
death of the mother, the figu~ative loss of the maternal 
required by the symbolic, was thus painfully literal for 
Shelley. It seems unlikely that the infant had any 
experience of her mother at all; Godwin describes in his 
memoirs how the doctor "forbad the child's having the 
breast, and we ... procured puppies to draw off the milk" 
(1798:117). The literal presence of Shelley's mother was 
replaced by figuration: she read about her mother and she 
l 
read her mother's writing. This too was a source_of 
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ambivalence, for while Wollstonecraft's work was egotistical 
and original, her death was, for all her radical feminism, 
described by her husband as that of the ideal lady: ' 
She was affectionate and compliant to the last .... 
whenever her attendants recommended her to sleep, 
she discovered her willingness to yield, by 
breathing ... in the manner of a person who 
sleeps .... (1798:121) 
Wollstonecraft was thus both a strong model for the 
rebellious appropriation of cultural, and particularly 
linguistic, power and at the same time absent as the result 
of death in childbirth, that most female of all fates. This 
irony was not lost on her critics: the Rev. Richard 
Polwhele, in a work called The Unsex'd Females (1798), used 
Wollstonecraft's death to demonstrate women's proper place: 
She died a death that strongly marked the 
distinction of the sexes, by pointing out the 
destiny of women, and the diseases to which they 
are liable ••.• (in Kelly, ed. 1976:vii) 
The death of Shelley's mother seemed a poetically just 
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punishment for daring to try and escape the natural cycle of 
birth and death that patriarchal culture determines to be 
female destiny. 
Shelley makes her female characters submit wholly to 
their "destiny." It is Frankenstein who rebels against the 
limits of his own sex in trying to deny nature the sole 
power of literal creation and then, having appropriated the 
role of "mother," refuses the consequences culture has 
already attached to such a role. In the myth, Prometheus 
both creates man and protects him, becoming his champion 
against a hostile god; Frankenstein, at the moment of giving 
life to his creatu~e, repents of what he has done and 
rejects the beneficiary of his stolen gift. 
In Hesiod and Aeschylus's versions of the myth, Zeus is 
the paternal ruler, master of all. Prometheus rebels against 
him and is punished. What strength he has comes from his 
alliance with nature, whose order is stronger and more 
permanent than the authority of the god. Nature is presented 
as female and maternal, as Gaia, Prometheus's mother. She 
may be said to embody an alternative law to that of Zeus, 
one which allows her to control the power of the male gods: 
her "name expresses the regularity of nature, the peaceful 
law shared by all its creatures," "the earthly maternal 
principle" in which "a just order has its natural 
foundation" (Ker~nyi 1959:100). This "justice" is an amoral 
cycle, limiting and controlling the strength of the 
individual. When each god strives to become too powerful, 
Gaia turns against him. Similarly among mortals, individual 
achievement and errors are all limited by the inevitable 
destinies determined by nature, by birth and death. 
In the myth according to Aeschylus, then, feminine 
nature is qpposed to the tyranny of Zeus as a patriarchal 
ruler who abuses his power. To this extent she is a useful 
figure for the woman writer, who woµld rebel against a 
culture where the paternal bears power. The prehistoric 
power of Gaia is seen as ultimately antecedent to, and 
greater than, that of culture, despite man's domestication 
of fire. In this lies the difference between Frankenstein 
and the Aeschylean Prometheus: a creator as in Ovid's 
version, he is also unjustified, as in Hesiod's, 
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because his defiance is against nature. Shelley explores in 
him the contradictions between ambitious patriarchal culture 
and the natural, between the symbolic and the presymbolic, 
or, for the pre-Oedipal child, between the paternal and the 
maternal. In exercising what Maurice Hindle calls the 
"aspiration of modern masculinist scientists to be 
technically creative divinities" (1985:23), Frankenstein 
performs a travesty of natural procreation by women. 9 His 
"technical creativity" is presented as unnatural and 
therefore dangerous. 
Frankenstein justifies his motives as altruistic rather 
than egotistical and presumptious: he intends to "banish 
disease from the human fram~ and render man invulnerable to 
any but a violent death" (89), to master the art of 
resurrection in "renew[ing] life where death had apparently 
devoted the _body to corruption" (102) and to "pour a torrent 
of light into our dark world" by creating a race of "happy 
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and excellent natures'' (101). He desires to take Gaia's 
power over birth and death. Walton,~the aspirant Prometheus 
whose narrative frames Frankenstein's, is, as a physical 
explorer, in a position to state these ideals even more 
clearly: he seeks "dominion ... over the elemental foes of 
our race" (77), over nature. Percy Shelley connected his own 
aspirations with those of Frankenstein when he wrote 
Waldman's statement in the novel that "The labours of men of 
genius, however erroneously directed, scarcely ever fail in 
ultimately turning to the solid advantage of mankind" 
(Hindle 1985:268, n.13). The novel, then, subverts the 
philosophy which Shelley's husband himself wrote into it. 10 
Each of Frankenstein's ambitious claims is called into 
question. He admires the "masters of the science (who] 
sought immortality and power" (95), rather than the good of 
others, and relishes the "glory" such a discovery would 
engender (89). His desire is to become the creator of a new 
race and he expects filial gratitude: "a new species would 
bless me as its creator and source .... No father could claim 
the gratitude of his child so compl~tely as I should deserve 
theirs" (101-2). Implicitly, he would be a go~ rather than a 
father, and there would be no mother with whom to share the 
gratitude and allegiance of his creatures. 
But before Frankenstein can create, he must understand. 
Despite the suffering he describes while working on the 
creature, his 'continued perseverance and his sudden disgust 
when the creature comes to life suggest that his remorse 
occurs only after he has carried out the final shift of 
nature's literal power into culture. 11 His initial research 
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is slightly different. Shelley sets up a comparison of 
-Frankenstein's scrutiny of nature with the Romantic view of 
nature as a benevolent reflection of the mind of man. 
Respectful Romantic symbiosis- is used to evince the moral 
health of both Elizabeth and Clerval, suggesting 
Wordsworth's concept of "natural piety," of a morality 
dependent on a close and reciprocal relationship with nature 
("My Heart Leaps Up" 1. 9, 246) . 12 This nature, though, is a 
figuration; Clerval "call[s] forth the better feelings of 
(Victor's] heart" by teaching him to "love the aspect [the 
face, or surface] of nature and the cheerful faces of 
children" (117), to appreciate visible and innocent beauty 
without seeking to act upon or change it. In Clerval's 
c9mpany, "happy, inanimate nature" gives Frankenstein 
pleasure. This imposed reading of nature as the passive and 
inanimate object of the Romantic gaze is what Frankenstein's 
remorseful narrative presents as positive but which, like 
the ladylike deaths of the novel's real mothers, is a view 
of nature from within the symbolic rather than of the 
literal maternal that exists outside it. Frankenstein's 
science forces him to confront the literal and unromantic 
realities of birth and death, unmediated by the words of 
culture. 
The dream he has on the night the creature is brought 
to life reveals this discovery: he takes his future wife, 
Elizabeth, in his arms, but as he kisses her, she becomes 
the corpse of his dead mother, her face "livid with the hue 
of death," "grave-worms crawling in the folds" of her shroud 
(106). His ideal and feminine love object, "in the bloom of 
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health," is transformed by his embrace into a literalisation 
of the side of nature he has uncovered: a rotting corpse. 
The body is specifically ~aternal, evidence of man's 
rejection of the mother and at the same time of her defiant 
return, revealing the horror which underlies all nature -
and particularly the female - despite its safely defined 
position (which includes beautifully sanitised and 
sentimentalised death) within culture. 
Frankenstein's embrace of the corpse of his mother also 
signifies his own death, but his return to the arms of the 
maternal is not a regression to the blissful utopia of 
infancy, the embrace which heterosexual desire within 
culture strives to represent, but into the maternal that 
exists outside of the symbolic, the rot and decay that 
culture longs to deny, but which irrevocably destroys each 
subject. The dead mother here is Gaia who ensures the 
dowfall of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, and by implication, 
also Prometheus, when their power becomes too great. She is 
the reality which Wordsworth's "intimations of immortality" 
would deny. 
Frankenstein's relationship with nature is based on an 
obsession which presumes to usurp power through knowledge. 
His desire for the mother oversteps the limits of the 
Romantic perception of her: he is not content to look at 
nature's "aspect." While Elizabeth as a child is happy to 
"contemplate ... with a serious and satisfied spirit the 
magnificent appearances of things," Victor, unsatisfied, 
"delight[s) in investigating their causes," and is "more 
deeply smitten with the thirst for knowledge" (85). 
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A stanza from Wordsworth's "The Tables Turned" appears 
to encapsulate the Romantic perception of nature's "lore," 
the doctrine against which Frankenstein transgresses: 
Sweet is the lore which nature brings; 
our meddling intellect 
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things; 
- We murder to dissect. (11.25-8, 131) 
Rather than appreciating the appearance of nature as 
impersonal -and impenetrable - beauty, Frankenstein tries to 
"dissect," to open and explore. Wordworth's lines suggest 
that the object of "murder" is nature, but the novel reveals 
a greater complexity; the overreaching intellect "misshapes 
the ... forms" which are "sweet" and "beauteous" in the 
Romantic perception of nature. 
Frankenstein only reveals what already exists and has 
been rejected because its implications are so threatening to 
culture. What he destroys is the Romantic image o'f nature, 
her figuration by culture as "sweet." Dissection reveals 
nature's power over culture, and implicitly reveals the 
danger to culture of the female when not domesticated into 
submissive femininity by the symbolic. 
Frankenstein longs to return to the apparently moral 
Wordsworthian perception of nature, but Shelley is 
ambivalent, supverting the Romantic view even as she 
criticises Frankenstein's defiance of it. His dissection of 
nature is, a revelation of the literal; his transgression 
against nature is in trying to create life and defy the 
inevitability of death, to deny the implications of what he 
has found. What he uncovers by dissecting corpses is the 
female nature repressed by, the RomantiG objectification of 
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feminine nature. 13 
Aptly, then, the aspects of nature Victor examines are 
not the superficially be~utiful, but the deeper mysteries, 
the secrets of an active and animate nature. He does not 
specifically examine the details of conception and birth in 
his search for the secret of life; his study is of death and 
decay. He invades "vaults and charnel-houses" (99), the 
churchyard is to him "merely the receptacle of bodies 
deprived of life, ... food for the worm", and he describes 
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his investigation of "every object the most insupportable to 
the delicacy of the_ human feelings" (99-100). His "torture 
[of] the living animal to animate the lifeless clay" 
(102) is a parody of Prometheus'~ giving life to mud, but at 
the same time it suggests a recognition of the literal which 
Ovid's myth does not: Frankenstein's art does not simply 
look up at the stars. 
This apparently clinical exploration of nature, this 
denial of "delicacy," is the centre of this Prometheus's 
"modernity." His scienca does not ~vince a sense of heresy 
in uncovering the secrets of nature. As Hindle points out, 
"the old God who ... had been the author and controller of 
Nature now falls silent in the overbearing presence of ... 
'Victor'" (36). Silencing the words of a controlling God 
leaves nature uncontrolled and so far more threatening. 
Death, from having profound spiritual (and so figurative) 
significance, is recognized as an unmediated biological 
phenomenon. 
Frankenstein's relationship with nature is also 
implicitly sexual. Carolyn Merchant discusses how the 
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figuration of "Mother Nature" shifted gradually to signify a 
rather different kind of female: 
The constraints against penetration associated 
with the earth-mother image were transformed into 
sanctions for denudation. After the Scientific 
Revolution Natura no longer complains that her 
garments of modesty are being torn by the wrongful 
thrusts of man. (in Hindle 1985:41) 
The way in which Frankenstein describes his obsession with 
nature makes her the object of a perverse and erotic desire; 
metaphorically, he seeks to "know" nature in the Biblical 
sense. His "gladness akin to rapture" is on learning "the 
hidden laws of nature'' (85) and his desire is to "penetrate 
into the recesses of nature and show how she works in her 
hiding places" (96). The imagery used to describe his 
feelings on discovering the secret of life emphasises this: 
The astonishment which I had at first experienced 
soon gave place to delight and rapture. After 
so much time spent in painful labour, to arrive at 
once at the summit of my desires was the most 
gratifying consummation of my toils. (100) 
, 
This consummation is not the moment of bringing the creature 
to life; it is the moment of knowing how to. Frankenstein 
describes his loss of innocence in a conflation of sexual 
intercourse and childbirth. His discovery of the secret of 
literal creativity is also implicitly incestuous: Hindle 
discusses how Frankenstein's "presumptuous act of creating 
life marks an' incestuous violation of .•. mother nature" 
(41), an illicit union with what exists beyond culture, with 
the nonsyrnbolic. His invasion of nature's "hiding-places" is 
a seizure of power and in carrying it out he destroys his 
own affection for nature. Shelley presents as fatal 
Frankenstein's rejection of Romantic "natural piety'' in 
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favour of the amoral secrets uncovered by his "meddling 
intellect." He defies the ethical system according to which 
his science is murder, estranging himself from what should, 
in Romantic terms, give meaning to his existence. He tells 
Walton that he "seemed to have lost all soul or sensation" 
while working with "profane fingers'', and he describes how 
his "eyes were insensible to the charms of nature" (102). In 
carrying out his act of creation, Frankenstein is alienated 
from cultural perceptions of order even while he reveals the 
literal - as opposed to the "sweet" - lore of nature. Unlike 
Prometheus, he does not have the wisdom of Gaia or Themis to 
support him. Frankenstein's exploration of nature begins and 
ends as an attempt to gain her power; it,is both a masculine 
sexual invasion of the female and an assumption of her role. 
The estrangement he feels from the "feminine," both as the 
Romantic perception of benign nature and as the social 
values of caring and community, indicate his discovery of 
the dangerous and alien power of the presymbolic maternal. 
There is another side to Frankenstein's theft; in 
Aeschylus's version, Zeus, as law-giver, is defied by 
Prometheus, who is protected and defended by the natural 
order. In Frankenstein, a human being attempts to defy 
nature and steal her secrets, which include the source of 
Zeus's power: Victor aspires to be like the ancient 
philosophers who not only "penetrate nature", but in doing 
so "acquire ... new and almost unlimited powers; they can 
command the thunders of heaven" (96). Implicitly, his 
ambition is to steal fire as the lightning initially given 
to Zeus by Gaia. Frankenstein's first intimation of the 
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power he desires is introduced in a thunderstorm. Ominously, 
the fire he perceives as the source of life has the opposite 
effebt on the tree, which becomes "a blasted stump" andi as 
he points out, "I have never seen 9-nything so utterly 
destroyed" (89). The remorseful Frankenstein later calls 
himself a "blasted tree," recognising this irony (205). The 
image of light is used again to reveal the irony of his 
aspirations: his plan is to "pour a torrent of light into 
the dark world" (101), but the creature comes to life "by 
the glimmer of the half-extinguished light" of 
Frankenstein's dying candle (105). 
The scientist's appropriation of nature's fire in the 
form of lightning places him on the side of the gods 
overthrown by Gaia, rather than on that of Prometheus, 
defended by her. His dream is to illuminate the world with 
the light of his illicit knowledge; at the moment of its 
realisation, a symbolic darkness reveals his mistake. His 
Prometheanism is a reversal of that in Aeschlylus's version. 
In the myth, nature and the gods are not absolutely 
opposed; only when an individual god becomes too powerful a 
tyrant must nature limit his rule. Similarly, the law of the 
masculine gods is not entirely exclusive of natural justice: 
Gaia has helped Zeus, and only when his ruie becomes unjust 
does she support the less powerful Prometheus. Nature is 
shown as regulating the masculine god's intellectually 
constructed cultural order. Frankenstein's work is illegal, 
against human as well as natural law, but Mary Shelley 
presents society as ambivalent about his actions and so 
incapable of controlling him. His theft is on behalf of 
culture and to this extent, he is able to work against 
nature with the support of human law. 
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The relationship between nature's justice and man's law 
is demonstrated both within the Frankenstein family and in 
wider society. Victor's parents, Alphonse and Caroline, are 
presented ambiguously. He remembers them to Walton in ideal 
terms which suggest a reaction to guilt rather than a 
realistic representation of them. Alphonse is involved with 
the government of Geneva, described by his son as a man of 
"integrity" with a great "sense of justice" in his "upright 
mind'' (80-1). Caroline has great courage and a "mind of an 
uncommon mould", which is "soft and benevolent" (81-2). They 
appear to be ideal parents, having a "deep consciousness of 
what they owed towards the being to which they had given 
life" and their disciplining of ·their son is likened to his 
being "guided by a silken cord" (82). Later, he admires 
their "spirit of kindness and indulgence .... [T]hey were not 
the tyrants to rule our lot according to their caprice, but 
the agents and creators of all the many delights which we 
enjoyed" (86). As natural parents, they fulfil the cultural 
responsibilities they owe their child. By Frankenstein's 
account, which does not distinguish here between the roles 
of mother and father, Alphonse is an unusually "feminine" 
father. 
The ethical beliefs of the family have the potential to 
prevent Victor from carrying out his obsession, but are not 
adequately put into action. The Frankensteins' philosophy is 
close to the Wordsworthian view that morality and sympathy 
with nature are inseparable. Such sympathy includes human 
social relationships: 
A human being in perfection ought always to 
preserve a calm and peaceful mind .... If the study 
to which you apply yourself has a tendency to 
weaken your affections and to destroy your taste 
for those simple pleasures in which no alloy can 
possibly mix, then that study is certainly 
unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the human 
mind. (103) 
Frankenstein tells Walton this as the conclusion he has 
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reached after his suffering. The father's belief is in the 
ethic of human affection; what is "unlawful" is what is not 
proper for the "delicate," civilised human mind. The 
importance of tranquil domestic affections is associated 
with feminine values, with "kinship" rather than culture, 
opposed to the accepted extradomestic ambitions of the male 
(Mellor 1988b:229). Both of Frankenstein's parents profess 
these values, but his mother is dead, leaving his father to 
enforce them. Victor ignores the warning signs that become 
evident while he works: he forgets about home, failing to 
write, and "shun[s] his fellow creatures" (104). 
Frankenstein's description of his father's justice is 
marred by his memory of a discussion they have about the 
work of Cornelius Agrippa. He shows the book to Alphonse, 
who looks "carelessly at the title page" and tells his son 
not to waste his time on such "sad trash" (87). Victor 
blames Alphonse for failing to ,prevent his downfall: 
If ... my father had taken the pains to explain to 
me that the principles of Agrippa had been 
entirely exploded .... [i]t is even possible that 
the train of my ideas would never have received 
the fatal impulse that led to my ruin. (87-8) 
Along' with Alphonse's failure to instil in Victor any 
respect for the mysterious, this leaves the son without 
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guidance from his father, from the voice of cultural order. 
Alphonse realises that his son is in trouble - and Victor 
agrees that "he was justified in conceiving that I should 
not be altogether free from blame" - but he does not act on 
his awareness of justice to save his son: he makes "no 
reproach in his letters and only [takes] notice of 
[Victor's] silence by enquiring into [his] occupations more 
particularly" (103). 
Frankenstein, Walton and Clerval all defy their fathers 
in striving to fulfil their ambitions. Walton disobeys his 
father's last injunction, that he should not go to sea. 
Clerval eventually manages to persuade his to let him choose 
his own future, but ~he terms used are Promethean: 
Henry deeply felt the misfortune of being debarred 
from a liberal education. He said little, but when 
he spoke I read in his kindling eye and in his 
animated glance a restrained but firm resolve not 
to be chained to the miserable details of 
commerce. (93) 
The law.of human society is presented in three examples 
of legal cases. The ironically named Justine is found guilty 
of the murder of William, Safie's father is condemned to 
death in Paris, and Victor is acquitted of the murder of 
Clerval. The failure of human law emphasises that what 
Victor has done is beyond the control of a fragile cultural 
order; it is beyond the power of society to punish or 
forgive him. 
In each trial, the law fails. The innocent Justine is 
hanged, despite Alphonse's assurance that she will be given 
a fair trial (he says she can "rely on the justice of our 
laws" [127]). Victor describes the "harsh, unfeeling 
reasoning" of the judges, implicitly comtrasting them, as 
"these men" (135), with the feelings of Elizabeth. 
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Justine is finally executed because she confesses to 
murder; the confession is-a lie, but that makes no 
difference~ She lies because her confessor has convinced her 
that she will be better off doing so. As she says, 
I did confess, but I confessed a lie .... [M]y 
confessor has besieged me; he threatened and 
menaced, until I almost began to think that I was 
the monster that he said I was. (133) 
He has the power to convince her of her own monstrosity. As 
a killer of children she would be an apt example of 
deformed, inverted motherhood, but it is her silence, her 
refusal to admit to the sin, to the man's definition of her, 
that makes him "besiege" her and call her monstrous. Her 
power over language is what has to be destroyed; once she 
has accepted his definition, she is left in peace. 
Shelley's attribution of monstrosity to Justine is 
significant. The creature, before framing her for William's 
murder, talks to the sleeping girl: 
Awake, fairest,' thy lover is near - he who would 
give his life but to obtain one look of affection 
from thine eyes; my beloved, awake! (188) 
Justine is both servant and adopted member of the 
Frankenstein family. Stallybrass and White call the role of 
the maid-servant "'the hole in the social cell', the site of 
transgressive desire" (1986:169). Elizabeth discusses 
Justine in a letter, revealing her hybrid position 
(apparently Percy Shelley wrote this section [Hindle 
1985:269 n.17]): 
A servant in Geneva does not mean the same thing 
as a servant in France and England. Justine, thus 
received in our family, learned the duties of a 
servant, ... which ... does not include the idea 
of ignorance and a sacrifice of the dignity of a 
human being. (113) 
Elizabeth reminds Frankenstein that Justine had been "a 
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great favourite of yours; ... you once remarked that if you 
were in an ill humour, one glance from Justine could 
dissipate it" (113). Elizabeth's (slightly jealous?) 
description of the power of Justine's gaze foreshadows its 
importance to the monster, who desires the same look but 
cannot trust that he will receive it. 
Of all Shelley's female charactersr only Justine bears 
the disruptive potential of the hybrid. Her eyes remain 
closed; she does not see the creature's monstrosity, and so 
she does not reject him. The possibility that she could have 
looked at him with affection is deliberately not tested. The 
significance of seeing and not seeing will be expanded on 
later; what is revealing here is Shelley's association of 
the female servant with monstrosity and her juxtaposition of 
this incident in the monster's narrative with his plea for 
Frankenstein to make him a "companion ... of the same 
species and hav[ing] the same defects" as himself (189). The 
possibility is raised that Justin~ might be the monster's 
human and female equivalent. Her destruction is suitably 
brought about by the portrait, the artificial appearance and 
aspect of Frankenstein's dead mother, which the monster 
-
places near her. He says Justine is less beautiful than the 
idealised painting of the mother; she is real and has the 
potential to look at him. The monster, afraid to risk this, 
instead "frames" her, literally: in a more overt~y negative 
version of the mother's miniaturisation in a portrait, 
Justine is subjected to culture's definitions of her as 
female, a servant, a murderess, and a monster. 
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Frankenstein cannot rescue Justine by telling the 
judges the truth of his own responsibility for it is beyond 
the capacity of their reasoning, which does not admit the 
mysterious within its carefully bounded cultural circle. 
Frankenstein's truth is likely to be dismissed as madness. 
This is borne out later when he tries to tell his story to a 
magistrate, in the hope that the law will help him to 
destroy the creature. The·man listens to the tale with "that 
half kind of belief that is given to a tale of spirits and 
supernatural events; but when ... called on to act 
officially in consequence, the whole tide of his incredulity 
return[s)" (243). This representative of androcentric law 
proves inadequate because of the limitations imposed by his 
confidence in his own system. Frankenstein's criticism of 
him points out culture's secure refusal to recognise the 
possible return of the rejected, of the deformation of its 
boundaries: "Man, •.. how ignorant art thou in thy pride of 
wisdom!" (244). Frankenstein has learnt thi~ for himself. 
In a trial closely resembling Justine's, Safie's father 
is sentenced to death because of "his religiori.-,[he is 
Turkish] and wealth rather than the crime alleged against 
him" (168), and in the third case, Frankenstein himself is 
tried for the murder of Clerval. In an agony of guilt and 
longing for death, he finds himself "doomed to live" (221), 
despite the detailed evidence given against him. With the 
intervention of his father, he is acquitted. 
Shelley presents the androcentric, and so flawed, 
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justice of human law: Justine, female and a servant, and the 
Turk, another cultural outsider, are unjustly punished, 
while Frankenstein, whose father is a member of government, 
is set free. These cases reveal both the assumed power of 
patriarchal language and its vulnerability as an inadequate 
patching over what men of the law choose to deny - in much 
the same way as Lacan's boy-child has to deny the maternal 
before he can take his place in the symbolic order. 
Frankenstein remains faithful to human law. He believes 
he has defied his upbringing in creating the monster, but 
his "rebellion" is shortlived: at the moment of success, he 
rejects his creature. He is a Prometheus who steals fire for 
man and then helps Zeus punish the recipient of his gift. He 
does not consider duty while planning his project, for what 
.counts is the gratitude he anticipates. His parents treat 
him as a 
creature ... whose future lot it was in their 
hands to direct to happiness or misery, according 
.as they fulfilled their duties towards [him]. 
(82) 
Despite this, he forgets that he has involved himself with 
the cultural implications of the power he has stolen. His 
failure is that he refuses the role society imposes on 
mothers. This would require the denial of his egotistical 
desires, for motherhood requires self-abnegation and 
service. In appearing to appropriate the power of nature he 
has, in fact, to the extent that he has "mothered" the 
creature, taken on culture's· demand that he do what 
"natural" mothers should: nurture. His suffering is thus the 
result of his rejection of the cultural, the feminine, as 
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well as his invasion of the natural. 
The monster reminds him of "what the duties of a 
creator towards his creature'' are, and briefly he recognises 
these (147). But Frankenstein has to choose between the 
race to which he belongs and the new one he has created, 
between his masculine identity within cultural law - which 
allows the man to go about his eg6tistical existence after 
fathering a child - and the requirement that the creator, as 
mother, should also nurture. He is briefly torn between the 
two: 
I created a rational creature and was bound 
towards him to assure, as far as was in my power, 
his happiness and well-being. This was my duty; 
but there was another still paramount to that. My 
duties towards the beings of my own species had 
greater claims to my attention .... (259) 
It is predictable that Frankenstein should choose his own 
race and, implicitly, his duty to his own gender. He has 
stolen the natural power of procreation, an ability usually 
associated with the female, but when the product of the 
theft proves different to the legitimate offspring of 
conventional reproduction, he rejects it. His ambitious 
creative imagination fails. Victor is afraid that, rather 
than being blessed by the new race he has made, he will be 
cursed by the future people of his own race as the "pest, 
whose selfishness had not 'hesitated to buy its own peace at 
the price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole human 
race" (211). It is paradoxical that, had he treated his 
creature even slightly differently (had he, for instance, 
put him in a cage and exhibited him at a museum or a 
carnival freak show), he might have been hailed as a 
scientific genius for taking to its logical end his 
culture's ethic of ·masculine ambition. But in the face of 
the power that he has uncovered, he can only retreat into 
complete denial bf what he has done and a desperate return 
to conventionality. 
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Thi~ choice leads to Frankenstein's punishment. His own 
perception of transgression is what lies at the root of his . 
suffering: his rejection of what he has done - the act as 
well as its issue - is what causeshis pain. As I have 
pointed out, he associates his suffering with Zeus's mode of 
punishment: "I am a blasted tree; the bolt has entered my 
soul," overtly linking the source of his theft with his 
suffering (205). Shelley also seems to draw parallels 
between Frankenstein and Satan: he is "like the archangel 
who aspired to omnipotence, .•. chained in an eternal hell'' 
(254). He goes on to describe his position: 
I trod heaven in my thoughts ... but how am I 
sunk! ... a high destiny seemed to bear me on, 
until I fell, never, never again to rise. (254) 
This echoes the end of Prometheus Bound when the Titan is 
flung from his mediating position down into Tartarus. 
Frankenstein uses even more Aeschylean terms: ''for an 
instant I dared shake off my chains and look around me with 
a free and lofty spirit, but the iron had eaten into my 
flesh, and I sank again, trembling and hopeless, into my 
miserable self" (205). 
This absorption in t~e self is an apt punishment for 
the sin of selfish presumption; Frankenstein is isolated 
within himself, the suffering imposed from within is self-
disgust, remorse resulting from his own perception of his 
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guilt. This emphasises Shelley's ambiguous presentation of 
nature; it is both an implacable force, entirely external to 
culture, and at the same time closely connected with human 
morality ( i·n the same way as Zeus's lightning has its source 
in nature). Shelley's use and simultaneous critique of the 
Romantic construction of nature is thus evident in 
Frankenstein's guilt. He has recognised that he is, despite 
the denial implicit in his creation of the monster, part of 
nature. Frankenstein cannot rebel against Mother Nature 
with impunity because she is part of himself. Unlike 
Prometheus, he does not perceive himself as having stolen 
from an external oppressor but from the maternal system 
which he has rejected: in "sinning" against her, he is 
forced to recognise her power. Connected with the mother's 
death, his act also affirms the fact that she can never be 
completely killed, or that as "dead", absent, she is even 
more threatening and powerful. 
Victor tells Walton how at risk is "he who aspires to 
become.greater than his nature will allow" and how his work 
made him untrue to himself; it "swallowed up every habit of 
my nature" (101, 103, emphases mine). Alienation from one's 
own nature emphasises the culturally defined rift between 
the feminine and the masculine. Mellor discusses.the "mutual 
deprivation inherent in a family and social structure based 
on rigid and hierarchical gender divisions" (1988b:221). 
Frankenstein, in following the masculine ethic of 
independence and achievement within culture, has rejected 
the feminine ethic of care - and denied the implications 
concealed by this of the female, of undomesticated birth, 
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sex and death. It is to this that Mellor attributes his 
inability to love the product of his work (1988b:221). He is 
evidence of the agony caused by gender division within the 
individual, a division created by the definition of nature 
as feminine and as alienated from - and controllable by -
the self. 
There are moments when Frankenstein finds respit_e from 
his guilt. After Justine's execution, he goes into the 
mountains, where he is to encounter and listen to the 
monster. The mountains are significant in that they 
represent the sublime aspect of nature, the awesome and 
terrible rather than the simpler beauty earlier associated 
with the Wordsworthian love of nature. Here Frankenstein is 
confronted by nature's power: 
The weight upon my spirit was sensibly lightened 
as I plunged yet deeper in the ravine of Arve. The 
immense mountains and precipices that overhung me 
on every side, the sound of the river raging among 
the rocks, and the dashing of the waterfalls 
around, spoke of a power mighty as Omnipotence -
and I ceased to fear or bend before any being less 
almighty than that which had created and ruled the 
elements .•.. (140) 
In Wordsworth's Prelude, the speaker recognises in the "huge 
and mighty Forms" (I:l.425, 385) of the mountains, which he 
finds troubling at first, a divinity, the "Wisdom and Spirit 
of the universe" (I:l.428, 385), who "intertwines": 
The passions, that build up our human Soul, 
Not with the mean and vulgar works of Man, 
But with high objects, with enduring things, 
With life and nature, purifying thus 
The elements of feeling and of thought •... 
(I:ll.434-438, 386) 
For the Romantic subject, the immensity of nature's power is 
inextricably connected with "our human Soul." By comparison, 
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Frankenstein apprehends in the mountains a power which seems 
entirely i-ndependent of the symbolic's reading of it. At the 
same time, he does not perceive nature as exclusively 
negative: Frankenstein's recognition of that power and his 
willingness to bend before it to the exclusion of all else 
prefigures the chance he is about to have of at least 
partial salvation, the opportunity to make peace with his 
creature. 
Remembering the "tingling long-lost sense of pleasure" 
of his childhood, he briefly regains innocence, and is 
rewarded by a transformative re-perception of nature, a 
brief return to secure unity with the mother: the-"very 
winds whispered in soothing· accents, and maternal Nature 
bade me weep no more" (141). 
In this "glorious presence-chamber of imperial nature," 
Frankenstein meets his creature (142). Before the "icy wall 
of [a] glacier," prefiguring the place of his death, he has 
his grief "subdued and tranquillized"; seeing "an eagle, 
soaring amidst th~ clouds," he is put "at peace" (142). The 
eagle, instrument of Prometheus's punishment, becomes a 
source of comfort to Frankenstein. This is associated with 
his recognition of nature's power and his return to a 
childlike state. 
The moment is given greater significance by two other 
allusions to Prometheus's torture by the bird. The literal 
eagle is associated with redemption, with a return to 
symbiosis with the presymbolic maternal. But the bird 
appears twice more, figuratively, and is associated with 
suffering. After hearing the monster's tale, Frankenstein 
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sees him "descend the mountain with greater speed than the 
flight of an eagle" (193) - here, the creature is connected 
with both the potential for redemption and the instrument of 
punishment - and later, just before the death of Elizabeth, 
the image returns in an even more threatening form: a storm 
rises and the moon is dimmed by clouds sweeping "across it 
swifter than the flight of a vulture" (238). Not only is 
the image of the eagle transformed into the figure of a bird 
that traditionally haunts the dying, as Victor has lost all 
hope of forgiveness, but the vulture was the bird used to 
punish Prometheus in Hesiod's version of the myth (Aeschylus 
made it an eagle). There are implicit connections here 
between Shelley's rewriting and the earlier and more 
conservative version, in which Prometheus's suffering was 
presented as entirely justified. 
Shelley does make Frankenstein, in his narrative to 
Walton, present himself as entirely deserving of punishment. 
The vision of the myth which identifies Frankenstein as 
Prometheus is a conservative one. He usurps the role of 
literal creator but refuses the responsibility which is the 
necessary consequence of such power. Percy Shelley's 
Prometheus defies dictatorial Jupiter/Zeus on behalf of the 
oppressed masses of mankind; Frankenstein defies Gaia on his 
own ambitious account. Mary Shelley, using the Romantic 
conception of nature, reveals the contradictions in 
idealised Romantic Titanism: apparent altruism does.not 
conceal the.dangerous egoism of the hero who rises above the 
mass, even if ostensibly to protect it. Shelley revises the 
myth of Prometheus to show that he, like Ouranos, Kronos and 
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Zeus before him, must have his power regulated by nature. 
Frankenstein's "dissection" of nature.reveals the 
immense and threatening power of the maternal, a power 
which, he learns, culture cannot control. But this power is 
not sufficient for the woman writer; it may be 
uncontrollably vast, but it is also easily subjected. to 
Romantic interpret~tion which makes it the silent reflection 
of the greatness of man's mind. While Wordsworth's 
philosophy posits the active power of nature and rejects the 
"mean and vulgar works of man"; the implications of this are 
ambiguous. Natural power is seen as entwined with those 
works of man which are not mean and vulgar but immensely 
ambitious, or Promethean. Wordsworth still emphasises the 
creative power of men, which relegates women to the realm of 
the other and enforces that relegation by idealising it. 
Further, as Homans points out, there is "no discontinuity 
between imaginative sympathy with nature and death" 
(1980:21). Logically the feminine, like Frankenstein's 
mother and, his wife, is most perfect when dead; like 
Wordsworth's Lucy, idealised because: 
No motion has she now, no force; 
She neither hears nor sees, 
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course 
With rocks and stones and trees. 
("A Slumber did my Spirit Seal" 11.5-8, 147) 
The place in nature which Wordsworth gives to Lucy does not 
confront the implications of her other place as the corpse 
consumed by worms. 
Frankenstein may be seen as an attack on the 
connections which culture, particularly Romanticism, makes 
between the feminine and nature, and between human creative 
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potential and the masculine. Shelley explores the ide~lising 
appropriation of nature into culture by the Romantic subject 
and his disregard and devaluation of what remains outside 
culture. The implications of her discoveries for the woman 
writer are mixed: she reveals the power of the iiteral, but 
her Promethean "hero" is destroyed by it. To what extent, 
then, is he a potential model for the "female Prometheus"? 
To what extent can Shelley have identified with him? 
I have explored Frankenstein's attempt to combine 
cultural and literal creativity in an effort to compare his 
doing so with the similar project of women writers. 
Frankenstein is a man, and he creates a living creature, 
something virtually all women are capable of. The woman 
writer, made by nature to be a mother (as culture tells 
her), gives birth to a text. Both, then, seem to be 
monstrous, if Griswold's logic about "hermaphroditic 
disturbers of the peace" holds true. In this case, Shelley 
seems to say that to be a woman writer is to be as culpable 
as Frankenstein is. He is perhaps a reason for giving up the 
project of being a "female Prometheus." In the light of her 
later submission to nineteenth century expectations of 
feminine behaviour, and her 1831 alterations to the novel, 
this seems likely . 14 
But Frankenstein does not give birth to a human baby. 
His cultural creation gives rise-to a new kind of creature, 
a hybrid. The replacement of natural with cultural 
creativity entails the distortion of the materials of 
nature; like the use of fire by Ovid's Prometheus, natural 
creative power is made figurative, removed from its 
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referents - from the literal - by culture's use of it. Like 
so many Romantic texts, the monster is the product of 
culture's reading of nature - and, Shelley seems to suggest, 
it is a misreading. 
Frankenstein is rather more like Io than like a "female 
Prometheus"; where the cow-woman's monstrosity is a 
literalisation of her reproductive natural role, his is from 
trying to make cultural and so figurative the aspects 
of humanity which are inseparable from nature: procreation 
and death. In this way, he takes to its logical conclusion 
patriarchal culture's appropriation and objectification of 
nature and the female. 
If there is a Pandora in the novel, she is destroyed.by 
Frankenstein before she is given life, her "voice." He fears 
that the female creature will be evil, possibly "ten times 
more malignant than [her] mate," that she might "refuse to 
comply with a compact made before ·her creation" - she might 
refuse to keep promises, so distorting the truth of language 
as Pandora does - and he fears that she could be the mother 
of a new and evil race, causing "devils [to be] 
propagated on earth" (210). Her characteristics are 
remarkably close to those of Prometheus's first female 
counterpart. Frankenstein's destruction of her, then, places 
him firmly on the side of the patriarchal mythology which 
has always suppressed her part in the myth. Shelley has her 
- . 
version of Hesiod's Prometheus give in to Zeus and save men 
from the female "evil" his defiance might have unleashed. 
Frankenstein is a potential Prometheus, as Shelley is, but 
he is one whose courage fails. He loses the blind hope, the 
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overweening optimism, with which he began. After 
dismembering the female monster, he feels "as if a film had 
been taken from before my eyes and that I for the first time 
saw clearly" (215). What Shelley has him see is the same 
danger of the Promethean that she herself, after her first 
blind rush into freedom, had discovered. 
Shelley's critique of Romantic heroism, then, is two-
sided. Potentially a feminist revelation of the power of the 
female and of the danger of culture's attempts to delimit 
it, it becomes, to the extent that she has identified with 
the project of the Romantic writer, a conservative 
retraction criticising all exercise of power on behalf of 
individual aspirations. Hence Frankenstein's implicit 
association of himself with the monstrous: he is "half made'' 
because of his failure to conform to the anti-heroic, anti-
Titanic values of community and self-effacing altruism. This 
emphasises Shelley's identification with him, for these are 
the values culture imposes on women rather than men, the 
ones she has become monstrous by ignoring. 
Frankenstein describes his suffering as unspeakable: 
"words cannot convey an idea of [my] heart-sickening 
despair" (132), and "remorse and the sense Df guilt ... 
hurried me away to a hell of intense tortures such as no 
language can describe" (136). These echo Shelley's 
description in her journal of her own "misery beyond words." 
The implications of speechlessness and silence are important 
in h~r case: remorse is what makes her try to silence her 
past, Promethean self by rewriting her first brave theft of 
the myth, and remorse is what silences, in her later work, 
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all but her most conservative voice. 
And yet, at the centre of her novel is a voice that she 
does not rewrite. Frankenstein, as both the masculine 
appropriator of literal creativity and the perpetrator of a 
transgression that ironically resembles·the woman writer's 
attempt to bring the literal into culture, may be seen as a 
reflection, albeit inverted, of· Shelley. The moment of clear 
vision that is his destruction becomes for her the chance to 
repent in time and avoid, as far as she can, his fate. 
But it is too late. As the introduction to her 1831 
edition reveals, she had already borne the monstrous product 
of her hybridism. The novel is her own "hideous progeny" 
(60). Frankenstein uses the metaphor of childbirth to 
describe the "painful labour" of his cultural creation 
(100), but he is male, and the metaphor serves to emphasise 
the difference between his work and the labour of 
parturition. 15 Shelley's use of the metaphor is more 
effective in connecting her writing with the fact that she 
is also, literally, a mother. Although her progeny ·is 
hideous, she rather fondly wishes it. well, and emphasises 
that she has "an affection for it" (60). Her relationship to 
her creature does not resemble Frankenstein's. 
As the offspring of Frankenstein's cultural creation, 
the monster's birth echoes that of Athena, sprung from the 
head of Zeus. At the same time, the monster is the product 
of a female author, herself the monstrous offspring mothered 
by that other "half-man," Mary Wollstonecraft. To this 
extent, the monster, like the novel itself, resembles 
Gargantua,, born of an indissoluble union between head and 
body. It has the hybrid power of the grotesque. 
In Shelley's second - and central - rewriting of the 
myth, Frankenstein, the creator who does not love his 
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creature, resembles Zeus. The monster who rebels against him 
is Promethean. 
THE VOICE OF THE UNSPEAKABLE: ANOTHER PROMETHEUS 
I found a fire ... and was overcome with delight 
at the warmth I experienced from it. In my joy I 
thrust my hand into the live embers, but quickly 
drew it out again with a cry of pain. How strange 
... that the same cause should produce such 
opposite effects! ... 
I had obtained [fire] through accident 
and knew not how to reproduce it. (150) 
I shall collect my funeral pile and consume to 
ashes this miserable frame ... . 
... I shall ascend ... triumphantly and exult in 
the agony of the torturing flames. 
Shelley, Frankenstein {264-5) 
By the end of the novel, the monster has learnt to reproduce 
-fire. He learns its ambiguity early, and later he shows 
Walton that he has mastered its reproduction. To the extent 
that fire is a metaphor for language, Frankenstein's monster 
has acquired it "by accident," left behind by inhabitants of 
the wood: he learns to speak by overhearing the talk of the 
cottagers, picking up their linguistic leavings. His 
narrative, which forms the core of the novel, reveals his 
ability to-reproduce language: ·as the epigraphi reveal, he 
has acquired the subjective "I" of the symbolic, and can 
recount, in the past tense, what he has experienced in the 
words he has learnt. 
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His last speech, in the future tense, also reveals that 
he can do more than reproduce: like Pandora, he_refers to 
what does not (yet ·- and need never) exist. In his promise 
of self-destruction by fire, he uses language to create. 
This kind of figurative creation is speculative, 
signifying, as does Pandora's speech, non-existent 
referents. The monster is himself the product of such 
speculation (on the part of both Shelley and Frankenstein). 
He is nameless, and his speech at the end of the novel names 
things and states which do not exist. Rosemary Jackson 
discusses the subversive power of fantasy, which undercuts 
the assumption of a direct and necessary connection between 
language and reality and so "threatens to subvert ... rules 
and conventions taken to be normative" (1981:11). This 
threat to signification is carried out by the separation of 
"names" and "things": Frankenstein's monster is nameless 
because culture does not have a place, or a signifier, for 
him. His promises at the end of the novel are the reverse, a 
series of what Jackson calls "thingless names". Both 
"establish ... a disjunction of word and meaning" (1981:41). 
The monster's use of language to posit what does not exist 
is a function of his own monstrous identity. Shelley's own 
science-fiction/fantasy, her work of speculation, has the 
same potential. She, too, is a hybrid and unnameable, as I 
shall show, and hence more capable than Frankenstein of 
, escaping the constraints of what culture is prepared to 
accept as real. Where Victor's imagination fails (he cannot 
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accept - or name - the creature because it is like nothing 
he has ever seen before), she and the monster are free to go 
beyond the realm of reliable signification. The monster, 
like Shelley - and like her anc~stor Pandora - has the 
potential to find freedom by liberating language from 
conventional meaning. 
If Victor Frankenstein is Shelley's revision of Hesiod 
and Ovid's versions of the Prometheus myth, of the Titan as 
both creator and as transgressor justly punished, then the 
monster is her rewriting of Aeschylus, her own "Prometheus 
Unbound." 
The monster's Prometheanism lies less iti theft than in 
rebellion, in his disruptive defiance of the authority of 
human and ·especially patriarchal culture, and particularly 
of the value of Romantic male egoism which allows his 
creator, his father-god, to abandon him. 
The monster is the instrument of Frankenstein's 
punishment, reminder of the consequences of his ambitious 
presumption. He is not only the eagle or vulture which 
torments the trapped Titan, though, but also the Prometheus 
whom Gaia uses to unseat the excessively powerful Zeus. He 
is the offspring of Frankenstein's exploration of the 
literal and his use of it within the symbolic. Like the 
Titan, the monster is a ·giant, neither god nor human, 
immensely strong and capable of surviving what mortal man 
can not. There is a possibility that, like the Titan, he is 
immortal. Like the woman writer's text, he is-born of an 
illicit union, and as such has the disruptive power of the 
grotesque, the potential to unsettle the binary system of 
androcentric culture which disempowers the female by 
associating her with feminised nature. 
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The monster as a possible role model for women writers 
emphasises the power rather than the culpability of the 
Titan. Identification with the monster may prove a less 
pessimistic prospect for the "female Prometheus": where 
Frankenstein's suffering is what is "beyond words," it is 
the monster's very identity which exceeds definition by 
language. Where Frankenstein regains his fidelity to 
culture, learning to see clearly, as he puts it, the monster 
remains undefinable and so uncontrollable. This, as I shall 
show, also has connections with vision and, more 
importantly, with escaping the vision which .results in 
Victor Frankenstein's final conservatism. 
The monster is a grotesque creature born of 
Frankenstein's discovery of the fecund maternal body which 
underlies and undermines patriarchy's sanitised 
representations of death, nature and the female. Despite 
this, Shelley's presentation of the monster's perceptions of 
nature suggest that he is not the abomination which his 
maker considers him: his response to the "pleasant showers 
and genial warmth of spring" resembles CLerval's (161). He 
recognises in nature a "[h]appy, happy earth! Fit habitation 
for gods," and he finds solace here. Hi~ "spirits [are] 
elevated by the enchanting appearance of nature; the past 
was blotted from [his] memory, the present was tranquil, and 
the future gilded by bright rays of hope and anticipation of 
joy" (ibid.). The monster is not a reflection of his 
creator; his initial sympathy with nature suggests his 
independence from the ''sin" of his conception: he is 
abhorrent to man but, unlike Frankenstein, he is not 
alienated from nature. Shelley makes a significant 
distinction here between the monstrous and the immoral. 
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The monster is the first of a new race; by implication, 
if Frankenstein were more like Prometheus the creator, he 
would produce a mate for the creature and so institute a new 
species. It is finally the limits of his imagination, his 
assumption that the new creature's appearance will conform 
to the expectations of the old race, that make him fail, for 
Ovid's Prometheus did not simply create one ill-endowed 
misfit. The monster's dream is Edenic: 
If you consent [to make a female], neither you nor 
any other human being shall ever see us again .... 
My companion will be of the same nature as myself 
and will be content with the same fare. We shall 
make our bed of dried leaves; the sun will shine 
on us as on man ..... The picture I pre~ent to you 
is peaceful and human .... (191) 
In fact, it is not a human picture, but the vision of the 
beginning of a new culture. The creature and his mate appear 
as a new Adam and Eve, taking with them both kinds of fire: 
the literal existence given to them by Frankenstein and the 
culture the monster has learnt. The problem, of course, is 
that this learnt culture has already made impossible the 
creation of a new one. The monster has already assumed the 
values of patriarchy. The language which enables him to 
reason with Frankenstein in the hope of escaping human 
society is the same which rejects him as monstrous. This 
paradox resembles that experienced by the woman writer: 
language is difficult to separate from its androcentric 
origins. The monster's dream cannot come true; the best he 
can do is make use of 'the culture he has appropriated to 
disrupt it from within. This is precisely what the woman 
, 
writer has to do. The hybridism of each leads to an 
ambiguous position in relation to the symbolic and, for 
each, monstrosity is the source of both their misery and 
their power. 
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The connections between the monster and "Mother Nature" 
are like those between Prometheus and Gaia; he is half hers, 
a hybrid, and as such is appalling to culture: Frankenstein 
is, after all, a horror story. The return of what culture 
banishes to its margins is what lies at the base of horror. 
Julia Kristeva's name for this is "abjection," "death 
infecting life," and the abject is that which "disturbs 
identity, system, order" and "draws attention to the 
fragility of the law" (1982:4). 
Frankenstein's monster is created unnaturally - that is 
by culture's appropriation of nature's power - but he is 
significantly not made of synthetic, cultural materials: he 
is a resurrection of corpses, of the evidence of death. His 
monstrosity lies partly in his being a reminder of the 
abject, of the decay which is absolutely natural and as such 
is a threat to culture. Culture needs to reject reminders 
that Gaia finally is stronger than any human ambition. The 
humanity of man, then, depends on Prometheus's creation of 
him as looking up and away from the earth beneath his feet. 
The monster and the woman writer both embody the 
hybridisation of earth and sky, Gaia and Ouranos. 
Frankenstein uncovers the frightening reality of the 
presymbolic maternal, but the creation itself is a denial of 
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"earth." 
As I have suggested, the Romantic association of women 
with nature denies them a voice in culture and so 
disempowers them, but also associates them with a source of 
power most threatening to patriarchy. Pandora is both1mother 
and liar; her "evil" has its source in her ability to 
reproduce her own kind as well as to mis-produce language. 
When the abject is brought into the realm of culture, horror 
results. The threat of the monstrous, either as woman who 
writes, as her hybrid text, or as the creature made from 
corpses, is the unearthing and return of the banished 
maternal. 
Barbara Creed, using Kristeva's theory of the abject, 
distinguishes between two different forms of the maternal. 
They may be likened to the two versions of the literal, the 
nonsymbolic language wh.ich exists entirely outside of 
culture, and the literal as perceived from within the 
symbolic. What Creed calls the "archaic mother" is 
completely external to culture. As "the mother who gives 
birth all by herself, the original parent, the godhead of 
all fertility and the origin of procreation" (1986:62), she 
is the mother of the presymbolic dyad, the source of life 
which calls into question the subsequent cultural myth of a 
male deity's creation with words (or fire). Because entry 
into the symbolic requires (at least for the boy) the 
rejection of the maternal, the archaic mother, as viewed 
from within the symbolic, is necessarily seen as 
threatening. Within 
patriarchal signifying practices ... , she is 
reconstructed and represented as a negative 
figure, one associated with the dread of the 
generative mother seen only as the abyss, the 
monstrous vagina, the origin of all life 
threatening to re-absorb what it once birthed. 
(Creed 1986:62) 
The profound ambivalence associated with the maternal, as 
both the source of life and the reminder of death, results 
in the .feminisation of the female, nature, and especially 
the mother, by culture. When this domestication fails and 
the threatening reality appears, the result is abjection, 
the monstrous. Frankenstein finds the female creature too 
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horrible to complete. While the original monster is male, 
Frankenstein's dream on the night of its creation (in which 
his embrace transforms Elizabeth into the corpse of his dead· 
mother) reveals that his horror is for the female. The dream 
is virtually a compendium of the "abominations" Creed lists 
as abject: "sexual immorality and perversion; corporeal 
alteration; decay and death; ... the corpse; ... the 
feminine body and incest" (1986:46). Shelley's novel, then, 
despite being about a male monster, is particularly about 
the horror of the female. Frankenstein is threatened less as 
a human being than specifically as a man. 
The function of ''horror" as art, or fiction, is 
frequently to define and so delimit the power of the abject, 
in the same way as, according to Stallybrass and White, the 
carnival is the site of the construction as well as the 
deformation of "symbolic polarities 11 (1986:16). The 
presentation of the grotesque as freakish and abnormal can 
be used to domesticate the monstrous by labelling it as 
irrelevant, marginal to culture. Culture's ambivalent 
' treatment of the monstrous leads to its potentially 
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subversive position on the boundary between the accepted and 
the repressed. The cultural definition of fire delimits its 
terror in a similar way. Frankenstein, like Ovid's 
Prometheus, takes fire/procreation from its place in nature 
and attempts to place it safely within the controlling realm 
of culture. The monster denies that realm by existing on the 
margins between culture and nature, refusing definition in 
culture at the same time as refusing to be silenced. 
Creed describes the "central ideological project" of 
conventional, conservative horror as the "purification of 
the abject.~' Horror fiction confronts the abject ~in order 
to eject [it] and re-draw the boundaries between the 
human and the non-human" (1986:53). The self is 
reconstituted, the threat removed, "by the conventional 
ending of the horror narrative in which the monster is 
usually 'named' and destroyed" (1986:65). 
Naming the monster, that is, giving it a defining label 
which places it safely within the symbolic, destroys its 
monstrosity. Language, then, has a particular power in 
relation to the abject. 
The only names Frankenstein's monster is given are 
expressions of horror and these, apprehending his 
monstrosity, emphasise rather than defuse his threat by 
connecting his grotesque appearance with evil. He is called 
"devil", "villain" (213), "fiend", "daemon" (145). He is, as 
I have suggested, a threat to signification. The power of 
the earth goddess in Prometheus Bound is connected with the 
unnameable in a similar way: Prometheus says of his mother 
"one form she hath but many names" (v.212). This 
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multiplicity of names has the same effect as being nameless: 
it undermines patriarchy's ability to delimit by labelling 
and emphasises maternal nature's independence of the laws of 
culture. 
The monster is illegitimate, not positioned according 
to (human) law, in that he lacks a father's name. Jane 
Gallop discusses the "Name-of-the-Father" as the basis of a 
culture founded on the exchange of women (as Levi-Strauss 
describes exogamy): the "system of the Name-of-the-Father 
implies authorized possession-of the woman, who since 
possessed can be exchanged" (Gallop 1982:49). This ownership 
by naming is based on biological fatherhood, and the mother, 
while powerless to name, is capable of undermining the 
name's power: 
[T]he patronym, patriarchal law, patrilineal 
identity, language as our inscription into 
patriarchy. The Name-of-the-Father is the fact of 
the attribution of paternity by law, by language. 
Paternity cannot be perceived, proven ... ; it must 
be instituted by judgement of the mother's word. 
(1982:47) -
Hence, a female monster witq a nameless mate could produce a 
race of creatures who are illegitimate, not subject to 
legislation because independent of the naming on which 
patriarchal law is based, a "race of devils" as Frankenstein 
describes them (210). 
That the monster's namelessness was deliberate and 
important to Shelley is borne ou~ by a comment in a letter 
about the first theatrical adaptation of Frankenstein: 
The play bill amused me extremely, for in the list 
of dramatis personae came, ~~ by Mr T. Cooke 
[the actor playing the monster]: this nameless 
mode of naming the unameable (sic] is rather 
good .... (Shelley to Leigh Hunt, 9 September 
1823, ed. Bennet 1980:378) 
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This escape from representation, coupled with the use of 
language as a means of undermining its source, is a strategy 
of the woman writ~r. The anonymous text, as Frankenstein was 
when first published, and the speculation to which it 
usually gives ris~tend to conceal the writer in the same 
way as the translator is concealed behind the "voice" of the 
original author. 
The first edition of Frankenstein was criticised for 
its excess of "painful sensation" and its apparent lack of 
moral didacticism . 16 Hindle suggests that the reason for this 
was its inscription to William Godwin, Shelley's father and 
"infamous philosophical radical of the anarchist Left" and 
so "most reviewers assumed the work's author to be Percy 
Shelley, Godwin's best-known literary disciple" (1985:8). 
Ironically, the preface to this edition was written by 
Percy. 
Attributing the novel to its author would in any case 
have been very difficult in 1818. Not Mary Shelley, for she 
was not yet married, and to all intents and purposes no 
longer Mary Godwin, for her father disowned her when she 
eloped, she was herself - apart from the non-defining (if 
appropriately resonant) first name of her mother - nameless. 
The novel, like the children she bore during this period, 
and like the monster, is truly illegitimate. 
In the same way as she and the creature are nameless, 
the female author of Frankenstein, like a translator, is 
technically voiceless. The narrative- consists, apart from a 
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few letters written by Elizabeth, entirely of male voices. 
Instead of a female subject, there is at the centre of the 
novel the autobiographical narrative of the monster. It is 
significant that in most retellings of Shelley's myth (that 
is, in the many film versions of the novel), the monster's 
narrative is left out. The "h.orr'or story" of 
Frankenstein is far more easily told when the,monster is 
looked on as unambiguously evil, the object of a familiar 
human subject's terror and hatred. By making the monster the 
subject of his own narrative, Shelley gives the "other" a 
voice, the stolen language. 
James P.Carson suggests that Shelley's impersonation of 
the masculine supports her theory of "the value of 
sympathetic identification with the other" (1988:450). In 
giving the monster a voice (her own?), and having it heard, 
she does what Frankenstein cannot do for his creature, and 
what patriarchal culture usually refuses to do for the woman 
writer. 
If he is given a voice, to what extent is the creature 
a "thief of language," or of fire? As the text which is 
Shelley's "hideous progeny," he i~ the recipient of 
Promethean fire, the monster mothered by a monster. Only at 
the end of the novel does he carry out a kind of theft. 
Within his autobiographical narrative, the monster's 
experience is with the positive aspects of fire. He 
discovers it while "oppressed by cold" (149). It is as if 
nature makes a gift of fire to him, as Gaia did to Zeus when 
she wanted him to overthrow Kronos. His process of learning 
about fire suggests primitive man re-inventing culture. He 
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examines "the materials of fire" and discovers the use of 
dry wood for burning. He learns to "rouse the embers" and 
how to cook. Shelley thus presents an alternative cultural 
development; the monster's science is much simpler and more 
primitive than Frankenstein's. When he decides to move on, 
he does not take the fire with him: "I had obtained [it] 
through accident and knew not how to reproduce it" (150). 
Discovering how to reproduce is what makes him Promethean, 
even if it is, because of Frankenstein's rejection of him, 
fire and language that he reproduces, rather than himself• 
In asking for a companion, he tells Frankenstein of ~the 
fire of love that burns my heart" (193). The monster is not 
permitted literal creativity, making him another kind of 
mirror image of the female, who is denied the figurative. 
The monster uses what he does know of fire to help the 
cottagers, collecting firewood and leaving it outside their 
home each night. His use of fire and his learning of 
language are connected; he learns to speak by listening to 
the cottagers teach Safie their language, this "godlike 
science" which he desires to know so that he can achieve 
sympathetic communion with others (158). 
His first attempts to speak echo Io's inarticulateness: 
he is a tormented creature who tries to express himself, but 
is "frightened into silence" by his own "uncouth and 
inarticulate sounds" (149). Gradually he learns words, and 
the first one is "fire" (158). Having discovered the use of 
literal fire, he gains the figurative fire of language. As 
fire, for the creature, is associated with nurturing, even 
with maternal care, so is language, at first: the second 
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word he learns is "milk" (158). 
This benevolent use of fire is emphasised when the 
creature meets Frankenstein and tells him his story; it is 
cold on the mountain and, while the monster is strong enough 
to survive it, he recognises that the "temperature of this 
place is not fitting to [Frankenstein's] fine sensations." 
He invites his creator into his own hut, and keeps him warm. 
Victor sits "by the fire which my odious companion had 
lighted" (147). 
The monster's rejection by those who have unwittingly 
become his foster parents precipitates his rebellion against 
human society. When the cottagers abandon him, he sets fire 
to their house and burns it down. He has learnt to reproduce 
fire, and uses it qS the mode of his rebellion, in the 
symbolic destruction of a cultural structure. 
His understanding of patriarchal society is based 
largely on what he has read "of men concerned in public 
affairs, governing or massacring their species" (174), and 
of "peaceable lawgivers,"· whom he admires, his impressions 
affirmed by the "patriarchal lives of [hiS] protectors" 
(175). Shelley opposes the idea of patriarchy to the "glory 
and slaughter" desired by a young soldier, emphasising that 
patriarchy at this stage is associated by the monster with 
the peaceful - and abnormal - order of the De Lacey family; 
its patriarch is blind. Also, there is no mother. 
Mellor suggests that this family can be contrasted with 
the "pattern of inequality and injustice" Shelley presents 
as the rest of society, calling them "a vision of a social 
group based on justice, equality and mutual affection" 
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(1988b:222). They are only this while viewed from outside, 
however. When the monster tries to make contact with them, 
he is attacked, beaten and fled from. The family's apparent 
enlightenment is based on blindness. The creature's few 
moments of hope are experienced in the company of De Lacey, 
who lacks the faculty on which cultural differentiation, the 
discrimination between binary opposites, is based. 
Ideas of blindness and darkness are significant in the 
monster's narrative. Jane Gallop analyses the role of 
oculocentrism, the privileging of sight, in phallocentric 
culture; the visibility of the male genitalia emphasises the 
lack of any visible female equivalent. Masculine power, 
then, is based on seeing. The subject's entry into the 
symbolic is usually dependent on the visual recognition of 
one's (mirrored) image and representation is based on naming 
what is absent, what cannot be seen, on figuring (in the 
"mind's eye") the literal that, if visibly present, would 
not need to be named. Carson discusses the blinding of the 
father as "mutilation", as a metaphqrical castration which, 
his phallo/oculocentrism disrupted, "permits daughters, 
monstrous sons and their doctrine of sympathy to be heard" 
(1988:435). He points out that 
[t]he blinded father both arouses sympathy and is 
himself capable of greater sympathy than a man who 
is entire, seamless, and potent .... (1988:442) 
De Lacey is not the only character who does not see the 
monster who, like the Gorgon, is so ugly - so unsightly -
that even those who are able to see have to blind themselves 
temporarily in order to remain in his presence. No-one can 
listen sympathetically and look at him at the same time. 
Walton describes seeing the creature: 
Never did I behold a vision so horrible as his 
face, of such loathsome yet appalling hideousness. 
I shut my ey~s involuntarily .... (261) 
The creature is described by Frankenstein as "too horrible 
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for human eyes" (146). Like the abject maternal, the monster 
must be unseen - by implication, absent - for signification 
to take place. His lite~al, visible. presence disrupts the 
symbolic which is based on seeing. 
If the monster is not looked at, he can be heard. When 
asked to listen to his story, Frankenstein at first refuses, 
_saying "Relieve me from the sight of your detested form" 
(147). The creature responds by placing his hands over his 
maker's eyes, saying that he should still listen, and be 
compassionate. He temporarily blinds Frankenstein. 
Appropriately, the tale is finally heard in the creature's 
dark hut, where the only light comes from the fire he has 
made to keep his parent warm. 
Carson implies that writing can be a means of blinding 
which permits the monstrous woman writer's voice to be 
heard; Shelley's editing of her husband's work by the 
paradoxically silent intrusion of her own voice, was called 
"mutilation," and Carson associates this with both blinding 
and castration (1988:435). Rewriting the voice of an author, 
by translation of whatever kind, is then one way to "blind" 
the eye of patriarchy, the gaze which defines the female and 
natural as either silent and beautiful or monstrous and 
evil. Carson points out that there are "scenes of daughters 
caring for their blind fathers" in thre~ of Shelley's 
novels, Frankenstein, Valperga, and The Last Man (1988:442): 
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Shelley literalises the effect of her writing, particularly 
her rewriting of the myths of patriarchy, on oculocentric 
culture. Disrupting the visual discrimination underlying the 
symbolic makes possible the non-gendered writing of the 
monstrous and the presymbolic. 
The clarity of vision Frankenstein describes when he 
destroys the female monster is the reverse of this 
sympathetic blindness. There is a sense that if he.had 
retained the "blind hope" with which he began his project, 
he might have brought it to a.less desolate conclusion. The 
candle that is extinguished at the moment of the monster's 
birth is perhaps the flame which Frankenstein will now, 
seeing the danger of what he is doing, never attain. Again 
the ambiguity of the moth's blind flight into the flame is 
emphasised: Shelleyt as a potential Prometheus like 
Frankenstein, has to choose between remaining blinded by the 
light of her ambition and seeing - by the same light - that 
it will burn her. 
The creature describes his state before learnin9 
language as "blind vacancy'' (167), and his first experience 
of light is that of the moon, all that he can distinguish· 
out of a "strange multiplicity of sensations" (148). He 
learns to identify objects by seeing them, but he does not 
see himself until after he has acquired language. His 
identity is based first on the pejorative words used to 
describe him, and on the image of himself reflected in the 
eyes of man, who sees him as a monster. In a reversal of the. 
Lacanian formation of the subject, the monster's acquisition 
of language precedes his vision of his own image: by the 
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time he sees himself mirrored in a pool of water, he has 
already been evaluated in what should be the reliable sight 
of his parent, and has learnt the culture of men. In a 
parody of narcissism, he encounters his visible image; his 
double in the mirror becomes his self, seen through eyes 
already trained in human cultural values. "I became fully 
convinced that I was in reality the monster that I am" 
(159). (This explicitly recalls the corifessor's ability to 
convince Justine that she is monstrous.) The creature's "I 
am" and "reality" are inseparable from the epithet 
"monstrous," based on the judgement of sight. He has already 
entered the symbolic - the agonising moment of seeing and 
recoiling from his reflection is not his rejection of the 
mother, but of himself. 
This reversal of the formation of the supject, and the 
fact that those listening to the monster's discourse never 
see him at the same time, suggest that .he uses language 
without becoming fully a part of the symbolic. Language and 
seeing remain separate for him, his subjecthood constituted 
differently to the conventional relationship between 
representation and subject. 
The monster's hybridism, then, extends beyond his 
origins and his physical structure to his linguistic 
ability. Like the woman writer, he is capable of a grotesque 
transgression of language, a shift of the terms that try to 
silence the nameless. The creature is given a voice, not by 
the failed Prometheus who made him, but by the potentially 
successful one, his author. A measure of Shelley's success 
is his final escape even from her: in her conservative 
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rewriting of the novel, his voice remains untouched. 
The monster, after Frankenstein has died, speaks to 
Walton of the future. Once before he has done this,· telling 
his creator the dream of a new Eden. This hope destroyed, he 
says he has a new one: oblivion. He tells Walton that he 
plans to kill himself, saying that he longs "for the moment 
when these hands will meet my eyes" (264) in a final 
rejection of oculocentric culture; when he can no longer 
see, or be seen, he will be free. 
The creature has the power of using language, a power 
which almost succeeds in attaining for him the companion 
which will facilitate the institution of a new culture. At 
the same time he remains free from the implications of bei.ng 
a part of the symbolic: unseen and unnamed, he retains the 
freedom of being excluded from culture. Of course this 
freedom is ambiguous; like the woman identified with nature, 
to escape culture by returning to what Shelley herself 
called "Nature & solitude" is to be silenced. But the 
monster's rejection of culture, because juxtaposed with his 
appropriation of language, is more complex than ~his. 
He acquires the "fire" of culture; but his use of it is 
associated with its opposite, ice. He tells his story to 
Frankenstein in the Alps under the wall of a glacier, both 
frozen and moving, so hard yet so unstable that "speaking 
... [is] sufficient to draw destruction upon the head of the 
speaker" (143). 
Gallop discusses the parallels between representation 
and freezing: to be seen, culturally, is to be pinned down, 
made immobile, or frozen. Kristeva relates the visual 
103 
representation of the subject to this paralysis: she calls 
the milk of the mother "la glace," both "ice" and '"mirror," 
presenting the maternal in the condition Homans describes as 
"frozen by androcentric culture into the objectified form of 
a still and silent mirror" (1986:21). To release the mother 
- and thus the child, too - from the trammels of figuration, 
the ice must be melted and moved. Gallop points out the 
female voice's potential to carry out a double discourse 
which can both retain subjectivity and disrupt the 
representation which can "freeze ... the nameless flow": 
... without represe~tation there is only infantile 
passivity, powerlessness, anxiety. The only way to 
move is to exercise power and criticize it, not 
let it gel into a rigid representation. (Gallop 
1982:121) ' 
The monster's story, the narrative of the unnameable, spoken 
unseen, is the only speech which can be made in the presence 
of the glacier, an unstable and potentially dangerous wall 
of shifting ice. It exercises figurative language at the 
same time as revealing its flaws. The hybrid and grotesque 
noise of literal and symbolic language speaking together 
might shift this ice; the stolen fire might melt it just 
enough to set it - and the mother - free. 
The final part of the monster's narrative takes place 
in the frozen Arctic wasteland. He has chosen to lead 
Frankenstein there, to "the everlasting ices of the North" 
(248) because of his own abnormal ability to withstand the 
cold. His final speech to Walton is a promise which provides 
a figure for the ending of the novel - his suicide and a 
restoration of order - but does not enact it. He says, in 
the languag~ which he has no cultural right to, that he will 
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destroy himself by burning, using the literal fire to 
destroy both stolen figurative forms: the life he has been 
given and the culture he .has taken. It can never be told 
whether he does burn himself (simultaneously melting the 
"ice" of representation - and so silencing himself 
completely - once and for all?) or whether he continues to 
live in the Arctic, free. Finally, he escapes the narratives 
of his authors, both Frankenstein and Shelley. 
To the extent that Shelley identified with her "hideous 
progeny," it (both as novel and as monster) is a figure for 
the ambivalent and double rewriting of the woman writer. 
Literal and figurative creativity are combined in the 
writing mother as they are in the speaking monster: both are 
"half-men" and each achieves a subversive theft of fire. The 
ambivalence remains: the monster's,escape from the pain of 
isolation within culture seems to imply either suicide or 
silence, in the "darkness and distance" (265) of the Arctic. 
Frankenstein himself contemplates suicide: "I was 
tempted to plunge into the silent lake" (137). He calls on 
the stars either to kill him - "crush sensation and memory; 
let me become as nought" - or at least "leave me in 
darkness" (194). At the lake (modelled, by a curious 
phonetic coincidence, on the Swiss "Mer de Glace" [Hindle 
1985:23]), he considers the "brute" without "superior 
sensibilities" as fortunate: ''If our impulses were confined 
to hunger, thirst, and desire, we might nearly be free" 
(143). This is the same freedom that Mitchell described as 
"pre-historic, pre-civilization" (1974:366), the only way in 
which women can be entirely free of patriarchy, but a 
freedom which is also oblivion, a unity with nature that 
leaves only silence. 
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The creature similarly longs for an end to the pain of 
consciousness. He is not a mere brute, and he suffers 
according to the values of the same system he rebels 
against. He wishes he were that "brute": "Oh, that I had 
forever remained in my native wood, nor known nor~felt 
beyond the sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat!" (166). 
He longs to see nothing, and to be returned to the passive 
cycle of nature, his ashes "swept intd the sea by the winds" 
(265). The creature's desire to return to nature echoes the 
place of Wordsworth's dead Lucy in "earth's diurnal course," 
inanimate and silent. Even if he does not die, the monster, 
it seems, is alone in the darkness, outside of culture. 
But, apart from the possibility that he will go on 
living when he has escaped perception, when patriarchy can 
no longer see whether or not he makes literal the death he 
has represented, Shelley implies that he will go on using 
language. While Frankenstein is pursuing him, the monster 
leaves him messages, "marks in writing on the barks of the 
trees or cut in stone" (248). He writes, as Homans puts it, 
"on the body of nature" (1986:110), joining inseparably the 
literal earth and the figuration of writing. What he writes 
both torments his pursuer -"my power is complete" - and 
helps him -"you will find near this place .~. a dead hare; 
eat and be refreshed" (248). He thus ~xercises the ambiguity 
of the fire he ha~ stolen. He h~s the potential to go on 
writing on the world after he has promised to die: his 
promise to Walton may be his first fiction, his first poem. 
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Shelley carried out Ostriker's ''invasion of the 
treasuries of existing language" (1986:315) in two ways: she 
revised the myth of Prometheus in such a way as to subvert 
the patriarchal mythology that produced it, and she created 
a monstrous metaphor for the representation and potential 
resolution of women's position in relation to culture and 
language. 
Shelley suffered for being monstrous, and finally she 
gave in t6 her fear of the danger she, like Frankenstein, 
saw in the theft of fire. Her ideas about the education of 
her only surviving biological child reveal what she had 
learnt: 
There is a poetic, if not historic, truth in the 
story that when she was reproached for sending her 
son to Harrow rather than some school where he 
would learn to think for himself, Mary said: 'For 
heaven's sake, let him learn to think like 
everybody else!,, (Grylls 1938:xiii) 
Her misery, "beyond words," finally silenced h~r. Her novel, 
as the mirror in which she represented and then recognised 
the consequences of her own defiance, may be seen both as 
the burning flame which she had briefly seized and as its 
light, the source of vision which destroyed the blind hope 
Prometheus recognised as so essential to any mortal 
aspiration. 
In her 1831 introduction, she writes a retrospective 
description of the monster's -0rigin: in her dream, the 
sleeper awakes, opens his eyes, and is confronted by the 
monster's "yellow, watery, but speculative eyes" (59). They 
are speculative in that.they question and in that they, like 
his use of language, posit infinite possibilities. But 
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"speculative" has its source in the word for mirror. The 
woman writer awakes-and sees in her creature's eyes the 
reflection of her own monstrosity. As Shelley's introduction 
and her subsequent writing attests, the sight warns her not 
to go on. 
"Monster" comes from the Latin, possibly monstrare, to 
show; probably monere, to warn (Chambers 1989). Shelley, 
unwarned and unseeing, created a monster and then, by the 
light of the fire she had stolen, saw and repented. 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning read Frankenstein. Her career as 
a "female Prometheus" is an inverted mirror image of 
Shelley's. What Barrett had to do was take on the "blind 
hopes" and act, heroically, in the knowledge of the danger 
she had seen. 
CHAPTER THREE 
APPREHENSION AND ESCAPE: ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING 
Did you ever see a tree ·after it has been struck 
by lightning? The whole trunk of that tree was 
bare and peeled - and up that new whiteness of it, 
ran the finger-mar~ of the lightning in a bright 
beautiful rose-colour ... the fever-sign of the 
certain death .... When my father came into the 
room to-day and found me hiding my eyes from the 
lightning, he was quite angry and called it 
'disgraceful to anybody who had ever learnt the 
alphabet'; - to which I answered humbly that 'I 
knew it was' - but if I had been impertinent, I 
might have added that wisdom does not come by the 
alphabet but in spite of it? 
Elizabeth Barrett to Robert Browning, 
12 July 1845~ (1:123-4) 
Elizabeth Barrett was afraid of lightning's fire, but her 
words suggest that she found it desirable as well as 
dangerous. The ambivalence in this passage echoes that which 
seems to characterise much of her work. Any attempt to 
determine whether her work on the Prometheus myth can be 
considered an enactment of a feminist theft of language 
requires an examination of this ambivalence. The act.of 
linguistic rebellion is both appealing and frightening: 
Barrett knew that the Promethean theft of fire is carried 
out in defiance of Zeus and his. thunderbolts. She could have 
answered her father that his language is not necessarily the 
source of wisdom, thereby appropriating his words about the 
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alphabet to express her own concern about language, but that 
would have been "impertinent"; instead she agrees with him, 
later expressing her ambivalence in a letter to the man with 
whom she is soon to commit the real impertinence against her 
father: her escape from him. 
Barrett's writing re~eals the certainty that language 
is hers, but to maintain this assurance as a writer, there 
is much she denies. It took her forty years to ·accept fully 
the implications of her potential to be a "female 
Prometheus," and the presence of the myth in her work 
throughout this time plays a significant part in her 
development. 
Mary Shelley, in her revision of the Prometheus myth, 
explores the desirability of appropriating patriarchal 
culture while simultaneously criticising it. There are 
dangers inherent in such a project: the woman writer, like 
the monster, is both freed from some cultural constraints by 
her marginalised position and possibly silenced by her 
exclusion. She can "steal l~nguage" but, like Frankenstein, 
will alw~ys be puni~hed in some way for transgressing. The 
ambiguous ending of Frankenstein suggests this: the monster 
is free, but he is also alone. ~arrett learnt this. 
In age there were only nine years betwee·n Shelley and 
Barrett, who was born on 6 March 1806. Both women rebelled 
by eloping to Europe with poets. Significantly, though, Mary 
Shelley ran away in 1814 at the age of seventeen and wrote 
Frankenstein-two years later. Elizabeth Barrett, already 
having produced her work dealing most explicitly with the 
Prometheus myth, her two translations of Prometheus Bound, 
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escaped in 1846: she was forty. Barrett was the product of a 
Victorian rather than a Romantic upbringing; if Shelley's 
work evinces a shift from audacious Romantic individualism 
I 
to remorseful Victorian conformity, then Barrett's reveals a 
gradual development from ambition, limited by the 
apprehension of danger, to a virtual reconciliation of 
Romantic and Victorian values, and of figurative and literal 
creativity. 
The status of the figure of Prometheus changed in the 
Victorian period. A conflict was perceived between 
Christianity and paganism which for the Romantics, removed 
as they were from orthodox religion, was insignificant. 
Prometheus became associated with an "alliance between 
aggressive humanism, self-reliance, and Satanism" as opposed 
to "God-reliance, total commitment to Absolutes, and 
consequent self-immolation" (Bush 1937:266). Closely related 
to this was the perception of women: as Mary Poovey shows, 
the ideal Victorian woman, the "proper lady" was not far 
from the female characters Shelley presented in 
Frankenstein, pure and angelic, epitomizing self-abnegation 
(Poovey 1984). The Victorian woman was expected never to be 
proud, insolent, self-willed or rebellious. 
It was inevitable, then, that Barrett's fascination 
with the Prometheus myth would lead to conflict: attempts to 
reconcile the Promethean and the Christian, the Romantic and 
the Victorian, and the feminist and the feminine, play a 
crucial part in her work. The myth became bound up with her 
need to make sense of her dual identity as woman and writer. 
Barrett was seen by many as the ideal of the 
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conservative Victorian ''poetess." Dbrmer Cre~ton's 1943 
biography is entitled Andromeda in Wimpole Street: in Greek 
myth, Andromeda, like Prometheus, is bound to a rock. In her 
case, however, the reason for her suffering is not her own 
transgressiori, but that of her parents, ~nd she escapes not 
by any action of her own but because she is rescued and 
married by the hero, Perseus. Creston's book presents 
Barrett as the heroine of a Victorian romance. The 
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conflicting mythical images seem to sum up the writer's 
ambivalence: can she be seen, finally, as the passive 
Andromeda, or as the figure who fascinated her, the 
rebellious Prometheus? 
At first glance, Barrett's work seems to conform to the 
expectations of the kind of lady's writing· Griswold did not• 
find "hermaphroditic." Her lyrics and romance-ballads made 
her immensely popular and beloved. Stedman, in his 1904 
survey of Victorian poets calls her the "apotheosis of 
womanhood" and describes her "delicate genius" as "purely 
feminine" (147). But this, it seems, was not how she 
perceived herself. 
B'arrett, having produced an epic poem, "The Battle of 
Marathon," at the age of eleven and published an imitation 
of Pope, "An Essay on Mind," at seventeen, sought the 
intellectual eminence of the male poet, making her what 
.Griswold would have attacked as possessed of both genders, 
and so monstrous. She had to decide, as Shelley did, whether 
she could accept this identity and its implications. 
Like Prometheus, Barrett took possession of the fire of 
language. She tried to avoid punishment by isolating 
herself. In solitude she could deny her own monstrosity: 
just as Frankenstein's creature had to be invisible to be 
accepted, so Barrett's exclusion from society enabled her 
deny her own difference. 
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Unlike the monster's, though, her rebellion against her 
father/creator was what ended her isolation. Her 
translations of Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound, it seems, 
af f irm~d her identity as a poet as the same time as raising 
questions about the implications of this identity. She would 
have to negotiate the difficulties of exercising the 
cultural power bestowed by her use of language, for as a 
woman she remained marginalised by that culture. As long as 
she went unseen, deliberately excluding herself, she could, 
as Frankenstein did, deny her own monstrosity and continue 
writing as she pleased. At the same time, as her letters to 
Robert Browning reveal, she recognized her loss in giving up 
the "normal" life of a woman within society. Her ambivalence 
was based on the necessity to decide whether or not she 
dared to take on the role of Prometheus, with its 
implications of transgression and punishment, as well as 
heroism and liberation. 
Barrett's description of the thunderstorm does not only 
present the destruction of a tree; it contains a warning she 
could identify with more closely, a literalisation of Zeus's 
punishment: 
[I)n that same storm, two young women belonging to 
a festive party were kil·led on the Malvern Hills -
each sealed to death in a moment with a sign on 
the chest which a common seal would cover - only 
the sign on them was not rose coloured as on our 
tree, but black as charred wood. So I get 
'possessed' sometimes with the effects of these 
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impressions .... (EB to RB, 12 July 1845, 1:123-4) 
Women enjoying themselves are struck down by a thunderbolt. 
Barrett's retelling (she does not say whether she saw the 
corpses herself, but Malvern was noi far from Hope End) 
suggests that the women have been branded with fire, marked 
"on·the chest" (on heart or breast?); the mark is not 
meaningless, but "a sign," small but mortal, and their 
destruction lacks even the beauty she sees in the dead tree. 
The signs resemble "charred woqd": dead, the female flesh is 
like that of the tree, echoing Frankenstein's description of 
the oak reduced to a "blasted stump" (89). 
In Barrett's diary there are suggestions that reading 
Frankenstein had affected her in some way: commenting on The 
Last Man, she compares the two, saying that the beginning of 
the latter had disappointed her: "I ... fancied that all 
[Shelley's] genius had exhaled in Frankenstein" (9 August 
1831, 132). 1 To speculate, perhaps Barrett remembered 
Frankenstein's burnt tree, and his own reduction to a 
similar state. Perhaps the monster was a warning to her, and 
perhaps she feared the "exhalation" of her own genius. In 
any case, she knew the role of lightning· in the Prometheus 
myth, and the danger of incurring the wrath of Zeus. 
( 
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CREATING ZEUS, OR THE MONSTER'S FATHER 
But how canst thou disobey 
The father? Doth not this affright thee ... ? 
Prometheus Bound vv.40-1. (Trans. EB 1833:18) 2 
Is disobedience to the Father's word 
A possible thing? Dost quail not ... ? 
(Trans. EB 1850:141) 3 
Any reading of the character of Prometheus requires careful 
interpretation of the character of Zeus. Is he just, and so 
justified in punishing the rebellious Titan, as Hesiod 
suggests? Is he the cruel tyrant Aeschylus makes him? Or is 
he somewhere between the two, ambiguous? If what is at issue 
here is whether Elizabeth Barrett's writing about Prometheus 
amounts to a successful enactment of the myth itself, 
perhap~ the first ambiguity to be examined should be the 
·nature of her personal Zeus, a powerful influence on her 
writing: her father. In a letter to Robert Browning she 
calls him by another name for Zeus, "Jupiter Tonans, 11 the 
thunderer (12 July 1845, 1:122). 
According to popular legend, reinforced by Rudolph 
Besier's popular play The Barretts of Wimpole Street (1931) 
and its subsequent film version, Edward Barrett was the 
epitome of the harsh Victorian patriarch, an oppressive 
tyrant. 4 Yet his daughter's letters and diary suggest that 
he was also the loving and beloved father wh~ opened his 
library to her, published her childhood writing and made it 
possible for her, although a girl, to become a poet. It is 
this ambivalence about the father that is perhaps at the 
root of much female and feminist uncertainty: that the one 
who loves is also the one who entraps is difficult to 
recognise and even more difficult to change. In her essay 
''Wicked Fathers: A Family Romance," Cora Kaplan analyses 
this ambivalence: . 
If wicked fathers and their surrogates were not, 
often, also loved and living figures; if their 
female children bore them only the just measure of 
hatred due to abstract tyranny then they.would not 
pose the kinds of problems that they do for 
feminism. (1986:193) 
Aeschylus's Zeus, the tyrant, would be relatively easy to 
rebel against: the biological father of the family in 
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patriarchal culture is far more powerful because he is 
nearer to a Christian conception of god, controlling with 
love and so confounding the clarity of mind so necessary in 
effective rebellion. Aeschylus's Zeus could have Prometheus 
staked to a rock and eaten alive by a vulture, but he could 
not make him torture himself with remorse. 
Margaret Forster examines Barrett's relationship with 
her father, finding that she was deeply dependent on and 
possessive of him, suggesting that it was this and her 
illness which made him so protective of her 
(1988:53,94,117)• Forster suggests that Barrett, once she 
found herself romantically interested in Robert Browning, 
needed to evaluate her father and find him, like Zeus, a 
tyrant and so easier to defy without regret. Only this would 
remove the paralysing dependence standing in the way of her 
freedom, a freedom based not so much on escaping from her · 
father as on entering the dangerous world of experience, of 
learning the wisdom that does not come from the alphabet. 
She could not afford to be ambivalent, so it is possible 
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that she actively made her father a tyrant. She can be seen 
to do this in her letters, presenting him to her friend, 
Mary Russell Mitford, as "an endearing eccentric" but at the 
same time to Browning as "a cold, unfeeling monster" 
(Forster 1988:161). In order to rebel against her father, 
she had to believe in Aeschylus's reading of Zeus. It is 
Robert Browning who, about two weeks before their secret 
I 
marriage, makes the connection explicit, calling Mr Barrett 
"father Zeus with his paternal epistles, and peggings to the 
rock" (RB to EB, 31 August 1846, 2:499). Browning goes on to 
quote in Greek the lines from Aeschylus which Barrett had 
translated as 
Think no more 
That I, fear-struck by Zeus to a woman's mind, 
Will supplicate him, loathed as he is, 
With feminine upliftings of my hands, 
To break these chains. Far from me be the thought! 
(vv.1002-6, trans. EB 1850:159) 
The lines are appropriate: Barrett's rebellion is seen by 
her not as a feminist act against a patriarch, but as a 
complete rejection of what she perceives as natural feminine 
submissiveness. She refuses to use "feminine upliftings" of 
her hands which, as feminine, can be used not for breaking 
chai~s, but only for supplication. She determines to break 
those chains herself as a man, a hero like Prometheus, 
would. 
This rejection of femininity points to the real 
ambivalence: the one thing it seems Barrett never doubted 
was her vocation as a poet, but maintaining this emphasised 
the conflict between the dual image of herself as woman and 
writer. Neither of Barrett's parents was a writer: she had 
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no close models of the necessary conflict between her work, 
and her gender. Her father had not treated her like a 
daughter, and she did not think like one. Shelley's mother 
was dead and so absent, and yet figuratively, pervasively 
present through what she wrote and what was written about 
her. Barrett's mother was physically present throughout her 
childhood, but as a far less ambiguous model of how not to 
be. What Barrett understood, scorned and rejected about 
women was, it appears, based largely on the example of a 
mother who gave birth to twelve"children and died young. 
Forster points out that Barrett read Mary 
Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman at the 
age of twelve (1988:29). It appears that Barrett's 
recognition of women's lack of rights did not impel her to 
want to fight for those rights; her response seems rather to 
have been determination to distance herself from what she 
must hav~ considered the normal lot of her gender, rejecting 
the fact of her own femaleness. 
Her childhood writing reveals a precocious certainty 
of her intelligence and her future as a writer, something 
her father was clearly instrumental in fostering. She was 
allowed to study the classics with her brother's tutor, her 
father arranged the publication of her first epic poem, "The 
Battle of Marathon" when she was fourteen, and even earlier, 
at the age of six, gave her ten shillings as a prize for 
writing a poem about virtue, calling her Poet Laureate: it 
was he who first gave her the name of poet. 
She writes about this at fourteen, in her "Glimpses 
into My own Life and Literary Character," the early 
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autobiography of the "Poet Laureat [sic] of Hope End," who 
at "nine ... felt much pleasure from the effusions of [her] 
imagination in the adorned drapery of imagination" and at 
eleven, "wished to, be considered an authoress" (in Moers 
1978:5-6). To be a writer was, for Barrett, to be 
"determined," "inflexible," "self-loving," "passionate," 
"independent" and even potentially "violent": she describes 
herself, proudly, as all of these (ibid.). Her idea of the 
character of an "authoress" is a far cry from the 
conventional view of self-effacing Victorian womanhood. Her 
early development as a writer, then, suggests that she 
created for herself an essentially masculine poetic 
identity. Instead of suffering the anxiety of being both 
woman and writer, and so the site of conflict, she rejected 
the half of the dualism which she valued less. This was a 
solution which could be made with ease only temporarily. 
In her "autobiography," Barrett rejects femininity 
explicitly: "My mind is naturally independent and spurns the 
.subserviency of opinion which is generally considered 
necessary to feminine softness" (in Moers 1978:6). She sees 
herself as "naturally," 'even biologically, different from 
most women. As Kaplan points out, her fourteen-year-old 
writing reveals "a self almost wholly.at odds with 
contemporary ideologi~s of the feminine, ~n 'I' modelled on 
a full-blooded male romanticism" (1986:198). 
But when Barrett was fourteen, her brother was sent 
away to school and she had to stay at home, denied access to 
his tutor. Suddenly she could not ignore that fact that she 
was-a' girl and as such, disadvantaged. Not long after this, 
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the illnesses that were to isolate and disable her for much 
of her life made their first appearance, removing her from 
normal social involvement and expectations and freeing her, 
as an invalid, to pursue without distraction her role as 
poet. Ironically, this weakness made her seem typical of the 
delicate Victorian "lady," dependent and cosseted. It is 
also likely that much of her father's seeming tyranny was a 
r~sult of her apparent need to be protected. Her "Jupiter 
Tonans" and the myths that have attached to him may well 
have been as much a result of her mythmaking as of his own 
disposition. 
Barrett's mind continued to rebel against the ideology 
of the Victorian feminine: when she was twenty-one she met 
the scholar Hugh Boyd who was to become her tutor and 
mentor. With him she went on reading the classics. In her 
diary she writes that she and Boyd "talked comparatively 
. 
about Homer, Aeschylus and Shakespeare: and positively about 
Aeschylus's Prometheus" (4 July 1831:97). Seven months later 
she wrote her first translation of Prometheus Bound. 
Boyd was the first and, before Browning, the only man 
outside of her immediate family with whom Barrett became 
closely acquainted: although he was married, some of her 
diary entries suggest a passionate but confused infatuation _ 
on Barrett's part. Also, Hugh Boyd was blind. 
CONCEALING THE MONSTROUS 
sisters three, 
The Gorgons, serpent-haired and man-abhorr'd, 
Whom mortals cannot look upon and, live; 
I warn thee against such. 
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Prometheus Bound (vv.798-801, trans. EB 1833:45) 
the Gorgon sisters three, ... 
With twisted snakes for ringlets, man-abhorred -
There is no mortal gazes in th~ir face, 
And gazing can breathe on. I speak of such 
To guard thee from their horror. 
(Trans. EB 1850:155) 
Elizabeth Barrett was afraid to be seen. There is 
consistent evidence in her correspondence that she 
vehemently avoided immediate, and so visual, social contact. 
Forster discusses this: 
On paper, she was extremely sociable; face to 
face, she felt constrained and ill at ease. This 
paradox fascinated her: she never tired of trying 
to analyse precisely why, on the one hand, she 
loved people and was fascinated by the minutiae of 
their lives and yet, on the other, could not bear 
to meet them. (1988:33) 
She could communicate best indirectly, in writing: when she 
was invisible, her voice was separated from its source. Her 
letters to Browning reveal her prolonged postponement of any 
direct encounter between them: she did not want him to see 
her. 
There is nothing to see in me .... If my poetry is 
worth anything to any eye, it is the flower of 
me .... the rest of me is nothing but a root, fit 
for the ground and the dark (EB to RB, 16 May 
1845, 1:65) 5 
Karlin attributes Barrett's fear of being seen to the 
connection between seeing and evaluation: she "focuses on 
appearance: the eye becomes a metaphor for the mind which 
judges and values her poetry"; she is concerned that he 
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would find her to be "anonymous, a let-down," failing to 
live up to the image he has of her poetry (1985:71). Her 
writing can be looked at because it is removed from her 
body. 
Browning loves her verses with all his heart, as he 
declares in his first letter, and for him this is the same 
as loving her. He believes he sees her clearly in her poems: 
"You speak out, you, - I only make men and women speak" (RB 
to EB, 13 January 1845, 1:6). He believed that her poetry 
and her self were indistinguishable, that her writing seeded 
to purify language until it became transparent, containing 
and simultaneously revealing its writer. But the writer did 
not want to be seen, and she believed that what Browning saw 
was an illusion. 
Barrett seemed afraid that in seeing her, Browning 
would encounter something far more dangerous (both for him 
in seeing, and for her in being seen) than just a 
disappointment: "anonymous," perhaps, not in Karlin's sense 
as nondescript or insignificant, but rather as something 
nameless and unnameable. A woman who went to see her once 
described her in a letter as follows: 
The poetess was everything I did not like. She had 
great cavernous eyes, glowering out under two big 
bushes of black ringlets .... She never laughed, or 
even smiled, ... and through all the gloom of the 
shuttered room I could see that her face was 
hollow and ghastly pale. (in Hayter 1962:23~) 
Seeing her as a "poetess," as both writer and a woman, she 
sees something horrifying. Barrett is shut away in the dark, 
visited to be viewed and reported on by normal women as some. 
kind of freak. 
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It seems the "root" she was afraid to let Browning see 
was her physical person, her body. What was best kept 
concealed by darkness (or blindness) was her identity as a 
woman, potentially capabl~ of desire and of bearing children 
- of literal creativity - rather than as idealized poetic 
subject or a cripple, the invalid female. To hide her 
womanhood was to deny her possible monstrousness. 6 
Their first meeting proved disastrous because Browning 
immediately made a declaration of love based on his new 
perception of her as a woman rather than as poet. Once their 
mutual love had been confirmed and she was well on the way 
to becoming his wife, she was convinced he did not really 
see her, but was luckily blinded by his love: 
I stand by a miracle in your love, and because I 
stand in it and it covers me, just for that, you 
cannot see me! May God grant that you never see me 
- for then we two shall be 'happy' as you say, and 
I, in the only possible manner, be very sure. (EB 
to RB, 2 May 1846, 2:119) 
Her happiness, she warns him, is dependent on his not seeing 
her for what she really.is. Maintaining the separation 
between writing and author, poetic subject and female body, 
meant that Elizabeth Barrett managed for a while to avoid 
the disruptive ambivalence of being a woman and a writer. 
Her early productivity and certainty of voice is perhaps 
evidence of her avoidance of the paradox, her careful 
splitting of writing from body. Shelley's early writing, by 
comparison, reveals immersion in the chaos of this 
dislocation; as both literal and figurative mother, she had 
no choice but to go about welding the two aspects of the 
maternal into her "hideous progeny." It seems, then, that 
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Barrett's writi~9 could never have been hideous. Its 
apparent lucidity and purity was a result of her 
invisibility: she did not want Robert Browning to see her, 
because his seeing would force her to see too. When this did 
happen, she had to choose between trying to remain hidden, a 
pure and disembodied voice concealing an illusory and 
perf~ct body, and confronting and accepting her implicit 
monstrosity. 
Eventually, Barrett chose the second option and this 
necessitated her rejection of her father, her creator. For 
in encouraging his .daughter to write, Edward Barrett had 
created a kind of monster, a woman writer who read the 
classics and dared to translate Aeschylus. once forced to 
recognize that she was "hermaphroditic," as Griswold put it, 
she had to disturb the peace, to prove herself powerful and 
disruptive, to seize the freedom of the marginalised "half-
man." She no longer needed to be concealed and protected by 
her father; rather, she needed to rebel against him because 
he was, as father, symbol and representative of the 
patriarchal culture which had made it so monstrous and 
dangerous for her to be a writer as well as a woman. That 
her father, unusually, seemed to want her to be a writer 
rather than a woman did not reduce her need to escape his 
power. 
At one point in her correspondence, Elizabeth Barrett 
uses the word "monstrous" to describe a woman writer. 
Writing to Robert Browning, she haltingly presents what she 
would have him see as her views on female intelligence: 
.. I would confide to you perhaps my secret 
profession of faith - which is .. which is .. that 
let us say and do what we please and can .. there 
is a natural inferiority of mind in women - of the 
intellect .. not by any means, of the moral nature 
[ .... ] I believe women [ ... ]to have minds of 
quicker movement, but less power and depth .. and 
that we are under your feet, because we can't 
stand on our own[ .... ] (EB to RB, 4 July 1845, 
1:116-7) 
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Ellipses not in parentheses are in the original. The 
frequency of these in Barrett's denunciation of the female 
intellect reveals less certainty than the words themselves 
suggest. Instead, they emphasise Barrett's ambivalence about 
her own identity. Her description of the ."monstrous" woman 
develops this: 
One woman indeed now alive .. and only that one 
down all the ages of the world - seems to me to 
justify for a moment an opposite opinion - that 
wonderful woman George Sand~ who has something 
monstrous in combination with her genius[ .... ] 
(ibid.) 
A year earlier, Barrett had written two sonnets addressed to 
George Sand. 1 These help to define this ·"monstrosity": in 
the first, called "A Desire", she addresses the poet as 
Thou large-brained woman and large-hearted man, 
Self-called George sand! (335) 8 
Sand seems the embodiment of Griswold's hermaphrodite. 
Barrett desires that Sand will be purified, given white 
wings and made angelic so that she 
to woman's claim, 
And man's, mightst join beside the angel's grace 
Of a pure genius sanctified from blame .... (335) 
Uncomfortable with androgyny, with the implications of a 
woman having man's intellect, name and language, Barrett 
desires to add a third, neutered, angelic, quality, which 
will transcend the otherwise inevi~able conflict between the 
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masculine and feminine. Her desire is that Sand should 
become pure enough that "child and maiden press ... to thine 
embrace, / To kiss upon thy lips a stainless fame." This 
stainless fame is what Barrett has maintained in her own 
life, by scrupulously denying her own lack-of "purity." 
In the second sonnet, "A Recognition," Barrett 
expresses even more clearly the distress which comes from 
her desire to transcend what is so undeniable: 
True genius, but true woman! dost deny 
Thy woman's nature with a manly scorn, 
And break away the gauds and armlets worn 
By weaker women in captivity? 
Ah, vain denial! that revolted cry 
Is sobbed in by a woman's voice forlorn!-
Thy woman's hair, my sister, all unshorn, 
Floats back dishevelled strength in agony, 
Disproving thy man's name! and while before 
The world thou burnest in a poet-fire, 
We see thy woman-heart beat evermore 
Through the large flame. Beat purer, heart, and higher, 
Till God unsex thee on the heavenly shore, 
Where unincarnate spirits purely aspire. 
(335) 
In this "recognition" of Sand's womanhood, Barrett might as 
well be describing herself, with her "manly scorn" for the 
thralldom of "weaker women," and then confronting, perhaps 
for the first time, the impossibility of pretending not to 
be a woman. Sand's method, the wearing of a man's clothes 
and name and her promiscuous denial of standards of feminine 
sexual purity, is exactly the opposite of Barrett's and yet 
there are suggestions, other than in the sonnets, that 
Barrett desired the same. Falk quotes· from one of Barrett's 
letters to Mary Russell Mitford: 
[T]hrough the whole course of my childhood, I had 
a steady indignation against Nature who made me a 
woman, & a determinat~ resolution to dress up in 
men's clothes as soon as ever I was free of the 
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nursery .... (1988:71) 
As it turned.out, she found another way of disguising her 
femininity, in her isolated writing, but later, in Aurora 
Leigh, she would explicitly connect the two: Aurora's 
father, in teaching her the classics, "wrapt his little 
daughter in his large / Man's doublet, careless did it fit 
or no" (Aurora Leigh I:727-8) . 9 
"A Recognition" is spoken by a plural voice, separating 
itself from "the world," which .se,e.co only, Sand's 
"burn(ing] •.. in a poet-fire", both powerful and implicitly 
destructive. The speaking voice, "we," can see, "through the 
large flame," the Promethean, heroic and masculine act of 
writing poetry, and recognizes the truth, her "woman-heart," 
which withstands the burning. Barrett takes on what seems to 
be.the voice of all women, emphasised by her call to Sand as 
"my sister," setting up the possibility of a powerful 
confrontation between the abstract flame of masculine 
writing and the beating physical reality of the female 
heart.· 
Sand's femaleness is revealed by her "woman's voice" 
and by the long hair which, while unshorn and associated 
with strength (bringing Samson to mind), is also disordered 
and "in agony." Both voice and hair belie the apparently 
secure disguise of a man's name. Her voice is not, as it 
could be, exultant, giving a triumphant cry of revolution 
(Barrett's ambiguous use of the form "revolted" is 
significant; it implies the repulsive as well as the 
rebellious), but is "forlorn, 11 ·and "sobbing," failed 
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because, as far as Barrett is concerned, the voice issuing 
from a woman's body can never be a poetic voice as well. 
The solution Barrett offers is a complete avoidance of 
the monstrous, praying for the heart, and the voice, to be 
purified of their femaleness, to become "unincarnate," 
disembodied. Rather than considering having the woman poet 
steal the fire of language for herself, she sees the only 
solution as the complete denial of gender: she longs for 
Sand and, implicitly, for herself, to be "unsexed." 
Ther~ is, however, a palpable echo here of Lady 
Macbeth's call, "spirits, ... unsex me here'' (Macbeth I.5.36-
7'), with its suggestion that to be unsexed is not to become 
angelic and pure, but to be freed from the restrictions of 
traditionally feminine morality, and so made capable of 
dangerous, immoral and implicitly masculine acts in a 
rebellion against patriarchal culture's interpretation of 
nature. Ironically too, the word echoes the title of 
Polwhele's book, The Unsex'd Females (1798), an attack on 
women intellectuals who were monstrous precisely because 
they were "unsex'd", as his opinion of Wollstonecraft's 
death indicated (see 54 above). 
This ambiguity, along with the rather desperate tone of 
her final prayer, undermines to some extent the apparent 
certainty of Barrett's solution. Even the idealised 
purification from gender leads.to ambivalence. 
Because George sand is "true genius, but true woman!", 
she is a hybrid. She appears to deny her femininity, but the 
sonnets imply that the source of her creative power is in 
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her double identity. It is necessary for the woman writer to 
recognize the conflict patriarchal culture has set up 
between figurative and literal creativity in order to find 
herself a language that is not a borrowed and false male 
voice, sterilised of the body, but is also not simply and 
weakly "sobbed," "a woman's voice forlorn." Barrett had to. 
confront her double identity, had to see monstrosity not as 
a warning but as an opportunity to rebel. She had to learn 
not to fear being found "revolting." It seems that allowing 
Robert Browning to see her as female facilitated her 
creation of a voice that revealed not the ephemeral 
"personality," the idealised image of the poet, but the body 
of the woman writer. 
Having survived this confrontation, she produced work 
which surpasses the pristine romances which Stedman 
considered so perfectly feminine, the conservative products 
of the Victorian "poetess." She revised the traditionally 
masculine subjecthood of the love poem, addressing to 
Browning the Sonnets from the Portuguese. These, as Ellen -
Moers suggests,influenced the works of other nineteenth 
century female poets, particularly Christina Rossetti and 
Emily Dickinson {1978:164-72). But Barrett's major work is 
Aurora Leigh, which she completed in 1856. It is a 
confrontation of the opposites which made up her 
ambivalence, a fertile bringing together of the elements of 
her monstrosity. It is a truly hybrid work, a novel written 
in verse, a "novel-poem," echoing both Wordsworth's The 
Prelude, which traces the development of the Romantic male 
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poetic subject, and Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre, the 
Bildungsroman of a Victorian woman. It is the fictionalised 
autobiography of a protagonist who is both a woman and a 
writer. 
She had planned it for a long time. Having just 
finished her second translation of Prometheus Bound, in 
1845, she tells Browning that she is planning a "completely 
modern" novel-poem, which is to go 
running into the midst of our conventions, and 
rushing into drawing-rooms and the like ... , 
speaking the truth as I conceive of it out 
plainly. That is my intention. It is not mature 
enough yet to be called a plan. I am waiting for a 
story, and I won't take one, because I want to 
make one, and I like to make my own stories, 
because then I can take liberties with them in the 
treatment. (EB to RB, 27 February 1845, 1:32) 
The story Barrett was waiting for was her own and, until she 
had confronted the central paradox of its plot, she could 
not write it or take the liberty to rewrite it. She first 
had to accept the mons~rousness associated with being a 
writer and with not being "unsex'd." Her translations of 
Prometheus Bound play a crucial role in this. I believe that 
her work with the myth emphasised both the potential danger 
and the necessity of rebellion, making possible both her 
escape from her father/creator and her confrontation in 
Aurora Leigh with the ambivalence of the woman writer. 
. ( 
TRANSLATING PROMETHEUS: SIN AND EXPIATION 
Some years ago, ... I translated or rather undid 
into English, the 'Prometheus' of Aeschylus .... it 
is the most miserable of all miserable versions of 
the class .... the comfort is, that the little book 
was unadvertised and unknown, and that most of the 
copies (through the entreaty of my father) are 
shut up in the wardrobe of his bedroom .... the 
recollection of this sin of mine has been my 
nightmare .... And so I resolved to wash away the 
transgression, and translate the tragedy over 
again. (EB to RB, 27 February 1845, 1:31) 
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Why should a translation be a transgression, a sin that 
needs to be expiated? And why should the translator's father 
entreat her to hide her work in his wardrobe? What did 
Elizabeth Barrett produce, that it should need to be kept 
such a shameful secret? 
The first translation was written in thirteen days in 
February 1832, a month before Elizabeth's twenty-sixth 
birthday. She carried it out with confidence, writing in her 
diary: 
I have finished my translation. 1075 lines of 
Aeschylus translated in a fortnight. And I think I 
am satisfied - tolerably satisfied. But the 
original is too magnificant for translation. 
(15 February 1832, 245-6) 
This satisfaction, even if qualified, does not-hint at the 
profound remorse she was later to express. It is unclear 
exactly how the change happened. Elizabeth reports that her 
father had suggested she submit the manuscript to a 
publisher, Valpy, but that she insisted on consulting Boyd 
first. The following day's entry remarks cryptically on his 
reply: 
A letter from Mr Boyd! How it surprised me. He 
does not like the Valpy plan. If the translation 
is good enough to be creditable to me, it shd. be 
published separately .... His letter is cool 
enough. I answered it by a note of explanation on 
Valpy's work; by rating very humbly my translation 
- & by telling him how little inclined I feel to 
publishing, & how I wished that I had never done 
so. The real truth! - If I never had, I never shd. 
have been exposed to the pain which has been & is 
oppressing me. (19 February 1832, 246) 
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The contradiction between def ending her right to publish 
despite her mentor's misgivings (the basis of which is 
unspecified) and her ardent wish that she had never 
published at all are strongly ambivalent. What is the nature 
of the pain, so closely related to publishing-her work, 
which she confesses to be "the real truth"?; 
Two days later she receives Boyd's reply, in which he 
appears to encourage her to publish after all. Her record of 
it betrays distress and confusion. She comments that his 
letter is "cool enough still .•. I wonder he shd. have 
thought it worth while to write it at all" (21 February 
1832, 247). He has asked for some of_ the translation, which 
she sends, "begging him not to read what I sent," saying 
"Would I not a thousand times rather have his work 
attended to than mine?" (ibid.). Nonetheless, she begins 
writing a preface to the translation, and there is no 
further mention of it in her diary. As will be shown, 
though, this preface reveals her growing anxiety about the 
implications of her translation which, on 11 May 1833, was 
published as Prometheus Bound. Translated from the Greek of 
Aeschylus. And Miscellaneous Poems, attributed namelessly to 
"the author of An Essay on Mind." 
Her reliance on Boyd's opinion, her ambivalence about 
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publishing, and the mysterious "pain" she describes all 
suggest some kind of crisis. Critical reception of the 
translation was negative, but it is unlikely that criticism 
like that in The Athenaeum should have been enough to cause 
her complete rejection of it: the reviewer advised "those 
who adventure in the hazardous lists of poetic translation 
to touch anyone rather than Aeschylus; and they may take 
warning by the author before us" (in Forster 1988:76). 
A later review may be slightly more revealing. As Alice 
Falk points out, a Quarterly Review critic unknowingly 
discovers the connection between Prometheus and the 
translator: 
Her early enthusiasm for Aeschylus has sensibly 
aggravated the tendency to the overstrained and 
violent, which seems natural to her mind, and 
irretrievably precluded, we fear, that discipline 
of art and sense of beauty which a warmer study of 
Sophocles might have imparted. The [authadia] of 
her hero, Prometheus, communicates itself to Miss 
Barrett's preface and notes; she is something too 
dogmatic in her criticism, and a world too 
positive in her philosophy. (in Falk 1988:74) 
The translator has become too much like her subject, her 
hero. Authadia means "the Promethean characteristic of 
insolent, self-pleasing self-will" (Falk 1988:74). This is 
an accurate description of the temperament revealed in 
Elizabeth's early autobiography, the passionate and 
rebellious philosophy which is the hallmark not of the 
acceptable Victorian poetess but of the writers Griswold 
called hermaphrodites. 
If Barrett perceived these connections between herself 
and Prometheus, her shame and fear may to some extent be 
explained: for th~ first time she was faced with public 
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recognition of th~ ambition of her writing in connection not 
with unambiguous success, but with transgression and so with 
the danger of punishment. 
There is no explanation, or proof, of her father's 
insistence on hiding the unsold copies of the translation, 
but this would also reveal an intriguing change of heart; 
after all,' he was the first to suggest that she publish it. 
Did her Titanic aspirations place him, her "Jupiter Tonans," 
uncomfortably in the position of Zeus? 
The translation is not mentioned again until her letter 
to Browning. In almost all later collections of her poetry, 
it is the 1850 version which is published, although often 
the 1833 preface is retained. In one edition, The Earlier 
Poems of Elizabeth Barrett Browning 1826-1833, the editor 
sees fit to replace the first translation, which opened the 
original volume, with the 1850 version, saying he had "not 
thought it wise or desirable to re-produce.the earlier crude 
attempt or the girlish preface that accompanied it" 
(1878:vii). But, as will be shown, the preface is far from 
11girlis;h •II 
As a translator, Barrett was able to appropriate the 
voice of Aeschylus as well as transmit it, and have her 
·words published under his name, a form of linguistic "theft" 
which was apparently the reproduction of the male author's 
creation. The translation also permitted her to conceal 
herself behind Aeschylus and, like Frankenstein's monster, 
speak both nameless and unseen. 
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SPEAKING UNSEEN: THE FEMALE TRANSLATOR 
Dost thou not fear, such daring words ejecting? 
Prometheus Bound (v.932, trans~ EB 1833:50) 
How art thou not afraid to utter such words? 
(Trans. EB 1850:157) 
As I have suggested; the idea of translation as a feminist 
project is less paradoxical than it may seem. It is 
apparently a valid argument that if the feminist 
appropriation of language is a battle against the perceived 
silencing of women in patriarchal society, it must be 
counterproductive to carry out the diligent transferring of 
the words of an author from one language to another, where 
the translator can say nothing for herself, effacing herself 
behind another text, silently and invisibly reproducing the 
creation of the original author. But the translator remains 
a writer. Bringing literal reproduction into the realm of 
figurative creativity by making use of the common metaphoric 
figuring of translation as literal and female, allows her a 
duplicitous position: she can re-create rather than 
reproduce, engendering a grotesque hybrid, a shifting of the 
structures of the reproduction of texts, and of language. As 
Walter Benjamin implies, transla~ion has the potential to 
liberate language ( 1970: 80) .· 
In the preface to her first translation, Elizabeth 
Barrett begs the reader to"forgive my English for not being. 
Greek, and myself for not being Aeschylus" (1896:11) . 10 On 
the face of it, this apology seems to conform to the self-
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deprecating stance expected of a translator, but at the same 
time it emphasises the fact that the translator is not 
Aeschylus and that the language of the text is her own. The 
liberation of language from paternal authority is as 
possible in a poetic translation as the liberation from 
meaning is in a perfectly literal one. 
The silence of the translator is-potentially different 
from the muteness of those who have been silenced: it is a 
possible source of power because it can be deceptive. This 
silence appears, and can be, acquiescent, reverent and 
faithful to the original, but it can also be a site of 
deliberate misrepresentation, of subversion and infidelity. 
There are echoes here of the silence of Prometheus in 
Aeschylus's drama. He knows the secret of Zeus's possible 
downfall, but he refuses to reveal his knowledge. His 
silence is the source of his power, revealing not 
inarticulateness but the possession and deliberate (dis)use 
of language. 
The translator can either be the silent, natural 
reproducer, faithfully mothering the text which will take 
its father/author's name, or she can make her apparent 
silence powerful. Christopher Norris differentiates between 
speaking and writing in a way which clarifies the source of 
this power. The speaker has his or her visible presence to· 
evince the truth of the meanings produced in speech, and the 
writer's name is at least affixed to the written text to 
identify the .voice's source despite its invisibility. By 
comparison, the translator is not heard directly not only 
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because not seen, but because apparently speaking another's 
voice. His or her name is secondary, usually forgotten, if 
ever noticed; the translator is like the monster, speaking 
only when invisible, free, finally, to construct fictions. 
·Translation, even more powerfully than writing, then, 
obtrudes an alien depersonalized medium, a 
deceiving shadow which falls between intent and 
meaning, between utterance and understanqing. It 
occupies a promiscuous public realm where 
authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and whims 
of textual 'dissemination.' Writing, in short, is 
a threat to the deeply traditional view that 
associates truth with self-presence and the 
'natural' language wherein it finds expression. 
(Norris 1982:28) 
The anonymity and invisibility of the translator are 
potentially subversive. In terms of the above, translation 
facilitates an escape from the natural through promiscuity: 
the translator/mother has the capacity and the opportunity 
to lie (about much/with many); she need not reproduce the 
father/author's work faithfully. 
The connections between translation and biological 
reproduction are not coincidental: Lori Chamberlain reveals 
a long tradition of describing the production of texts and, 
even more overtly, the reproduction of translations, in 
sexual and gendered terms (1988:454-72). The childbirth 
metaphor, in relation to the accurate translation, can 
suggest faithful - and mindless - reproduction. 
Nevertheless, the metaphor provides a useful framework for 
considering the role of translation as a form of writing by 
women. As I have said, Chamberlain calls translation an 
"archetypal female activity" because of its secondariness to 
the act of original authorship (1988:467). Barrett's 
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translation of Prometheus Bound may have provided the first 
opportunity for her to discover the disruptive potential of 
_concealing her figurative creating behind an act of apparent 
reproduction. 
The unfaithful translation threatens the entire 
structure of the production of texts and meanings just as 
the unfaithful woman threatens the woman-exchanging kinship 
system on which patriarchal society rests: the offspring is 
not the product of the father/author whose name is attached 
to it, for its mother has been unfaithful. It is 
illegitimate. 
The attribution of an author's name is significant: 
like-the 1818 edition of Frankenstein, the first translation 
was published anonymously, Barrett's writing marked only 
with the name of Aeschylus, despite her apology for not 
being him. Her concealment behind his name is a potential 
. . 
source of power. Her anonymity, though, emphasises the 
woman's lack of a name of her own, the condition of being 
labelled with the father's name and then exchanging it for 
the husband's father's name. The anonymous woman writer, 
like the unnameable monster, is excluded from the power 
structures of patriarchal culture. This can become an 
advantage: the woman who writes is usurping the author-ity 
of fathers, the ability to make and name which has its 
justifying source in the bestowal on Adam of God's ability, 
in being and using the originary Logos, to .create by 
naming. 11 But because the woman has no name of her own to 
bestow, her creature, if illegitimate, be it child or 
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translation, is potentially unnameable, unspeakable. 
Shelley was delighted with the emphasis the programme 
of the theatrical adaptation of Frankenstein gave this by 
referring to the monster as"--" (see 94 above). The 
register of the st. Marylebone Parish Church for the 12 
September 1846 records the marriage of the following: 
Robert Browning (Condition: Bachelor; Rank or 
Profession: Gentleman ... ) and Elizabeth Barrett 
Moulton Barrett (Condition: Spinster; Rank or 
Profession: --- ). (in Karlin 1985:15) 
At this time, Elizabeth Barrett's reputation as a poet was 
well established, far more so than that of her husband. 
Nonetheless, she defied classification; she could not be 
named. 
This attests to the difficulty society has in 
positioning the woman writer. The wordless signifier reveals 
Barrett's ambiguous position in relation to patriarchal 
culture, echoing the potentially liberating namelessness of 
Frankenstein's monster. The hybrid bearer of literal and 
figurative confounds patriarchal culture's attempts to name 
and so destroy the monstrous. 
The unfaithful translation can no longer be attributed 
to the original author; the father's name is removed. It is 
illegitimate, and so outside of patriarchal legislature: 
wrongly named, or not at all, it is not positioned within 
the patronymic structures of culture which would control it, 
as they aim to control all riatural reproduction. Rejected 
by, and so liberated from, the restraining structure, it has 
the freedom of- the monster: it has the power to subvert the 
structure, carrying off, as Frankenstein's monster does, the 
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fire of culture whose'light keeps at bay the darkness beyond 
the security of man's society. The illegitimate steals for 
itself the language which man uses to name and so control 
what is marginal, what disturbs his security and reminds him 
of the darkness: mothers and monsters. 
In subverting the Name-of-the-Father by writing, the 
unfaithful translator, like the creator of monsters and like 
the silent Prometheus, can enact the dual exercising and 
criticising of power necessary in a feminist appropriation 
of language (Gallop 1982:121). Conventionally, the 
unfaithful translation is seen as a deficient reproduction, 
an abortion, a failure to trans-l~te, to carry across: a 
miscarriage. But in fact, such a work is the carrying to 
term and bringing to birth .of a new and unnatural creature, 
the monstrous offspring of an illegitimate union. 
Of course, such an act identifies the translator not 
with the monster but with its creator, with Frankenstein, 
who is guilty of a crime against nature, and who suffers for 
his ambition. The unfaithful translation, as a form of 
linguistic theft, is inseparably linked with the fear of 
retribution. Ambivalence is inevitable. 
To what. extent was Elizabeth Barrett's first 
translation of the Prometheus Bound unfaithful? Stedman 
describes it as: 
at the time a unique effort for a young lady, and 
good practice; but [it) abounded in grotesque 
peculiarities, and in fidelity did not approach the 
modern standard .... Her other translations were 
executed for her own pleasure, and it was rarely 
her pleasure to be faithful to her text. 
(1904:121-2) 
What was "grotesque" about the translation? What Stedman 
objects to is not weakness; it is transgression, the 
committing of an infidelity, and the pleasure which she 
seems to have taken in transgressing. When a "young lady" 
commits the unholy act of pleasurable infidelity, her 
illegitimate offspring is bound to be "grotesque," to be 
monstrous. The first translation, which Elizabeth hid so 
ashamedly and with the willing help of her father, was 
perhaps her own "hideous progeny," the offspring of the 
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"half-man," the woman writer and, as such, characterized by 
profound ambivalence. 
In Prometheus Bound, Hermes, Zeus's messenger and 
henchman, threatens Prometheus by saying that the god always 
carries out the punishment he promises. The "literal" 
translation is "the mouth of Zeus knoweth not how to utter 
falsehood, but will bring to pass every word" (vv.1030-
1033). Barrett's translations of these lines are revealing: 
and 
The lips of Jove are impotent to lie, 
And consummation waiteth on the word. 
(1833:53) 
King Zeus's mouth is impotent to lie, 
Consummating the utterance by the act .... 
(1850:159) 
The two versions are uncharacteristically similar. Barrett 
seems to suggest a closer connection between Zeus's words 
and their results, hinting at a parallel between him and the 
Christian God who creates with the Word, making word and act 
inseparable, and implicitly connecting the God's creative 
and Zeus's punitive uses of fire/language. At the same time, 
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·though, she calls Zeus's inability to lie "impotence," 
implying that lies and deception, the breaking of faith are 
a source of power which the tyrant lacks. As well as 
I 
alluding to Prometheus's only power over Zeus, his ability 
to wi thold the trut.h, Barrett subverts the suggestion of 
immense linguistic power found in the second line. It is 
this kind of subversion which empowers the translator. 12 
' 
But is Barrett deliberately subversive, or even 
intentionally unfaith~ul to Aeschylus? Is there any evidence 
that she perceives infidelity to the original writer as 
desirable? Telling Robert Browning about the second 
translation, she writes that at least if "Aeschylus stands 
at the_ foot of my bed now, I shall have a little breath to 
front him" (EBB to RB, 27 February i845, 1:32). Her first 
translation would, she believes, have been offensive to the 
creator of the original, and she does not desire to offend 
him. 
In her preface to Prometheus Bound, written after 
completing the first translation, Barrett reveals much about 
her perceptions of both Aeschylus and Prometheus, as well as 
articulating her ideas about translation. These ideas do not 
form a consistent and unambiguous tneory. 
She distinguishes between the "literal version" of the 
original and the "transfusion of poetical spirit," which she 
calls respectively the "dead" and the "living letter" (3). 
Implicitly, it is the poetic which embodies the 
idiosyncratic interpretation· of the living translator, of 
necessity not "faithful" to the original, but rather re-
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animating what has reached completion, resuscitating it with 
new life, or re-creating it.', 
But Barrett does not present this poetic freedom as 
overtly transgressive, for she does not appear to consider 
fidelity an essential characteristic of a good translation. 
She likens the translation to a mirror, its reflection of a 
single image· varying according to how it is held. The image 
cannot be expected to resemble the object exactly: 
we do not blame Pope and Cowper for not having 
faithfully represented Homer: we do not blame Pope 
and Cowper for being Pope and Cowper. It is the 
nature of the human mind to communicate its own 
character to whatever substance it conveys .... (3) 
In this way, she seems to have exculpated herself of any 
accusations of infidelity. In the light of this, her request 
at the end of the preface for her reader to "forgive my 
English for not being Greek, and myself for not being 
Aeschylus" (11), is somewhat contradictory. Her apparent 
modesty may be deceptive. The apology follows a statement of 
her intention, clearly privileging the poetic above the 
literal: to "the literal sense I have endeavoured to bend 
myself as closely as was poetically possible" {ll). She 
distinguishes between the "sense" which must be translated 
literally, and the poetic or formal aspects which can be 
revised and changed by translators who, in all the examples 
she gives, are also poets~ She does not promise to have been 
successful in her endeavours, and her apology for possible 
infidelities (which implies ambivalence about whether her 
failure to be Aeschylus is really forgivable or not), is 
strongly undermined by her philosophical acceptance that the 
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reader will find much changed. 
In one of her notes to the first translation Barrett 
discusses the existence of many interpretations of the myth. 
She interrupts herself, overtly limiting her own work to a 
faithful translation rather than a subjective 
interpretation. The refusal is ambiguous, though: "a great 
many ... saw a great deal [under the mask of Prometheus] 
besides. But a translator is not, or at least need not be, a 
speculator'' (57,n.1, my emphasis). 
The qualification undermines Barrett's assertion, 
suggesting that speculation, conjectural reflection, is 
indeed possible for the translator. If the "living" 
translation is a mirror (or speculum), it follow~ logically 
that the translator can be a speculator, seeing new images, 
re-visions of the original object. Like Shelley and her 
monster, even the apparently conventional translator has th~ 
potential to construct alternative possibilities that 
disrupt, as Pandora's speech does, the relationship between 
the sign and the absent referent. 
Barrett refuses to define explicitly what she does, 
creating instead an ambiguous space for herself where 
speculation is not only possible but, because covert, is 
potentially subversive. In refusing to state clearly the 
truth about what she is doing, Barrett, like Prometheus, has 
the power which Zeus lacks. 
connections between herself and Prometheus are implicit 
' in the rest of the preface too. She goes on to present a 
defence of the Greeks and especially Aeschylus to the • 
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" Victorian age, which she describes as preferring "undreamt 
of dreams" and "unearthly frenzy" (4) - in short, 
originality to the classical, "cold and polished and 
imitative poetry." She defends herself doubly, and again 
ambiguously: she warns against the possible dangers of lack 
of control and unguided originality, and yet goes on to 
extol similar qualities in the ancient Greeks, who "wrote 
antecedently to rules: they felt passionately, and thought 
daringly'' (5). Translating Aeschylus's Prometheus carries 
the possibility of taking on the passionate and daring 
defiance of norms which characterize the hero. As the critic 
in the Quarterly Review pointed out, the wilful authadia of· 
Prometheus seemed to characterize the translator as well. 
The terms in which Barrett discusses Aeschylus's style 
also' suggests a connection between the dramatist and his 
hero: 
[Aeschylus] is a fearless and impetuous, not a 
cautious and accomplished poet. His excellences 
could not be acquired by art, nor could his defects 
exist separately from genius .... [S]ometimes his 
fancy rushes in, where his judgement fears to 
tread, and language ... writhes beneath its 
impetuosity .... (6) 
Barrett's own writing has been described in remarkably 
similar terms. For instance: 
The stretching and twisting and shaking which Mrs 
Browning gave to English poetic diction shows its 
effect in Rossetti and Morris, Meredith and 
Hopkins, and through them in most poets of the 
twentieth century. (Hayter 1962:233) 
Frequently, this stylistic impetuosity was seen as a defect. 
Stedman states that elements of her writing "justly were 
held to be an outrage upon the beauty and dignity of 
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metrical art", that her "taste never seemed quite developed, 
but through life [was] subordinate to her excess of feeling" 
and that "she showed a lack of the genuine artist's 
reverence, and not without egotism followed her wilful way" 
(1904:126-7). 
This fearlessness is what Barrett praises in Aeschylus. 
The connection she sees between him and Prometheus is made 
more explicit in a letter to Browning about the second 
translation, in which she discusses an idea which never came 
to fruition: 
... I have in my head to associate with the [second 
translation], a monodrama of my own, - not a long 
poem, but a monologue of Aeschylus as he sate a 
blind exile on the flats.of Sicily and recounted 
the past to his own soul, just before the eagle 
cracked his great massy ·skull with a stone. (EBB 
to RB, 27 February 1845, 1:32) 
There is a story, probably apocryphal, that Aeschylus was 
killed when an eagle dropped a tortoise on his head. Here, 
the destructive role of the eagle and Barrett's replacement 
of the rather undignified tortoise with a stone, along with 
her intention to juxtapose the poem with the translation, 
suggests a recognition by Barrett of similarities between 
Aeschylus and Prome.theus . 13 
The fact of Aeschylus's exile and B~rrett's apparently 
original invention of his blindness which, as has been 
suggested and will be further examined, was a revealing 
preoccupation of hers, are also significant. The preface 
emphasises that both Aeschylus and Prometheus were made to 
suffer unjustly for their audacity. Barrett discusses the 
lack of appreciation shown for Aeschylus by the Athenians, 
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which led to his final exile from the city "on whom he 
conferred the immortality of his name arid works" (9). 
Aeschylus suffers "the ingratitude and changefulness of man" 
(10) in the same way that ·Prometheus suffers at the'hand of 
Zeus, despite having helped him to victory. This emphasises 
how unjust the suffering of both can be made to seem. If 
Barrett identified what she had done in the first 
translation with Promethean authadia, with a bold seizure of 
poetic power, the importance of this analysis is clear. The 
evasive ambiguiiies in her preface and notes are not 
surprising. The Prometheus Bound is a tragedy, presenting 
the suffering which inevitably results from the hubris of 
its hero. As well as trying to show that the unfaithful 
translation is not necessarily a transgression, Barrett 
establishes the unfairness of punishing the kind of ambition 
it might reveal. 
Her detailed discussion of the character of Prometheus 
centres not on his heroism and ambition, but qualifies the 
connection she herself introduces between him and Milton's 
Satan: 
That conception (of Prometheus] sank deeply into 
the soul of Milton, and, _as has been observed, rose 
from thence in the likeness of his Satan. But the 
Satan of Milton and the Prometheus of Aeschylus 
stand upon ground as unequal, as do the sublime of 
sin and the sublime of virtue. Satan suffered from 
his ambition; Prometheus from his humanity: Satan 
for himself; Prometheus for mankind: Satan dared 
perils which he had not weighed; Prometheus devoted 
himself to sorrows which he had foreknown. (8) 
This opposition of Satan and Prometheus denies the 
rebelliousness of the Titan. She presents him as virtuous, 
altruistic and self-denying, a distinct contradiction of the 
qualities her earlier writing would have predicted she 
should admire in him. 
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Alic~ Falk points out that this suggests an 
identification of Prometheus with Christ, reflecting a shift 
in Victorian perceptions towards reducing Prometheus's 
rebelliousness and emphasizing that his suffering is on 
behalf of mankind, in short making him more a martyr than a 
rebel (1988:76).u She also observes that, despite the 
connections with Christ implicit in the preface, Barrett 
does not seem to reevaluate the hero in the 1833 translation 
itself. It seems, as I have suggested, that the preface, 
written after the completion of the translation, does not so 
much give an account of what Barrett has done, as try 
simultaneously to conceal and diminish its enormity. Her 
reading of the Titan is evasive, revealing ambivalence about 
her own identification with the character, an uncertainty 
based on her fear of the punishment authadia seemed to 
provoke. To identify not only with the great Aeschylus, and 
his creation the Titan, but then to connect these with 
Satan, may have seemed altogether too hubristic for 
Elizabeth Barrett. Perhaps her apology for not being 
Aeschylus carries in it a declaration of innocence too: she 
would like to remind her reader that she is after all, only 
the translator, not the creator. 
Barrett's ambivalence as a writer_, then, is evident in 
her preface. on one hand she implicitly defends the daring 
and audacity of her work, asserting her right to re-create 
the original and implying tha,t it is possible for her to 
speculate and revise as well as reproduce. On the other 
hand, she qualifies that boldness at its source, in the 
nature of Prometheus himself. 
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The choice she must make between a literal reproduction 
of the text and a potentially transgressive speculative 
translation echoes the contradiction existing between the 
woman's literal reproduction and the writer's figurative re-
creation. The subject of the translations, the myth itself, 
is applicable to both cases: it forms a comprehensive 
warning of the danger to any writer who appropriates what is 
denied her, either specifically as the creative voice of the 
author in her translation, or as the language of patriarchal 
culture in all her writing. 
The last words of the preface, though, defy that 
warning. Barrett discusses the "unequal union" of her own 
poetry with the work of Aeschylus (11). She asks how she can 
defend or justify what she has done and answers her,question 
by quoting, in Greek, the chorus of Prometheus Bound: this 
is "a war against which there is no warring" (v.904). _She 
will not even try to defend herself. But the context of the 
quotation is the chorus's prayer that they will never be 
desired by Zeus, as Io was; the onslaught against which they 
(and, by implication, Barrett) are helpless is the "unequal 
union" desired by Zeus himself, the uniting of god and 
mortal, heaven and earth, figurative and literal. Barrett 
will not defend herself against the possibility of the 
monstrous. 
The two translations of Prometheus Bound differ vastly, 
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but not uniformly. On the face of it, it is difficult to 
tell why Elizabeth Barrett should have so entirely rejected 
her first translation, or why the second should have been a 
satisfactory "expiation" of her "sin." 
Perhaps part of the reason lies in her perception of 
the first translation as sinful, as a transgression for 
which she had to atone. The contradiction between the 
Promethean and the Christian surely plays a part in this. 
Falk has discove_red what appears to be the addition of 
Christian resonances in the second translation, and suggests 
that it is more consistent with the preface than the first 
is. The second translation, she says, reinterprets 
Prometheus as a Christ-figure, one in whom the ambition and 
audacity of the hero are tempered with humanitarian motives 
and selfless suffering (1988:78-82). 
There is some support for this assertion in Barrett's 
discussion, with Browning, of the second translation. After 
her mention of the monologue about Aeschylus, he suggests 
that she write a revision, along the lines of Shelley's 
Prometheus Unbound, of the other missing play in the 
trilogy, Prometheus Pyrophoros (the fire-bearer). Barrett 
refuses, contradicting her statement in the preface about 
the importance of the Greeks to Victorian art: 
The old gods are dethroned. Why should we go back 
to the antique moulds ... ? .Let us all aspire rather 
to Life, ... For there is poetry everywhere .... 
And then Christianity is a worthy myth, and 
poetically acceptable. (EB to RB, 20 March 1845, 
1:45-6) 
This suggests that the second translation contains a shift 
away from, even an exorcism of, the passion and daring 
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' Barrett had attributed to the ancient Greeks. The change is 
not so simple, though, as continuing allusions to Prometheus 
in Barrett's later work, especially Aurora Leigh, will 
reveal. Similarly, Barrett's addition of Christian 
resonances to Aeschylus is not unproblematic. 
Falk compares Barrett's two translations of the first 
speech in the drama - that of the character Strength (vv.1-
11) - and finds three major changes: Zeus, from being "the 
father," is called "our Father," Prometheus becomes "guilty" 
rather than "audacious," and his punishment is for him to 
"expiate" his "sin" rather than to "pay exacted v~ngeance" 
for his "offence" (1988:79). There are numerous other 
examples of this kind of modification, but the changes are 
not absolutely consistent. 
' 
For instance, in Prometheus's first speech, Barrett 
translates the Greek word for "offence" as "sin" in both 
translations (v.112, 1833:21; 1850:143) and later what is 
translated as "sin" in the first appears as "crime" in the 
se6ond (v.388, 1833:30; 1850:147). Further, there are 
discrepancies in references to Zeus which may connect him 
with the Christian God: in the first translation Oceanus 
uses the italicized "him" to refer to Zeus and Prometheus 
replies using "Him"(v.392); in the second, Oceanus uses 
"Him" and Prometheus now simply uses "him," reversing the 
connection Falk finds earlier. 
More interestingly, Barrett introduces the idea of 
"hell" in both her translations. Prometheus states that he 
·has rescued man from being "blasted utterly, unto the house 
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of Death" (v.238). Barrett first translates this as a rescue 
"from sinking into hell exterminate" (1833:25), then, in the 
second translation, as from "meditated ruin deep as hell" 
(1850:145). Man is redeemed from the literal hell in the 
first version whereas the second uses hell orily as a 
metaphor for a less specifically Christian kind of ruin. 
A final example suggests that even where Christian 
resonance is added in the second translation, its use is 
more ambiguous than Falk suggests. Io, longing to escape her 
torment, contemplates suicide. In the first translation, she 
cries that in so doing she may "be freed / From all mine 
anguish" (vv.749-50, 1833:43). In the second this becomes 
the hope that "I may redeem / My soul from sorrow" 
(1850:154). Apart from an unlikely connection of suicide 
with Christian redemption, there is no sense of Io's having 
sinned at all: this is inconsistent with the expiation 
implicitly connected with Prometheus's punishment. 
Barrett's use of Christian resonance, then, seems less 
consistent than Falk suggests. The changes are perhaps more 
an indication of her ambivalence about the nature of the 
hero than the result of a deliberate identification of him 
with Christ. 
Further, reading Prometheus as a Christ figure raises 
significant problems for the interpretation of Zeus's 
character. Should he then be seen as God, as "our Father" 
would suggest? Aeschylus is unambiguous in his presentation 
of Zeus as tyrannical and in direct opposition to 
Prometheus, despite hints of a reconciliation in the lost 
final part of the trilogy. Prometheus has deliberately 
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defied Zeus, even if it is on humanity's behalf. He 
continues to do so, with increasing fervour, throughout the 
drama. 
Barrett moderates Aeschylus's characterisation of Zeus 
in both translations (for instance reading his "tyranny" as 
"kingship" or "royalty" [v.226, 1833:25]), but in ttie second 
she also tempers Prometheus's active opposition to Zeus~ In 
classical Greek, antipathy or enmity is necessarily a mutual 
thing: the verb for hatred assumes neither the active nor 
the passive voice. The translator must thus choose the 
subject of the verb in English. Prometheus is a "god who 
hateth the gods"(v.37, .1833:18) in the first translation; he 
becomes "a god the gods hate" in the second (1850:141); 
similarly, from being "the foe of Jove [Zeus]" (v.120, 
1833:21), he becomes "the god, Zeus hateth sore" (1850:143). 
The second translation, then, reveals an attempted 
reduction of the magnitude of Prometheus's rebellion. Is 
there any link between this and Barrett's "expiation" of the 
first version? An examination of the languag~ and form of 
the two translations reveals significant differences. 
The ode examined appears just after Prometheus has 
described the exact nature of his gift to mankind (see 
Appendix 1 for full texts). He enumerates the developments 
and advantages of culture, including language, which rescued 
them from their confusion, for before the gift of "fire," 
humans "seeing, saw in vain, and did not hear, / Hearing" 
(vv.447-8. Trans. EB 1833:33). The Chorus points out that 
Prometheus seems to have neglected himself in helping 
mortals, and prays never to be punished by Zeus. In the 
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second strophe it implies that the gift was worthless, and 
Prometheus's suffering needless, for man remains weak and 
blind. 
The most immediately obvious differences between 
Barrett's two versions are formal. She translated the Greek 
iambics into blank verse in both versions, whereas her 
translations of the odes are deliberately irregular. As 
Barrett states in her preface, she considers "[i)rregularity 
... to be indispensable to the conveyance of any part of the 
effect of the original measure" (11). Again, this is 
somewhat ambiguous, suggesting that the more irregular the 
translation is, the more faithful it will be to the style of 
Aeschylus. The second version is clearly more irregular than 
the first, which retains a regular meter, simply changing 
from the iambic pentameter of blank verse to a lyrical 
iambic tetrameter and, while the 'abbaccdd' rhyme scheme is 
not consistent throughout the ode, it. is more regular than 
the 'aabcbcdeedff' of the second. This would suggest that 
the latter is more faithful to Aeschylus's form. However, 
the first is closer in length to the original than the 
substantially longer second version, which in most other 
ways seems the looser of the two. 
In fact, the second introduces a number of changes not 
found in the first. These are hinted at by the less harshly 
despondent rhythm and tone of the second. But it is in 
subtle changes to the sense of the words themselves that 
Barrett most effectively revises the original. The idea that 
Prometheus's gift has been of no benefit to its giver, which 
is central to the original, is removed from the second, 
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which begins by questioning the worth (and so affirming the 
existence of) the "beauty" of humanity, by playing on the 
meaning of "fair": is mankind so attractive as to be worth 
suffering for, and is the punishment thus fair, or just? 
The first translation questions what help Prometheus 
can expect from such weak "men who last a day.n In the 
second, Barrett plays with the line, calling them "dying 
livers - living one day long." The pun on "livers" 
emphasises the etymological connection between "life" and 
the name of the organ which is central to the punishment of 
Prometheus: his liver is eaten daily by an eagle. The 
significance is that the liver regenerates itself each 
night, and can never be consumed entirely. It is possible 
_then that Barrett is subverting the hopelessness implied by 
man's mortality. 
This is further supported by the addition of "hope" in 
the second: "what help" becomes "what hope." This addition 
connects with the description of man's blindness, which is 
found in all three. translations, questioning whether_ the 
gift of fire has actually enlightened man and taught him to 
see. In Weir Smyth and in Barrett's first translation, man 
is "shackled" or "bound" to his weakness, which is related 
to dreaming, "slow" and "vision-like," men being 
"hoodwink'd," blindfolded and deceived. In the second, 
however, "poor blind manhood" is not fettered, like 
Prometheus, but "drifted from its end. i• While this 
aimlessness does not seem ~ignif icantly different from the 
bondage of the original, Barrett has again introduced an 
important ambiguity. While "end" could denote function or 
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purpose, it also means destiny or fate, and so recalls the 
particular "end" Zeus had planned for man: only Prometheus's 
gift of fire prevented Zeus from destroyi~g all of humanity 
after his victory over the Titans. Hence, while not 
appearing to change the passage to any significant degree, 
Barrett makes small alterations which, on close· reading, do 
reveal a shift in emphasis. It is of course in her interest, 
exploring as she is her own capacity for the Promethean, to 
modify any suggestion in Aeschylus's version that the 
Titan's gift was wasted on its recipients. 
The second translation also hints that man's blindness 
is now different from the "seeing vainly" that preceded the 
gift of fire: he could see, but his sight was useless. His 
new "blindness" is connected by Barrett in the second 
translation with the .idea of hope, and this recalls the gift 
Prometheus has said he gave first, distinguishing it from 
fire: 
PROMETHEUS: 
I did restrain besides 
My mortals from premeditating death. 
CHORUS: 
How didst thou medicine the plague-fear of death? 
PROMETHEUS: 
I set blind Hopes to inhabit in their house. 
CHORUS: 
By that gift, thou didst help thy mortals well. 
(vv.250-253, Trans.EB 1850:145) 
The gift of blind hope is what enabled mortals to make use 
of fire, for in preventing them from foreseeing death it 
freed them from the ambiguous power of Prometheus's 
foresight, the knowledge of future suffering which makes his 
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act of rebellion so doubly heroic. In her second translation 
of the ode, Barrett reminds the chorus, who are trying to 
make Prometheus see the hopelessness of h1s position, of 
their earlier approval of man's blindness. In so doing, she 
emphasises that their present despair is contradictory, and 
that humans, because of their gifts, can indeed, with 
"mortal wranglings(,] ... confuse /The (restricting and 
oppressive] harmony of Zeus." 
The subtle "wranglings" Barrett seems to carry out 
in her second translation seem evidence of this ability. In 
it, overtly the atonement for a sin, the moderation of the 
audacity of her hero, she takes far greater liberties with 
the words of Aeschylus than she ever did in the first. 
In a letter to her, Robert Browning discusses the gift 
of blind hope, using it to remonstrate with her for her 
despair, and her thinly disguised threats to commit suicide 
by jumping from her window. This, and her reply, extend the 
symbolic significance of blindness beyond her desire not to 
be seen as a woman and writer. It can also be advantageous 
not to see, and her apparent romantic interest in the blind 
Hugh Boyd may have contained an awareness of this, as would 
her apparently deliberate invention of the blindness of 
Aeschylus. She is the moth who knows she can only fly into 
the light if she wilfully closes her eyes to the danger. 
Yes! I am satisfied to 'take up' with the blind 
hopes again, and have them in the house with me, 
for ali that I sit by the window .... It is well to 
fly towards the light, even where there may be. 
some fluttering and bruising of wings against the 
windowpanes, is it not? (EB to RB, 5 March 1845, 
1:35) 
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Her awareness of the likelihood of "bruising," though, 
reveals that her hope is not completely blind, but rather a 
deliber~te refusal to foresee - and be discouraged by - the 
knowledge of future pain. 
In her preface, Barrett had distinguished between 
Satan, who "dared perils which he had not weighed," and 
Prometheus, who "devoted himself to sorrows which he had 
foreknown" (8). Her active decision to hope, and ignore her 
apprehension of danger, collapses her distinction between 
the two Titanic figures. 
In the.same letter, Barrett immediately goes on to ask 
Browning about the Titan's ability to predict his own 
punishment. She is concerned that, while Prometheus had 
"with full knowledge of the penalty reserved for him, ... 
sinned of free will and choice," it appears that he had not 
foreseen, had been blind to, the full "extent and detail of 
the torment" (1:35). She suggests that Aeschylus might have 
wanted to emphasise the Titan's "martyrdom," but feels that 
"the heroism of the martyr diminishes in proportion - and 
there appears to be a contradiction, and oversight" (36). 
This implies a distinction between the martyr and the hero, 
based on the courage of the hero who acts with full 
knowledge of coming retribution. 
This difference is apparent in the second passage for 
comparison, part of the dialogue between Prometheus and 
Hermes, the messenger of Zeus, just before the Titan is 
flung down to Tartarus for refusing to reveal his secret 
(Appendix 2). There are no major metrical differences 
between Barrett's translations here, as she translates the 
158 
iambics of the original Greek into blank verse. But again, 
the second version is longer. 
Prometheus reveals that he knows the extent, if not the 
detail, of the punishm~nt he is to receive for not telling 
Zeus the name of his potential enemy, and remains defiant. 
Nothing will "force [his] utterance," or "bend [his] sturdy 
will, and make [him] speak." There is a greater emphasis on 
language, on the act of speaking, in the second version, and 
this is contrasted with Zeus's ability to create universal 
disorder. Hermes tries to pursuade Prometheus to give in. 
His terms are made ambiguous by Barrett. In Herbert Weir 
Smyth's translation, he tells the Titan to "bend thy will" 
and be wise; in Barrett's first translation this becomes 
"endure," which seems to advocate the bearing of suffering 
rather than acquiescence. In the second, Hermes tells 
Prometheus to "take righteous courage" and "dare for once / 
To apprehend and front thine agonies / With a just 
prudence." Courage is associated with surrender rather than 
endurance. Even more important is Barrett's addition of the 
word "apprehend"; Hermes wants Prometheus to discard his 
heroic ability to act despite the known consequences and 
confront the fact of his suffering. The double meaning of 
the word undermines this advice, for the apprehension of 
agony means not only recognising it, but also fearfully 
anticipating it. Prometheus does foresee his suffering, but 
ignores his fear; he refuses to be "prudent." 
Aeschylus presents femininity as the epitome of the 
weakness rejected by Prometheus. While Barrett retains the 
connection between femininity and fearful supplication, the 
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derogatory connotations are modified. Instead of the 
pejorative adjective "womanish," Barrett uses "shall prove a 
woman" in the first and "struck ... to a woman's mind" in her 
second translation and, in both versions, "feminine 
upliftings of mine hands." The sense of "aping" women is 
removed entirely. Further, what Weir Smyth translates as 
"terror" of Zeus is "loath[ing)" in both of Barrett's 
translations, connoting a scorn and disgust as well as fear, 
and reducing the sense of cowardliness connected with women. 
The same occurs earlier in the drama where Strength 
criticises Vulcan for his compassion, for "play[ing) the 
woman," as Weir Smyth has it (v.79). In fact, Barrett's 
translations are more accurate, avoiding the Greek's 
possible (but not necessary) connotations of effeminacy: "Be 
soft and tender" (1833:20) and "Be thou gentle and tender" 
(1850:142). 
The consistencies which do exist between the two 
translations, particularly in relation to Aeschylus's 
presentation of the feminine, suggest that Barrett had not 
rejected the ideas of her early work. As her letters reveal, 
she continues to be concerned that Prometheus is more a hero 
than a martyr. It is important to Barrett that Prometheus 
sinned knowingly, rather than being the innocent victim of 
Zeus's cruelty. 
There is a character in the drama who suffers 
undeservedly, and her treatment in the translations reveals 
more about Barrett's perception of women in relation to 
heroism; it is not quite as simple as Prometheus's refusal 
to be like a woman suggests. This character is Io. 
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In the preface, Barrett remarks that readers of 
Aeschylus are "impatient at Io's long narrations" (8), only 
wanting to hear Prometheus speak. Nonetheless, some of the 
changes she makes to the presentation of the character 
suggest that Barrett sees Io as more than a tedious 
digression. Io is both the helpless and innocent victim of 
divine tyranny, and the source of its downfall. She is a 
feminised reflection of Prometheus, but a conventionally 
feminised one (if Pandora is a "female" one): Io's power is 
unwitting, her suffering martyrdom rather than heroism. 
As I have suggested, Io's transformation into a cow is 
significant: Zeus desires her female body and she becomes a 
creature that seems to epitomise female reproduction. This 
is important in relation to fire as language and culture, 
for her transformation does not affect only her body. While 
she does not become an inarticulate animal, Aeschylus 
emphasises that the change is not just physical. Her 
restoration to normality is described as returning her to 
her "senses" (v.849), and Barrett translates this in both 
versions as Zeus's giving back to Io her "perfect mind." 
Zeus's view of Io as an object of desire has been 
instrumental in the loss of that mind. Her final speech 
expands on the effect of her punishment (Appendix 3). 
The speech begins with a cry of anguish, translated by 
Barrett at first as "Ah me," then as "Eleleu," which is a 
direct transliteration from the Greek and in English is less 
recognizable as being coherently verbal. Io first bemoans 
her pain, which is as much mental as physical. In her first 
translation, Barrett differentiates between these as 
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"gangrene and insanity," drawing them together in the second 
by using the idea of burning found in the original, calling 
the "insanity" "fire on the brain." The connection of fire 
with her suffering seems to be emphasised by Barrett. 
Further, the gad-fly's sting is in Weir Smyth's translation 
"unforged by fire" (the Greek word means "fireless"), 
whereas Barrett reads it as ''fiery sting" in the first and 
the "sting of the curse, all aflame as it flew" in the 
second, not only connecting the pain with Zeus's punitive 
use of fire, but expanding the sense of "sting" from the 
literal, that of the fly, to all the suffering caused by the 
curse. (Significantly, the word that means "gad-fly'' in 
Greek can also have the figurative meaning of insane and 
tragic passion or desire.) 
Io then describes the effect of the pain: her beating 
heart, rolling eyes and staggering steps, which are 
translated similarly in both of Barrett's versions, and she 
tells of loss of mastery over language, how her words have 
become violent, disordered and useless. The effect of Zeus's 
punishment is the collapse, implicitly brought about by his 
use of fire, of the rational use of language given to 
mortals by Prometheus. 
The descriptions of Io's physical changes are also 
revealing. In the first translation, Barrett has her tell of 
"the corruption of my human form" by Zeus's "tempesting" 
(v.640). This is expanded in the second to 
speaking of the storm-curse sent from Zeus, 
And of my beauty, from which height it took 
Its swoop on me, poor wretch! left thus deformed 
And monstrous to your eyes. (v.642ff. 1850:152) 
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The idea is introduced of Io's prior beauty, her deformity 
is associated with monstrosity, and Barrett mentions the 
eyes which are necessary to distinguish both: seeing is that 
which recognizes the beautiful or the monstrous. This 
creates explicit connections between Io and the monsters 
mentioned by Prometheus in his description of her travels, 
in particular the Phorcides and the Gorgons. There are three 
of each, and all are female and appallingly ugly. The 
Phorcides are 
ancient maidens« .. with shape of swan, 
One tooth between them, and one common eye, 
on whom the sun doth never look at all 
With all his rays, nor evermore the moon, 
When she looks through the night. 
(vv.794-6, trans. EB 1850:155) 
The Gorgons have snakes for hair and looking at them is 
deadly: "no mortal gazes in their face, / And gazing can 
breathe on" (ibid.). 
In a note to this speech in her first translation, 
Barrett discusses the Greek use of the word "dogs" to refer 
to monsters, listing a number of examples. The list reveals 
her awareness of an ironic connection between women and 
monsters: 
In this place griffins are called dogs; a little 
further on ... eagles are called dogs; ... in 
Apollonius Rhodius, the Harpies are called dogs; 
in the Andromache of Euripides, (what a climax!) a 
woman is called a dog; and Synesius goes a step 
higher, and calls the Devil a dog. (62 n.21) 
Barrett herself chooses to include the woman in her list of 
monsters, and selects its position, only "a step" below "the 
Devil." 
As Io's description of her transformation reveals, the 
other side of the female is also emphasised in the second 
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translation: Barrett uses the word "beauty" a number of 
times. In his foretelling of Io's future, Prometheus 
describes fifty women, Io's descendents, who murder the 
cousins who marry them against their will. The. men are 
destroyed by what Barrett calls, in' the second translation, 
a "curse betwixt that beauty and their desire"; they are 
"overcome / In murtherous woman-war, by fierce red hands / 
Kept savage by the night" (v.853ff, 1850:156). The use of 
"beauty" suggests comparisons between Io and the women; 
unlike her they succeed in destroying those who lust 
violently after them. At the same time, though, one of the 
fifty spares her husband and it is she, the one who 
acquiesces out of love, who is the ancestor of Herakles. The 
· murdering women are "savage" and have unnaturally red bloody 
hands; their beauty, or more specifically, masculine desire 
for it, as in Io's case, leads to a kind of monstrosity. 
This echoes Barrett's own fear of being seen as desirable: 
for her, the recognition of female sexuality is what reduces 
all women to objects of masculine desire, and makes women 
writers into monsters. 
It is paradoxical then that despite the ambivalence she 
connects with female beauty in the second translation, and 
' despite her stated greater interest in the male protagonist 
rather than in the implications of the female, Barrett does 
show some evidence that .she is translating not as an 
"unsex'd," neutral writer, but with the consciousness of 
being a woman. In a number of places; especially in the 
second translation, she introduces terms referring to the 
female body which are not found in the original. A 
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pa~ticularly vivid example is the description of the 
Colchian maidens, translated quite faithfully to the Greek, 
in the first, as those "who untrembling stand / In war" 
(vv.415-6, 1833:32). This is expanded into "the maids ... Who 
with white, calm bosoms, stand / In the battle's roar" (1850 
:148) . 15 
Further, precious metals are described in the first 
translation as being found under the "bosom of the earth" 
(1833:34). This description is significant in that it 
empha~ises the relationship of Prometheus with Themis, the 
earth goddess, his mother: the source of most of his power 
is female. These additions are not limited to either one of 
the translations; in the second, "all-fost'ring earth" 
(1833:20) becomes "Earth, mother of us all" (1850:142). 
Barrett's presentation of the female, particularly in 
the second translation, typifies the ambivalence which 
characterises so much of her work, an ambivalence revealed 
clearly by a comparison of her two translations. The second 
does appear to reduce slightly the defiance and 
rebelliousness of Prometheus, particularly by adding 
Christian connotations, supporting, to this extent, 
Barrett's intention, presaged by ambiguities in the preface, 
to move.away from the daring of the Greeks who "wrote 
antecedently to rules" and towards the inspiratio!l of 
Victorian life and values. But the language of the second 
translation contradicts this apparent rejection of the bold 
and audacious poet she aspires to be even as early as-her 
autobiography. Despite its "Victorian" appearance, ~ith 
increased use of archaisms and censoring of implicitly 
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sexual references, for instance, the second translation is 
also characterised, as the above comparisons reveal, by a 
far more adventurous use of language . 16 At times in the 
second translation, Barrett makes changes which appear to 
contradict Aeschylus's text; she takes liberties with his 
language, playing with it. In faithfully reproducing the 
irregularities bf Aeschylus's writing, she creates new 
irregularities which take this fidelity to its logical 
conclusion: she finds power over his voice and "makes it 
writhe" (preface, 6). 
In the second translation, Barrett makes use of the 
space she had left for herself in her note to the first: the 
translator need not be a speculator, but she can be one. Her 
ambivalence about defiance and her possible fear of 
punishment do not lead her to produce a timid and faithful 
reproduction of Aeschylus, in "expiation of her sin," but 
rather a deceptive re-creation. 
Perhaps her dismissal of Io, in the preface, as less 
interesting than Prometheus is connected with her refusal to 
admit to her own womanhood: of course she would rather 
identify with the hero than with the innocent feminine 
creature cursed not for her courage and ambition but for her 
physiology. In the "speculum" of her second translation, the 
introduction of the links between masculine desire and 
feminine beauty/monstrosity supports this: the connections 
between Io's bovineness and the unsightly grotesqueness of 
the Gorgons were made just before the long period in her 
correspondence with Browning when she would not allow him to 
see her. 
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Over the period of this correspondence, the issues of 
sight and blindness become increasingly complex. Not only 
does Barrett want to remain unseen, but she also chooses not 
to see. She must take on the "blind hope" which enabled 
mortals to use culture and create in the face of their own 
mortality. Her resolve fails at times, as the ambivalence of 
both works attest. 
But there is one more significant reference to sight 
in Barrett's letters to Browning, one which reveals the 
changes which followed the second translation. Both versions 
were written while she lived at home, unseen, as the poet 
who could pretend not to be a woman. Until she left her 
father, she could dismiss Io as less interesting than 
Prometheus; before the woman is seen, she is neither 
beautiful nor monstrous. 
Prometheus was not blind, but acted in the knowledge of 
retribution, "sinning willingly." To be a true "female 
Prometheus" she had to do the same, actively "taking up" 
that blindness and risking bruising herself on the window, 
as she puts it in her letter to Browning. Her fear of doing 
so blinds her in another way: 
You seem to have drunken of the cup of life full, 
with the sun shining on it. I have lived only 
inwardly .... I turned to thinking ... that I had 
stood blind in this temple I was about to 
leave ••.. Why, if I live on and yet do not escape 
from this seclusion, do you not perceive that I 
labour under signal disadvantages - that I am, in 
a manner, as a blind poet? (EB to RB, 20 March 
1845, 1:43-4, her emphasis) 
This blindness is not courageous determination to be.unmoved 
by the.anticipation of punishment, but a weakness, which is 
connected as much with not being seen as with not seeing. 
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Barrett continues, "how willingly I would as a poet exchange 
some of this lumbering, helpless knowledge of books, for 
some experience of life and man, for some ... " (ibid., her 
ellipsis). She breaks off, unable to conceive in language of 
what exactly is missing. But perhaps implicit is that she 
desires experience not just "as a poet," but also, for the 
first time, as a woman. 
Whatever the case, eighteen months later she defied her 
father and left her seclusion. The most important work she 
wrote after marrying Robert Browning was her hybrid novel-
poem, Aurora Leigh. The work is as much the product of 
ambivalence as the translations, but is, despite - or 
peihaps because of - this, a significant explor~tion of the 
identity of a woman writer, a "female Prometheus." 
WORKING WITH FIRE: AURORA LEIGH 
... I felt it in me where it burnt, 
Like those hot fire-seeds of creation held 
In Jove's clenched palm before the worlds were 
sown, -
But I - I was not Juno even! my hand 
Was shut in weak convulsion, woman's ill, 
And when I yearned to loose a finger - lo, 
The nerve revel ted. 'T is the same even now:-
This hand may never, haply, open large, 
Before the spark is quenched, or the palm charred, 
To prove the power not else than by the pain. 
Aurora Leigh III:251-260. 
Aurora Leigh is both a woman and a writer. In the course of 
Barrett Browning's ~oem, Aurora experiences the stages of 
her author's career: she is popular "lady poetess," a 
168 
serious and isolated_artist, and finally a woman who is 
married, and writing. Barrett Browning identifies Aurora 
with Prometheus and, in doing so, rewrites both the myth and 
hers~lf. Aurora Leigh, as a "female Prometheus," is both the 
subject and the progeny of Barrett Browning's re-creation of 
her own life. 
After completing her second translation of Prometheus 
Bound, Barrett told Robert Browning that she planned a new 
work, but did not yet have a story for it, wanting to make 
her own story so that she could "take liberties with [it] in 
the treatment" (EB to RB, 27 February 1845, 1:32). She did 
not realise that she had been working on one part of the 
story, which was Aeschylus's, and that she had already twice 
"taken liberties" with it in the process of making it her 
own. The other was_the story of her own life, and she was 
about to enact its climactic escape and resolution. Aurora 
Leigh is the product of both forms of re-creation, the 
figurative translation of the myth and the transformation of 
Barrett Browning's own 1 if e' in her writing. 
In the above lines, Aurora describes "the heart" of her 
poetry at the moment she decides to change her writing, to 
start producing work that is not the writing expected of 
conventional women poets, which she calls "play[ing) at art" 
(III:240). This "play" produces lifeless poems which, if 
ripped up, would leave "no blood upon the rapier's point" 
(III:246). 
By contrast, she perceives the art she wants to produce 
as the result of serious and agonised labour; it burns and 
bleeds. Her description of it as "fire-seeds of creation" 
169 
conflates the most significant aspects of Promethean fire. 
The tenor of her metaphor is poetry, the cultural fire given 
by Prometheus to mortals in Aeschylus's version of the myth, 
figurative creativity. The vehicle is fire, specifically as 
the source of life, in this case given by Jove, but echoing 
Prometheus's use of it in Ovid, the figuration of fire as 
the source of literal creativity. The trope thus draws 
together the uses of fire which culture sets in conflict, 
the literal component of the metaphor refers to figurative 
creativity, and vice versa. But Aurora does not at first 
seem to.recognise the implications of this union. 
The two points of similarity used to connect fire and 
writing here are power and pain. Aurora Leigh describes 
herself as weaker than the god - and the god's wife - but 
paradoxically makes this weakness, her "woman's ill," the 
source of her ability to hold the fire. She says she does 
not have the strength to open her fist, clenched like that 
of Zeus, containing within it the seeds of both figurative 
and literal creation. Her metaphor is ambiguous: likening 
her ability to hold fire to that of Zeus, she nonetheless 
attributes that ability to feminine weakness. She holds in 
her weak hand the power and the seemingly inseparable pain 
of fire that creates both art and life. Emphasising her 
inability to let go suggests a desire to escape the 
responsibility of grasping fire. 
Her words also s~ggest complete acceptance of the pain; 
where before she had "yearned to loose a finger," she now 
says her hand may never haply open - with luck, she will be 
able to hold onto the fire forever. At the same time, there 
170 
is a danger that doing so will put the fire out as well as 
burn her hand. Further, the contrast between the god's 
"clenched palm" and a woman's hand opened "large" casts 
ambivalence on the metaphor. The fist is that of Zeus, the 
enemy of Prometheus. The pain comes from holding fire too 
tightly, keeping its power to oneself, as Frankenstein had 
tried to do. Prometheus gave his stolen fire away; his hands 
were open. The metaphor, then, reveals flaws in Aurora's 
perception of her identity as a writer. 
Aurora has discarded "playing" at writing for work, 
even if she must be a martyr to her art. Barrett Browning 
had done the same, denying herself an existence beyond her 
written one, and had learnt the limitations of vision such 
egotism leads to. (Aurora's voluntary isolation echoes 
Barrett's concealment, and seems to exculpate, at least to 
some extent, Edward Barrett from imprisoning his daughter. 
As I shall show, Aurora Leigh significantly reviews the 
poet's parents.) Barrett Browning undermines the apparently 
Promethean determination of her heroine by implying its 
limitations. The poem traces Aurora's growth: her 
determination to be a writer makes her deny the female 
altogether, and blinds her to the fertile possibilities her 
woman's hand can give the fire. Barrett Browning makes 
Aurora learn what she herself had had to discover. 
Elizabeth Barrett left the seclusion of her father's 
home and married Robert Browning, irreversibly confronting 
her identity as a woman. Forster describes the enormous 
changes in the conditions of her life_(l988:197-8). Suddenly 
she was no longer "blind," but experiencing what in her 
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earlier letter to Browning she had not even been able to 
find the words for. Forster tells how once, "at a very cold 
inn near Bologna, she was triumphant because she managed to 
lay and light a fire" (1988:247). In 1849, after two 
miscarriages, she gave birth to a child (becoming what her 
husband termed "offensively maternal" [Forster 1988:240]). 
She was forty-three and married, yet her position 
nonetheless echoes that of Shelley at the time of producing 
her own children and most hybrid writing. For in these 
circumstances Barrett Browning wrote the audacious new work 
she had been planning for so long. 
Aurora Leigh is not a faithful reproduction of Barrett 
Browning's life. She rewrites the story of her childhood: 
both Aurora's parents die early, her mother when she is 
four, her father, the poem implies, at the moment of 
menarche, as her body asserts itself for the first time as 
that of a woman. Kaplan calls the death of Aurora's father 
the "providential" removal of the "potent and potentially 
taboo love object" (1986:202). Barrett Browning saves Aurora 
the ambivalence she herself appears to have experienced 
about her parents, for Aurora does not watch her mother 
become what she does not want to be, and she does not have 
to escape her father's love. Identification with the mother 
and desire for the father are both circumvented. Aurora 
emerges as "the most successful and self-contained orphan in 
Victorian fiction" (Kaplan 1986:209). The success of her 
self-containment, however, is no~ unambiguous. 
Aurora's father introduces her to the classics and 
initiates her writing, while her mother embodies and 
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expresses the literal language which Aurora turns away from 
at an early age. It is the loss of this devalued language 
that haunts her development. Barrett Browning's description 
of Aurora's mother includes a reference to the kind of 
speech Homans describes as the literal, the presymbolic 
language which the woman writer needs to rescue from its 
marginalised position in androcentric culture (Homans 
1986:17-18). "Women know," says Aurora, of 
... stringing pretty words that make no sense, 
And kissing full sense into empty words. (I:51-2) 
The "sense" of words which contain no symbolic meaning comes 
from the proximity Of the mother's body. Aurora loses that 
connection early (as Shelley did), and much of the pain she 
suffers in association with her writing comes from an 
unacknowledged yearning for some return to that fulfilment. 
What Aurora has to do is reconcile the two languages, the 
figurative and the literal. 
In the light of this, the terms in which Barrett 
Browning presents Zeus's punishment of her Prometheus are 
revealing. Aurora calls poetry 
... my life, 
My eagle, with both grappling feet still hot 
From Zeus's thunder, who hast ravished me 
Away from all the shepherds, sheep and dogs, 
And set me in the Olympian roar and round 
Of luminous faces for a cup-bearer, 
To keep the mouths of all the godheads moist .... 
(I:915-924) 
The myth is revised: writing is like the eagle, sent by Zeus 
to make the poet suffer, but whereas in the original myth it 
tears the liver from Prometheus's belly (in what has been 
seen as a cruel parody of childbirth, the Titan's punishment 
.for inventing literal creation (Hughes 1979:83]), Barrett 
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Browning's female Prometheus is "ravished," connecting the 
Promethean and the Ionian. The poet is not physically 
tortured by Zeus, but is implicitly desired, and the eagle 
carries her off, away from the pastoral world of mortals and 
sets her on Olympus, to be a servant to the gods. While the 
poet is not tortured by the eagle, her ravishment is by no 
means unambiguously positive: Zeus's punishment is modified 
but not removed. In fact, her poetry is the punishment; her 
success and her suffering, power and pain, are inseparable. 
The pain is related to her separation from normality: she is 
elevated above her own kind, but is reduced to a servant. 
Her success is ambiguous. 
Aurora's cousin, Romney Leigh, asks her to give up 
her poetry and marry him. The scene facilitates a detailed 
discussion about women and art. Misunderstanding her 
rejection of his proposal, Romney assumes she is simply 
being coquettish. He expresses conventional doubts about the 
value of women's writing. Barrett Browning uses-Aurora's 
replies to defend women writers at the same time as 
exploring the flaws in her own past denial of womanhood. 
Aurora's assertions, while valid, are subtly undercut by 
their extremism: 
You misconceive the question like a man, 
Who sees a woman as the complement 
Of his sex merely. You forget too much 
That every creature, female as the male, 
Stands single in responsible act and thought 
As also in birth and death. Whoever says 
To a loyal woman, 'Love and work with me,' 
Will get fair answers if the work and love, 
Being good themselves, are good for her - the best 
She was born for. 
I too have my vocation, - work to do .... 
(II:434-455) 
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Despite the confident feminist cast of the speech, Barrett 
Browning reveals that this philosophy is inadequate. Much of 
Aurora's suffering as a writer comes from her adherence to 
this belief without the recognition of its ·converse, that 
one need not "stand single" all the time. Like Frankenstein, 
she has to learn to temper her ambition with a sense of 
community and nurturing. At the same time, she must avoid 
being engulfed by the limitations which patriarchal culture 
attaches to those "feminine" values. She has to learn to 
share the fire given by Prometheus as a gift. To be a true 
"female Prometheus", the woman writer cannot work in neutral 
isolation. 
Aurora, h_aving rejected Romney, goes off alone and 
lives in her own Olympian roost, "a chamber up three flights 
of stairs / Not far from being as steep as some larks climb" 
(III:l58-9) .. Her rejection of her sex is evinced by her poor 
opinion of other women. Romney later points this out to her: 
... you sweep your sex 
With somewhat bitter gusts from where you live 
Above them, - whirling downward from your heights 
Your very own pine-cones, in a grand disdain ...• 
(VIII:202-205) 
This disdain is evinced by the terms Au~ora uses to express 
irritation with herself when depressed: 
Why what a pettish, petty thing I grow, -
A mere mere woman, a mere flaccid nerve, 
A kerchief left out all night in the rain, 
Turned soft so ... ! (III:36-9) 
Aurora's rejection of womanhood is presented as the 
source of her blindness, not the "blind hope" of courage but 
a narrowness of vision. Her misreading of Lady Waldemar is a 
result of this: Aurora is incapable of empathy. Lady 
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Waldemar comes to tell Aurora of her love for Romney and ask 
for her help; she is harshly rejected. Aurora tells her: "I 
understand ... imperfectly .... how the strange confession of 
your love / Serves this, I have to learn - I cannot see" 
(111:669-675). Aurora refuses, or simply fails, to 
understand a woman's love. She cannot see. 
Lady Waldemar reveals what it is that Aurora is blind 
to: "love's coarse, natur~'s coarse .... We fair fine ladies, 
we're natural still ... we have hearts within, /Warm, 
live, improvident, indecent hearts" (111:455-462). Aurora 
-cannot accept this apparent tarnishing of the ideal love she 
professes. She dismisses Lady Waldemar's.request· for help, 
telling her to "go to the opera! yo,ur love's curable" 
(III:709). Aurora has to learn that love for a real object 
differs from the hypothetical ideal. 
In her earnest attempts at masculine poetic 
achievement, Aurora, as Barrett Browning had, strives to be 
like a man. She describes her childhood education in Greek 
as putting on a "large/ Man's doublet" (1:727-8), and a 
number of times refers to herself in masculine terms. 
Demanding honesty of Romney, she says 
-You face, to-day, 
A man who wants instruction, mark me, not 
A woman who wants protection. As to a man, 
Show manhood, speak out plainly ...• (11:1061-4) 
She begins to sense, however, that she has lost something. 
Later she calls herself, as a woman who publishes, a 
woman who has lost her place 
(The sweet safe corner of the household fire 
Behind the heads of children) (V:806-8), 
saying that Lord Howe, whom she is addressing, must not 
flatter or compliment her, "(a]s if she were a woman" 
(V:809). She goes on, 
We who have clipt 
The curls before our eyes may see at least 
As plain as men do. Speak out, man to man; 
No compliments, beseech you. (V:809-12) 
This combination of defiant pride with a bitter sense of 
' loss reveals the ambivalence felt by the woman who still 
believes that to be a writer she must deny that she is a 
woman. The cut hair recalls Barrett's second sonnet to 
George sand, whose womanhood, despite her man's name and 
clothes, was still evinced by her "woman's hair, ... all 
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un·shorn" (Barrett 3 3 5) . Shorter hair, Aurora suggests, gives 
her the clearsightedness of the man, which relates to the 
poet's ability to see beyond what is safe, to look, perhaps, 
on monsters: 
I would be bold and bear 
To look into the swarthiest face of things, 
For God's sake who has made them. (VI:l47-9) 
But this vision does not remedy her blindness. Telling 
herself to "be humble," she repeats the ideas of Barrett 
Browning's sonnets to George Sand, yearning for the 
escapings [from nature] of ecstatic souls, 
Who, in a rush of too long prisoned flame, 
Their radiant faces upward, burn away 
This dark of the body .... (V:20-3) 
This longing for disembodiment, to be "unsex'd," is undercut 
by its juxtaposition with her description of the nature she 
would apparently like to escape. She uses the language of 
female desire, of the "indecent heart," of 
spring's delicious trouble in the ground, 
Tormented by the quickened blood of roots, . . . 
.•. with all that strain 
Of sexual passion, which devours the flesh 
In a sacrament of souls ... [and] mother's breasts 
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Which, round the new-made creatures hanging there, 
Throb luminous and harmonious like pure spheres ... 
(V:8-18) 
She struggles to separate "souls" and "purity" from the life 
of the body. Barrett Browning has her learn the dangers of 
being invisible and so blind, of denying her hybrid nature 
and the rich language that is connected with the devalued 
and denied part of her identity. She has to recognise that 
she is a ~oman as well as a writer.- It is in observing 
Marian Erle with her child, in confronting her own desire 
for literal creation, that Aurora begins to see. 
Barrett Browning uses the image of fire in relation to 
literal as well as figurative .creativity; but the literal 
here is not the mediated spark used by Ovid's Prometheus, 
or, for that matter, the "fire-seeds" of poetry. It is 
natural motherhood, with its implications of the 
presymbolic·, of meaning that transcends cultural 
signification. Aurora watches Marian with the baby, 
drawing from his countenance to hers 
A fainter red, as if she watched a flame 
And stood in it a-glow. (VI:609-611) 
Aurora does not understand motherhood. In her reproval of 
Marian - the baby is illegitimate, the product of rape - she 
takes the image of the child as warmth-giving ·fire and 
associates it instead with the·cruelty of a punitive and 
patriarchal god. 
" I would rather lay my hand, 
Were I [you], on God's brazen altar-bars 
Red-hot with burning sacrificial lambs, 
Than touch the sacred curls of such a child." 
[Marian] plunged her fingers in his clustering 
locks, · 
As one who would not be-afraid of fire .... 
(VI:620-5) 
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Barrett Browning's ironic distance from her heroine, 
which reveals and even exaggerates her own past blindness, 
makes it difficult to sympathise with Aurora. This is 
necessary, though, for it emphasises the dangerous 
illusoriness of Aurora's apparent success; as an independent 
woman writer, she seems to have transcended the limitations 
placed on Victorian woman. If this were the final .outcome of 
Aurora Leigh, it would be accepted as a rather unrealistic 
feminist poem. Instead, Barrett Browning demands more for 
her heroine. To avoid the limitations of femininity by 
rejecting womanhood is the early solution she had herself 
found, and ultimately rejected. When Aurora gives in and 
marries Romney, what appears to be a retraction is in fact a 
step forward. She does not, in recognising her sexual and 
maternal desires, have to relinquish her writing. What 
Barrett Browning suggests instead is that to.realise her 
full potential as a woman writer, it is imperative for 
Aurora to learn Marian's fearlessness in grasping the fire 
of literal creativity. 
Aurora's growing awareness of her lack culminates in a 
crisis on her return to Italy, her mother's country. Here, 
in the scorching light and heat of Tuscany, she admits her 
love for Romney and its implications. Significantly, her 
recognition is expressed in her association of herself with 
Io (VII:829-32). She likens the truth of her new book to the 
fly which tormented the cow-woman, and yearns for the end of 
her suffering, to be given peace by the impregnating "Hand" 
of the god (VII:830). Her longing is for the literal aspect 
of the "fire-seeds." 
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Aurora goes on to consider writing as a means of 
revealing the spiritual significance of creation, discussing 
art's power to make visible the wondrous (VII:837-863). For 
her, this perception is moral. Her logic leads her to see 
art as a way of making mari (specifically) reverence ~nd so 
purify what she herself perceives with a very, jaundiced eye: 
... his very body as a man -
Which now he counts so vile, that all the towns 
Make offal of their daughters for its use .... 
(VII:864-6) 
This, like her excessively moral view,of Marian, is now at 
odds with her growing awareness of desire. She decides that 
writing is not creation at all, but the transmission of 
God's word, and expresses the longing to speak - and so 
create - for herself: 
... if we say a true word, instantly 
we feel 'tis God's, .not ours, and pass it on 
Like bread at sacrament, ... 
And I - my poem, - let my readers talk. 
I'm closer to it - I can speak as well: 
Let us go. 
The end of woman (or of man, I think) 
Is not a book. (VII:87)-884) 
Instead, she desires love, shifting her earlier metaphor so 
that art is now the kindling, and not the fire: 
.•• Love strikes higher with his lambent flame 
Than Art can pile the faggots. (VII:893-4) 
Aurora concludes that the god's restoration of Io, making 
her at last "hushed and satisfied'', is based not ori "truth, 
but love" (VII:895-7). 
There is a danger here that Aurora could reject her art 
completely in submitting to her female nature. She has not 
yet done so, though: what she imagines is what Barrett must 
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have, before she dared to marry Browning. Aurora sees for 
the first time the other risk the woman writer has to take 
if she is to fulfil the potential of her hybridism, the 
danger that she will be "hushed and satisfied," willingly 
silenced. There is a chance that, if she opens her hand, the 
fire will disappear. 
The pain expressed in her words indicates the crisis of 
this moment,, the recognition that in her mother's land, in 
embracing the literal, lies the danger of desiring her own 
silencing. The excess of light, like the blinding light 
which can be the death of the moth, is hypnotic: 
... let drag your fiery fringes, heaven, 
And burn us up to quiet. Ah, we know 
Too much here, not to know what's best for peace; 
We have too much light here, not to want more fire 
To purify and end us. We talk, talk, . . . . . . 
Whereat we take our own life up and ... pshaw! 
(VII:906-13, second ellipsis in original)· 
The fire has itself become dangerous: purity, either in the 
rejection of womanhood, or in complete identification with 
reproductive nature, is potentially suicidal. 
But Aurora does not abandon language. She recovers from 
her despair and at once decides to write a letter to friends 
in England - to use her writing with an open hand, so to 
speak. She muses on her happiness in Florence, with its 
"native air and tongue" (VII:929); here, she is surrounded 
by the ele~ent and language of her mother. This recognition 
of an alternative language culminates in her use of the 
literal words of Marian's child in her writing. Her 
despondent rejection of art in favour of love has almost 
immediately been transformed into a means of carrying the 
language of that love, of community and nurturing, and 
particularly of the maternal, into her writing: 
The little creature almost loves me now, 
And calls my name, "Alola," stripping off 
The ~'s like thorns, to make it smooth enough 
To take betw~en his dainty, milk-fed lips .... 
(VII:953-6) 
Her name has become an object, taken, like the mother's 
breast, into the child's mouth. ·she is learning about the 
literal, about the language inseparable from the body. 11 
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Immediately after this, she admits that the only source 
of her unhappiness is her yearning for Romney. She repeats 
his name three times; tasting it, perhaps, as the child had 
tasted hers. From this.point, it is only a matter of the 
complexities of plot before Aurora can, as Barrett Browning 
had done, actively join the literal to the figurative. 
But Romney has to learn to let her write. He is the 
second Prometheus in Aurora Leigh, and he is punished for 
his ambition. His Promethean authadia is-not in creation, 
but in championing mankind, yet he misreads and distorts the 
values of nurturing in the same way as Frankenstein had 
distorted literal motherhood. Romney is a philanthropist, 
and there are echoes of the Aeschylean Prometheus in his 
defiance of God on behalf of men: II I sympathise with m~n, 
not God" (54). 
Romney is a follower of the French socialist Charles 
Fourier, whose utopian ideal was to reorganize society into 
. / . 
small communities called phalanges. Romney is converting the 
ancestral home, Leigh Hall, into a phalanstery when it burns 
down. As well as destroying his work and the ambition which 
produced it, the fire blinds him. 
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He describes the fire t.o Aurora, recalling his change 
of heart as he tries to rescue the burning building: 
The sudden revulsion in the blazing house 
The strain and struggle both of body and soul, 
Which left fire running in my veins for blood, 
Scarce lacked that thunderbolt of the falling beam 
Which nicked me on the forehead as I passed 
The gallery-door with a burden. (IX:543~8) 
He then describes his new condition: 
When the fever's heat 
Dropped from me, as the flame did from my house, 
And left me ruined like it, ... 
A mere bare blind stone in the blaze of day, 
A man, upon the outside of the earth, 
As dark as ten feet under .... (IX:566-572) 
Not only is the fire described in terms which echo the 
thunderbolts of Zeus, but Romney is left in darkness which 
is likened to being buried under the earth. At the end of 
Prometheus Bound, the Titan is flung down into the darkness 
of Tartarus. Further, Romney's punishment bears even closer 
similarities to Zeus's punishment of Typhon, struck by the 
"headlong thunderbolt out-breathing fire" and left, "his 
strength/ ... thunder-blasted from him ... /Compressed 
underneath Mount Aetna's roots" (vv.361-7. Trans. EB 
1833:30). 
The blinding of Romney is what makes possible Aurora's 
escape from blindness. As in Frankenstein, the blind man is 
not a threat to the monster, or to the woman writer. Romney, 
no longer using the gaze of oculo/phallocentric culture, is 
able to recognise a kind of nurturing different from his 
egocentric and finally selfish altruism, and to correct his 
earlier dismissal of Aurora's writing. While he is 
recovering, Lady Waldemar reads Aurora's book to him. The 
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writer is invisible (because she is absent and he is blind); 
she is recognised as speaking/ writing subject, for she can 
never be the object of his gaze, and so becomes the object 
of a different kind of desire. Barrett Browning reflects and 
reverses Robert Browning's perception of herself: he had 
loved her writing, blind to her womanhood in any but the 
figurative sense, before meeting her. Romney indicates his 
new perception of Aurora in the way he names her, 
recognising both her independence and her vocation: she is 
11 0 poet" first, 11 0 my love" second (IX:900, my emphasis). 
For Aurora it is significant that she can be both 
"poet" and Romney's "love." Lady Waldemar is instrumental in 
Aurora's final recognition of her love for Romney. He brings 
Aurora a letter, in which Lady Waldemar responds to Aurora's 
misguided censure of her for preventing Romney's marriage to 
Marian. She corrects Aurora~s misperceptions, her final "I 
hate, hate, hate you" exposing the pain which that self-
righteous blindness had caused (IX:l66). 
It is interesting that Lady Waldemar, as the instrument 
of both Aurora and Romney's education in perception, is only 
partially redeemed at the end of the poem. There is no 
suggestion of a happy resolution to her sad story of 
unrequited love. She is revealed to have been less wicked 
than Aurora thought her but, her work done, she is 
forgotten. Visiting Aurora, Lady Waldemar calls Romney "a 
monster'' (III:511). His "godlike virtues and heroic aims", 
she points out, are joined with "limping possibilities of 
mismade human nature" (III:521-3). This recognition of his 
hybridism, however, is not the basis of her love, and does 
184 
not suggest admiration for his deliberately Titanic attempts 
at helping the poor. She correctly predicts disaster (he 
"limps / So certainly, he'll fall into the pit" [111:'531-
2]), but attributes it not so much to Romney's ambition as 
to his interest in what she perceives as beneath him. The 
"pit" she warns against is not the punishment of a hero, but 
marriage to a working class girl ("of doubtful life, 
undoubtful birth,/ ... [whose] coarse-grained hands/ are 
whiter than her morals" [111:535-7]). This "unequal union," 
unlike that between Aeschylus's voice and her own discussed 
by Barrett in her translator's preface, is treated 
ambiguously. Lady Waldemar objects.to this intenc~ed "tie / 
'Twixt class and class" (111:661-2). Aurora supports it. 
Barrett Browning seems ambivalent: Marian, fortunately for 
Aurora, declines Romney's offer to marry her at the end of 
the poem. Lady Waldemar's aversion to the hybrid, then, is 
social. Perhaps this explains her abandonment at the end of 
the poem: she reveals the truth to Aurora, but she is a 
flawed teacher, representing a class pride that is as 
dangerous as Romney's arrogance. 
There is another mention of .the monstrous in Aurora 
Leigh. A woman is implicated in arranging the rape of 
Marian. She is described as the epitome of evil, a "Devil's 
daughter" (Vl:ll75). Her evil is carefully distinguished 
from the monstrous, though. Marian emphasises that she was: 
A woman ... hear me, let me make it plain, ... 
A woman •.. not a monster ... both her breasts 
Made right to suckle babes .... (Vl:1182-4, 
ellipses in original) 
For Marian, the woman's evil is increasea by the fact that 
/ 
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she is natural and female, rather than abnormal. As a child, 
Marian had almost been sold to a man by her own mother; on 
running away, she had cried "God, free me from my mother" 
(III:l062). She describes the woman's involvement in her 
rape as a "motherly, right damnable good turn" (VII:lO). 
What Barrett Browning seems to suggest is that the test of 
monstrousness is motherhood: the woman who does not devote 
her entire body, or being, to literal creativity is a 
monster. Natural mothers can be evil, however and, following 
logically from this, a monster need not be. 
In accepting her identity as a woman and a writer, 
then, Aurora takes on a hybridism like that of 
Frankenstein's monster, the "half-man" who threatens the 
foundations of the structures which made it necessary for 
her to choose between writing and being a woman in the first 
place. Romney's punishment is a retrospective warning to 
her, symbolising her own isolated lack of vision. Romney 
expresses gratitude for his blindness: "Thank God, who made 
me blind, to make me see!" (IX:830). Both of them have 
learnt that there is more than one kind of blindness. 
In accepting her dual role, Aurora has also learnt to 
be "seen" for what she is. Before her escape, Elizabeth 
Barrett prayed that Robert Browning would never see her 
clearly, would always be blinded by love for her. As 
-
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, she has Aurora say to her blind 
husband "I would that you could see me bare to the soul!" 
(IX.704). It is paradoxical that only the impossibility of 
being seen can make her want to be seen, but the paradox 
lies deeper than Barrett Browning's narrative: it is only in 
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first undermining the domination of the eye of patriarchal 
culture that the woman writer can work within it, combining 
the figurative with the literal which culture sees as 
inferi·or. 
Aurora Leigh, then, is Elizabeth Barrett Browning's re-
creation of her own life, the product of her final 
achievement, of seizing her potential for literal creation 
and discovering that she would not lose hold of the 
figurative. 
Unlike Mary Shelley, Barrett began her Promethean 
venture with caution, apprehending the danger of heroism. 
The ambivalence of her translations reveal this. Finally, 
she was able to. translate the.Prometheus myth completely, 
carrying it into the realm of the female, creating and 
becoming a literalisation of what Alicia Ostriker calls the 
"female Prometheus." 
At the end of the poem, Aurora and Romney dedicate 
themselves to a life of love and work. There is a.sense in 
Aurora Leigh that part of the pain Aurora associates with 
her writing comes from her intensely serious view of having 
"work to do," of writing as something completely distinct 
from pleasure. Aurora learns, as Barrett had, that there is 
the potentialcfor pleasure in accepting the physical 
dimension of embodied language, ra.ther than maintaining the 
purity of "disincarnate spirits." 
The transgressive power of the monstrous is connected 
with the inversions of the carnivalesque, and it is here 
that the ambivalence of the woman writer truly comes to 
light. She has the Aeschylean Prometheus~s heroism in the 
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face of danger, but mixed with it is the earlier nature of 
the Titan: the trickster, the mischief-maker who delights in 
playing havoc with the staid order of Zeus. Danger is not 
the only implication '!f the phrase "playing with fire": 
this, too, can be taken literally. While the business of 
becoming "female Prometheuses" was, for the women writers of 
the nineteenth century, of mortal seriousness - and with 
good reason - the images and ideas that they carried, in 
open hands that nonetheless felt the scorching heat of both 
kinds of fire, were the "fire-seeds" that they pass~d on to 
future women writers, making it possible for them to take up 
fire and play with it. 
CONCLUSION 
PLAYING IN THE FLAMES 
All translation is ludic, before it is ethical. 
It turns into "play" the moment one moves out of 
the language of the original - the most serious 
play imaginable, since all knowledge hangs in the 
balance, or waits in the wings: the play of 
language with. language, and possibility with 
utterance. 
Ben Belitt (1978:42) 
There is another, reckless and joyful, side to the 
irrational and seemingly suicidal flight of the moth. 
Playing with fire is dangerous; it can also be pleasurable. 
There is a sense in Aurora Leigh that, in incorporating 
the child's mispronunciation - re-creation - of her name, 
Barrett Browning touches on the possibility of play, not the 
insincere and shallow "playing at art" which characterises 
her early writing, but something closer to the sweet 
nonsense talk, the maternal word games, which Aurora 
remembers of her mother. Patricia Y·aeger emphasises the 
necessity of pleasure in the project of women writers; her 
"honey- or language-mad" woman "consumes language playfully 
and with pleasure" (1988:75). The "works" she produces,. and 
the work she does, her offspring and their effect, are 
ideally permeated with a sense of delight in the taste of 
the language, and with taking fearless pleasure in 
transgression. This pleasure does not suggest that such 
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writing is in any way trivial. Its implications make it "the 
most serious play imaginable." 
Translation, the carrying across of languages, the 
shifting of structures, the potential re-creation of 
monsters, is a kind of play, in Belitt's terms. Rewriting 
Prometheus can take the form of carrying it over from myth 
to novel, from Greek to English, or from patriarchal culture 
into a re-created form of hybrid novel-poem bearing a hybrid 
woman-writer who in turn bears a literal-figurative child-
language-fire. All of these bring together not just 
languages, or symbolic systems, but what Belitt calls 
"possibility" and "utterance"; all engender.a freedom that, 
if words can be found for it, has the potential to be 
realised. 
George steiner writes usefully for the female 
·translator (pronouns notwithstanding). When translation is 
more than faithful reproduction, there is a possibility of 
what he calls 
'creative retransformation' [by which] the 
translator could propose, indeed enact an 
alternative development for his own language and 
culture .... (1975:339) · 
He continues: 
Here the hermeneutic of appropriation is meant not 
only to enrich the translator's native inheritance 
but to change it radically. Translation is made 
metamorphosis .... All tongues and literatures 
[and mythologies] are treated as a common store of 
being from which we may draw at will in order to 
countermand the errors, the lacunae of reality. 
(1975:341) 
In disregarding the rules with which patriarchal culture 
delimits the existence of both language and women, in 
carrying the fire of culture into the realm of the literal 
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language, the kind spoken with the body and understood by 
children - and forgotten by serious-minded grownups - the 
woman writer can begin to change language. The implications 
of such a change are vast. One might appropriate Steiner's 
words, and read his "our" as a feminine pronoun: "Ours is 
the ability, the need, to gainsay or 'un-say' the world, to 
image and speak it otherwise'' (1975:218). Or, as Ostriker 
put it, women writers have the capacity to, "subvert and 
transform the life and literature they inherit" and 
"redefin[e] ... both woman and culture" (1986:211). 
Frankenstein's monster avoids his author'~ revisions by 
escaping from the narrative she had put him in. The circles 
of masculine narrative that enclose his voice finally fail 
to entrap him; at the end of the novel he - and the part of 
Shelley that is him - runsoff into the darkness free from 
the limitations of patriarchal culture, bearing the 
potential to tell stories, to tell things as they are not -
but could be. 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning tells her own story. 
Translating Prometheus, she plays with the words of 
Aeschylus, shifting and altering them. From these seeds she 
creates a new story, which she both acts and writes. She 
gives birth to a child and creates Aurora Leigh. Fiction and 
biography, the figurative and the literal, become virtually 
inseparable. 
Perhaps there is a moment in the moth's flight towards 
the fire when it is no longer blinded by the light, but sees 
the charred bodies of other moths in the flames. Mary 
Shelley finally backed away from what she saw, but not 
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before creating from the stolen Promethean fire a new myth 
wh~ch was to become as archetypal, in a future she could not 
even imagine, as the Titan was in her time. Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning apprehended the likelihood of punishment 
earlier than Shelley did, but realised that the vision of 
danger is itself blinding and potentially crippling. 
Eventually she seized the flames of writing and womanhood 
and, by all accounts, found herself happy. 
Combining the figurative and the literal subverts the 
relationship between reality and language: the woman writer 
can rewrite the metaphor at the centre of the Promethean 
myth. She can say, if she likes, that fire need not burn. 
The human "female Prometheus," unlike Callosamia promethea, 
can choose to fly into the flame and, enlightened by its 
brightness, fly on, bearing it with her. 
The words "translation" and "metaphor" have the same 
etymology: both mean to carry som~thing to a new place. 18 
Mary Shelley and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, like 
Prometheus, carried the metaphor of fire. In translating 
one of the central myths of patriarchal culture, they bore 
language as Pandora bore her disruptive gifts - both 
figuratively in a cultural artefact, a jar or a poem, and 
literally in their female and maternal bodies into a new 
place. 
one of the missing parts of the Aeschylean trilogy is 
Prometheus Pyrophoros: the fire-bearer (Kerenyi 1962:67). In 
rewriting the existing versions, Barrett Browning and 
Shelley re-created the absent one. They bore fire, as a 
metaphor which itself bears a complex of connotations - both 
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literal/natural and figurative/cultural - into a place where 
that "and," the one between literal and figurative, natural 
and cultural, feminine and masculine, no longer divides, but 
connects. In re-writing the myth they created the 
possibility of a "fire" that need not burn·, one freed from 
connotations of punishment and pain, a "monster" that could 
signify a fecund potentiality rather than a loathsome 
aberration - and a returned mother. In carrying fire into a 
new place, they also brought the maternal back into play -
of the most productive kind - within , the.symbolic. The 
woman writer can translate into culture the archaic mother 
whose embrace we have all lost, the living mothers who 
created and procreated before them, and their own capacity 
.for being mothers of both kinds. The "female Prometheus" can 
make the union of "woman" and "writer" a joyous and doubly 
fertile one . 19 
In the 1970s, Margaret Atwood rewrote Shelley's myth in 
"Speeches for Dr Fr_ankenstein" (1976:64-69). She revisits 
the monster and the fire that he had taken with him, 
revealing the ongoing influence of the courageous "female 
Prometheuses" of more than a century before. 0 
The sparkling monster 
gambols there ahead, 
his mane electric: 
This is his true place. 
He dances in spirals on the ice, 
his clawed feet 
kindling shaggy fires. 
The creature, his arctic hackles 
bristling, spreads 
over the dark ceiling, 
his paws on the ·horizons, 
rolling the world like a snowball. 
(11.99-117) 
19-3 
The monster lights £ires where his feet touch the ground, 
and he ''glows" when he talks. He is incandescent, containing 
and radiating the heat and light of the stolen and liberated 
Promethean fire. Frankenstein considers "what equation" to 
"carve and seal in [his creature's] skull" (11.42-3). The 
monster, speaking the last line of the poem, denies the 
simple equations and binary oppositions of man's culture, 
even while speaking its words. (S)he takes the name and the 
language and makes them say something defiant and new: 
I will not come when you call. 
i 
NOTES 
THE REWRITING OF FIRE 
1. Ed. R~W.B.Browning, 1899. All references to the letters 
of Elizabeth Barrett and Robert Browning will be to this 
edition, and will take the form: date of postmark, volume 
number: page number. In subsequent references, I shall 
abbreviate the writers' names as 'EB' and 'RB' respectively. 
I shall reproduce quotations, including any idiosyncratic 
punctuation and emphases, exactly. Unless otherwise 
indicated, emphases are as in original; ellipses are mine. 
2~ ''Prometheus". The Oxford English Dictionary, vol.12. 
The dictionary specifies that the creature is called the 
promethea moth, using the feminine form of the titan's name. 
3. To quote Ostriker in full, a "major theme in feminist 
th~ory on both sides of the Atlantic for the.past decade has 
been the demand that women writers be, in Claudine 
Herrmann's phrase, voleuses de langue, thieves of language, 
female Prometheuses" (1986:210-1). 
4. Margaret Homans enumerates the strategies women writers 
can use to "literalize" the figurative while retaining their 
place as speakers within the symbolic. She refers to these 
practices as instances of "bearing the word," overtly 
connecting writing, the creation of texts, with childbirth, 
the literal creation of children (1986:29-32). · 
J~ne Gallop's discussion of the "duplicity" of wo~en's 
"double language" is useful in this context; she suggests 
that it is necessary for the woman both to "exercise power 
and criticize it," to draw the subversive literal into t.he 
sphere in which they. continue to write (1982:121-22). This 
argument will be expanded on in my second chapter. 
5. The problem of nomenclature serves to emphasise 
culture's construction around ·women's role as reproducers 
rather than creatorsw A woman has no name of her .own; she 
bears those of her father and her husband. Using her 
married name, then, leads to confusing her .with her husband, 
while her "maiden" name makes her indistinguishable from her 
father. The patronising use 9f her first name simply 
emphasises her cultural anonymity. 
Hence, I must refer to Shelley and Barrett Browning by 
the surnames under which their writing was published, as is 
the norm with all references to authorship. .In my 
discussion of Barrett Browning's early work, most of which 
was published before her marriage, I will simply use 
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"B.arrett." I shall identify their husbands by means of first 
names: Percy ~helley and Robert Browning .. 
6. Trans. Evelyn-White, 1914. All references to Works and 
Days are to this edition. 
7. I am indebted here to Kirk, who discusses Levi-Strauss's 
analysis of the role of fire in the parallel oppositions 
"nature/culture" and "raw/cooked" (1974:86). 
8. In both the English translations I use (Evelyn-White 
1914, Kirk 1974), the passage is syntactically ambiguous, 
with the possible meaning that mortals have speech taken 
from them. This.would be a fitting parallel to Zeus's· 
confiscation of ·fire. The original Greek, however, ls fess 
ambiguous; it is the "diseases," implicitly personified, 
which are silenced. 
9. It is now generally accepted that Aeschylus may well not 
have been the author of Prometheus Bound (Griffith 1977, 
Conacher 1982:141-174). T.his adds an interesting dimension 
to the drama's "theft" from its already .anonymous author.· 
For the purposes of this .study, however, it is expedient to 
retain the traditional assumption. 
10. Trans. Weir Smyth, 1922. All references to. Prometheus 
Bound, unless otherwise indicated, are to this edition. 
11. Trans. Innes, 1955. All references to Metamorphoses 
will be to this edition. 
12. Mary Poovey discusses the construction and.implications· 
of the difference between "The Proper Lady and the Woman 
Writer" (i984). 
13. "monster". Chambers English Dictionary. 1·989 ed. 
14. Earlier remarks reveal a ·male revulsion for any 
blurring of the-distinction between the feminine and the 
masculine, either physical or intellectual: 
Even nature herself abhors to see a woman shorn 
... ;a woman with cut hair is a filthy spectacle, 
and much like a monster; ..• for this is all 
one as if she should take upon her the form or 
person of a man 
William Prynne 1600-1669 
(in Morgan 1989:134), 
but 
A woman with a beard is not so disgusting as a 
~omart who acts a freethinker. 
John Caspar Lavater 1741-1801 
(in Morgan 1989:156) 
iii 
15. Io's deificati6n emphasises her innocence; as Isis, an 
Egyptian goddess~ she became the deity of a cult.of chastity 
which was widely adhered to. The Roma·n poet Propertius 
complains about her: 
·The rites are here again, the lover's bl{ght: 
Ten times has Cynthia worshipped night by night. 
Down with the cults of sultry Nile, the pest 
.That Isis sent to women of the west, 
To part _devoted lovers - still the same 
Ill-natured goddess, by whatever name. 
At least as Io, loved with stealth by Jove, 
·she learned, way-weary, what it is to rove, 
But Jove stripped off your beast-.mask, and thereby 
Made ·you, mayl;>e, so proud a deity. . · 
To serve you, are the Nile's swart sons too few? 
Why else was Rome, so distant, sought by you? 
Girls' sleep unpartnered -·do you profit so? 
Fierce one, be sure, your horns again will grow; 
............. ·-· 
But Cynthia! since my suffering now has been 
More than enough to mollify your sple~n, 
Having this.many a night drawn blank perforce 
Three times tonight let us complete the course. 
(Propertius II.33a, Trans. Watts 1966:116) 
Io remained, it seems, a source of (literal) power to women. 
16. George Thomson d~fines Prometheus as the "patron saint 
of the proletariat" (in Kott 1974:35). 
17 .. The source of "hybrid" is the "Latin hibrida, the 
offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar; with associations 
of the Greek hybris" (Chambers English Dictionary 1989). 
Although they do not make the point themselves, this 
porcine etymology is particularly apt for Stallybrass and 
White, who present the pig as a perfect example of 
transgressive hybridization (1986:44-59). 
18. Ed. Hindle, 1985. All page references to Frankenstein 
are to this edition. 
19. Susan Stanford Friedman, "Creativity and the Childbirth 
Metaphor: Gender Difference in Literary Discourse" (in-
Showalt~r, ed. 1989:7j-100). 
iv 
20. Mellor describes the influence of Wollstonecraft on her 
daughter's writing (1988:115,118,213) and, according to 




CREATION AND REMORSE: MARY SHELLEY 
1. Ellen Moers was probably the first to point out this 
aspect of the novel (1978:90-99). Waxman discusses 
Shelley's "recreat(ion] of the world of motherhood", closely 
comparing Frankenstein's experiences with those of the 
pregnant woman (1987:14-26). 
2. According to Gilbert and Gubar, despite the "maelstrom 
of sexuality" in which Shelley was involved when she first 
wrote the novel, it is very much "about Romanticism, ... 
about books and ... about the writers of books~' (1979:222). 
3. See "The Masculine Tradition" in Homans (1980:12-40). 
4. Anne K. Mellor quotes these entries, and others, to 
indicate the depth of Shelley's chronic depression 
(-1988a: 182-4). 
5. Poovey points this out; the reasons I suggest for the 
fact that "the monster's history receives the least 
attention in the 1831 revisions" are not quite the same as 
·oers (1984:137). 
6. See Poovey (1984:!'33-142) and Mellor (1988a:170-176). 
7. Mellor calls this, after Carol Gilligan, the "female 
'ethic of care'", which subsumes the individual ego to the 
communal good (i988b:229). 
8. The name of one of the female characters in a later 
novel of Shelley's, Valperga _(1823), is Euthanasia. As 
Mellor points out, as an educated, revolutionary and yet 
loving w6man, Euthanasi~ is a character who, in Shelley's 
experience, is doomed. Her drowning is "merciful" (Mellor 
1988a:210). Her name also indicates that she submits~ as a 
"proper lady" should, ·to a sweet,_or easy, death. 
9. "Travesty" seems to describe Frankenstsin's creative act 
particular~y well, to.the extent that he may be seen as 
appropriating female power~«its meanings is given as the 
"ridiculously inadequate representation" of ~the opposite 
sex" and its etymology is virtually identical to that of 
"transvestite" (Chambers). 
10. Poovey discusses Shelley's implicit criticism and 
transformation of "Percy's version of the Romantic 
aesthetic," exploring the reservations she must have had· 
about his ideas even while she allowed him to make changes 
to her work (1984:130). 
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11. I am indebted to Margaret Homans for pointing out that 
Frankenstein only seems to notice the creature's ugliness 
once it is alive (1986:103). 
12. Ed. Gill, 1984. All references to Wordsworth's poems · 
are to this edition. 
13. Throughout this study I follow Toril Mei's· 
differentiation between "female" as a biological term and 
"feminine" as a cultural one (1985:65). 
14. Poovey (1984:chapters 4 and 5) and Mellor 
(1988a:especially chapter 9), among others, explore this 
likelihood. · 
15. Friedman suggests, in her analysis of the chiidbirth 
metaphor, that Frankenstein's -creation is used to "express 
[Shelley's] essential fear that the patriarchal separation 
of creativities is necessary" (1989:87). It also seems 
important to distinguish between Shelley's attribution of 
the metaphor to Frankenstein as the male speaker of his 
narrative, and her own use of it as a female writer. 
16. According to the Quarterly Review, the reader of 
Frankenstein is left "after a struggle between laughter and 
loathing, in doubt whether the head or the heart of the 
author must be most diseased" (in Hindle 1985:7-8). The 
wording is unwittingly appropriate: the ambivalent response 
·of hilarity and disgust echoes strongly the effect of the 
carnivalesque grotesque, while the ambiguity found in the 
novel's "diseased" source reveals Shelley's hybridising of 
"head" with "heart", mind with body, making both appear 
abnormal. 
APPREHENSION AND ESCAPE: ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING 
' 
1. Ed. Elizabeth Berridge, 1974. All references to the 
diary will be to this edition, and in the form: date of 
entry, page number . 
. 2. Trans. Barrett 1833, Ed. Meynell 1896. 
vii 
References to Barrett's translations of Prometheus Bound 
will be indicated with her initials, the year of first , 
publication and page references. Line references are to the 
Greek, ·in Weir Smyth's 1922 parallel translation. 
3. Trans. Barrett 1850. Ed. Milford 1920. 
4. Kaplan discusses Besier's play and the "post-Freudian 
twist" he gave the Barretts' story (1986:192-3). 
5. I am indebted to Karlin for pointing out this, and the 
following quotation from Barrett's letters~ in a similar 
context (1985:71). 
6. Barrett's perceptions of her own body cannot even be 
guessed, but, as Stallybrass and White point out, the female 
body is frequently associated with the grotesque~ They quote 
Schnydet's case study of a,woman suffering from hysteria. 
Sha says: · 
When I looked at the shape of my body I was 
ashamed of being a woman .... I was humiliated 
being a woman and annoyed to feel anyone looking 
at me (1986:184). 
While not suggesting that Barrett was pathological,-this 
connection between shame and being seen, particularly as 
female, is revealing. 
v;;; 
7. A number of critics have commented on these sonnets. 
Elaine Showalter discusses Sand as "a heroine" for Barrett, 
"not because she had transcended femininity, but because she 
was involved in the turbulence of womanly suffering" 
(-1977:103). 
Dierdre David criticises the ''essentialism" that she 
finds in the sonnets for similar reasons, saying that the 
final 11 unsexing 11 suggests paradoxically that transcendence 
of gender polarities first requires "self-acknowledgement of 
one's essential being," in this case, femaleness (1987:149). 
It seems to me that Barrett was ambivalent about precisely 
this essentialism, as the simultaneous need for recognition 
and desire for transcendence suggests. The monstrosity 
Barrett associates with Sand has its source in this 
contradiction. 
8. Ed. Milford 1920. All page references to Barrett's 
poems, other than to Aurora Leigh, will be 'to this edition. 
9. All references to Aurora Leigh will be by book and line 
number. · 
10. Ed. Meynell 1896. All reference~ to the preface and 
notes of Barrett's 1833 translation are to this edition. 
11. Margaret Homans discusses the association of divine 
(and masculine) creativity with language, the figuration of 
literal creation, as found in Genesis and Milton's Paradise 
Lost (1980: 29-33). 
12. Interestingly, Byron's version of the myth captures 
both the power of Prometheus's silence and, in a way, Zeus's 
"impotence to lie." The speaker addresses Prometheus: 
... in thy silence was his sentence, 
And in his soul a vain repentance, 
And evil dread so ill dissembled, 
That in his hand the lightnings trembled. 
("Prometheus" -11. 30-3, ed. Allison 1983: 591) 
13. In Aurora Leigh, the story is used for ironic and ·comic 
effect; forced by her aunt to do embroidery, the poet gives 
her cross-stitched shepherdess pink eyes, and a 
... head uncrushed by that round weight of hat 
So strangely similar to the tortoise-shell 
Which slew the tragic poet. (I:453-5) 
14. This is not unlike Shelley's tempering of 
Frankenstein's heroism in her 1831 revisions; as Mellor puts 
it, Shelley makes her rewritten Prometheus "more ... a 
victim of circumstances than ... the active author of evil" 
(1988a:l74). Identifying with their Promethean characters, 
both Shelley and Barrett attempt to reduce their own 
culpability by questioning that of their heroes. 
15. Falk observes this, referring to Barrett's "associative 
imagery, linking breasts with female power" (1988:78). 
16. See Falk for examples of archaisms and Barrett's 
·"censoring" of Aeschylus ( 1988: 78). 
17. The language used by Barrett Browning's own child 
(nicknamed "Pen"!) is curiously appropriate here. Forster 
describes the late onset of speech: he "used gestures and 
touch to indicate what he wanted," and records Barrett 
Browning's note to Mrs Ogilvy that "he won't talk a bit" 
(1988:244). When Pen did begin to speak, the child revealed 
a very unusual linguistic education: 
[He had] added a smattering of French to his imperfect 
English and quaint Italian and the result was made even 
more bizarre because of the slight lisp which increased 
the puzzling effect of his peculiar mispronunciations 
in every language. Miss Mitford ..• had been outraged 
that the child was being brought up .•• in such 
linguistic confusion. Elizabeth was unperturbed. She 
thought it amusing that he dispensed with pronouns, as 
she herself had done as a child. It fascinated her to 
try and work out what Pen actually meant. (1988:259) 
This seemingly deliberate disruption of conventional 
language use is particularly interesting when coupled with 
the fact that Barrett Browning refused to socialise her son 
into male roles, dressing him ambiguously and refusing to 
cut his hair (Forster 1988: 238, 248, inter alia). 
ix 
18. Barbara Johnson makes use of this connection in "Gender 
and the Yale School" (in Showalter, ed. 1989:51). Johnson 
quotes Paul de Man's analysis of the words' parallel -
etymology: the German for "translation" is ubersetzen, which 
in Greek is meta phorein: metaphor. 
19. Writing in 1931, Virginia Woolf revises Griswold's term 
"hermaphroditic" in relation to women who write: "The 
androgynous mind is resonant and porous; ..• it transmits 
emotion without impediment; .•. it is naturally creative, 
incandescent and undivided" (48, my emphasis). The mind that 
conflates the poles of a binary opposition is .fiery and 
in.candescent: it glows. 
APPENDIX: PROMETHEUS BOUND 
1. 
CHORUS 
a. See now, my friend, how bootless was thy boon. 
Tell me, what succour for thee is there, and 
where, in creatures of a day? What aid? Didst 
thou not behold the helpless infirmity, no better 
than a dream, wherein the purblind generation of 
men is shackled? Never shall the counsels of 
mortal men transgress the ordering of Zeus. 
(vv.545-551) 
b. Lo! all thy gifts gave nought to thee! 
Where is thy help, beloved, say? 
What help from men who last a day? 
And dost thou not the weakness see, 
Slow, vision-like, by which is found 
The hood-wink'd race of mortals, bound? 
Man's counsefs ne'er can rise above · 
Th.e purposed fixedness of Jove. 
(Trans. EB 1833:36) 
c. Ah friend, behold and see! 
What's all the beauty of humanity? 
can it be fair? 
What's all the strength? - is it strong? 
And what hope can they bear, · 
These dying livers - living one day long? 
Ah, seest thou not, my friend, 
How feeble and slow 
And like a dream, doth go 
This poor blind manhood, drifted from its end? 
And how no mortal wranglings can ,confuse 
The harmony of Zeus? 






And art thou not a child and even more witless 
than a child if thou expectest to learn aught from 
me? There is no torment or device by which Zeus 
shall induce me to utter this until these 
injurious fetters be loosed. so then, let his 
blazing levin be hurled, and with the white wings 
of the snow and thunders of earthquake let him 
confound the reeling world. For ·naught of this 
shall bend my will even to tell at whose hands he 
is fated to be hurled from his sovereignty. 
HERMES: 
Look thee now whether this course seems to prof it 
thee. 
PROMETHEUS: 
Long ago hath this my course been foreseen and 
resolved. 
HERMES: 
Bend thy will, perverse fool, oh bend thy will at 
last to wisdom in face of thy present sufferings. 
PROMETHEUS: 
In vain thou troublest me, as though it were a 
wave thou wouldst pursuade. Never think that, 
through terror at the will of Zeus, I shall become 
womanish and, with hands upturned, aping woman's 
ways,· shall importune my greatly hated foe to 




No child thou art, but weaker than a child, 
If thou e~pect to gather aught from me. 
Nor is there chast'ning, nor device, whereby 
Jove shall constrain me to reveal.these things, 
Or ere he loosen my pernicious chains. 
Then let the torrid flame be headlong hurl'd: 
xi 
With white-wing'd snows and subterranean thunders, 
Let him commingle and astonish all. 
Nothing shall bend me, to declare by whom 
He will be hurled from dominion. 
c. 
HERMES: 
See now, if these things will avail thee aught. 
PROMETHEUS: 
They have been all foreseen, precounselled. 
HERMES: 
Endure, vain Titan, o, at last, endure 
To turn a prudent brow on present pain. 
PROMETHEUS: 
In vain thou chafest me with exhortation, 
xi i 
As waves the rock. Admit not in thy thought 
That I, fear-struck by Jove, shall prove a woman, 
And supplicate him, loathed as he is, 
With feminine upliftings of mine hands, 
To free me from these chains. Far be it from me! 
(Trans. EB 1833:52-3) 
PROMETHEUS: 
No·child~ forsooth, 
But yet more foolish than a foolish child, 
If thou expect that I should answer aught 
Thy Zeus can ask. No torture from his hand 
Nor any machination in the world 
Shall force mine utterance; ere he loose, himself, 
These cantankerous fetters from me! For the rest, 
Let him now hurl his blanching lightnings down, 
And with his white-winged snows and mutterings 
· deep 
Of subterranean thunders, mix all things, 
·confound them in disorder. None of this 
Shall bend my sturdy will, and make me speak 
The name of his dethroner who shall come. 
HERMES: 
Can this avail thee? Look to it! 
PROMETHEUS: 
. Long ago 
It was looked forward to - precounselled of . 
. HERMES: 
Vain god, take righteous courage! - dare for once 
To apprehend and front thine agonies 






Vainly dost thou chafe 
My soul with exhortation, as yonder sea 
Goes .beating on the rock. Oh! think no more 
'That I, fear-struck by Zeus to a woman's mind, 
Will supplicate him, loathed as he is, . 
With feminine upliftings of my hands, 
To break these chains. Far from me be the 
thought! 
(Trans. EB 1850:158-9) 
3. 
IO: 
Eleleu, Eleleu! Once again convulsive pain and 
frenzy, smiting my brain~ inflame me. I am stung 
by the gad-fly's barb, unforged by fire. My heart 
in terror knocks at my ribs; my eyeballs ·roll 
wildly round and round. I am.carried out.of my 
course by a fierce blast of madness; over my 
tongue I've lost all mastery; and a stream of 
turbid words beats recklessly against the billows 
of dark destruction. · 
(vv.877-886) 
Ah me! ah me! 
The gangrene and insanity 
Which striketh to my soul, are burning: 
The. fiery sting is pricking me; 
My throbbing heart my breast is spurning, 
·And round and round mine eyes are wheeling, 
And from their course my steps are reeling, 
By frenzy's blast·impellid to motion: 
My tongue is all without a chain, 
And beat my turbid words in vain 
'Gainst dreary Ate's ocean. 
(Trans. EB 1833:48) 
Eleleu, eleleu! 
How the spasm and the pain 
And the fire on the brain 
Strike, burning me thr9ugh! 
How the sting of the curse, all aflame.as it flew, 
xiii 
Pricks me onward again! 
How my heart, in its terror, is spurning my breast, 
And my ·eyes, like the wheels of a chariot, roll round! 
I am whirled from my course, to the east, to the west, 
In the whirlwind of frenzy all madly inwound -
And my mouth is unbridled for anguish and hate, 
· And my words beat in vain, in wild storms of unrest, 
on the sea of my desolate fate. 
(Trans. EB 1850:156) 
xiv 
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